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ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades, the impact of ownership structure and board composition on
managerial compensation and corporate performance has been a leading topic in the
finance literature. This topic remains relevant today, perhaps even more for emerging
economies when economic transformation and growth raise new issues regarding the
role of government. Does the government still considerably affect China’s listed firms;
are there any predictable effects of ultimate ownership on executive compensation or
firms’ economic performance?
First, this study examines the impact that ultimate ownership has on the CEO payperformance relationship via a sample of China’s listed firms. I used cash flow rights to
measure the positive incentive effects whilst excess control, the divergence between
control rights and cash flow rights, is used to measure the negative entrenchment effects.
I found that the cash flow rights negatively affect CEO pay level and positively affect
pay-performance relationship; while the excess control positively affects the level of
CEO pay and negatively affects the pay-performance relationship. I also found that
higher concentrated state-controlled firms have stronger CEO pay-performance relation
than those of lower concentrated state-controlled and non-state controlled firms. My
results further indicated that cash flow rights are almost double in state-controlled firms
than non state-controlled firms; while the excess control is only one third in statecontrolled than non-state controlled. I then showed that cash flow rights have strong
positive impact on pay-performance relationship in both state and non-state controlled
firms while excess control only has a negative impact on CEO pay-performance
relationship in state-controlled firms. I argue that the net results between cash flow
v

rights and excess control lead to higher CEO pay-performance relationship in statecontrolled firms than non state-controlled firms.
Second I examined the effect that independent directors of a board and independent
compensation committees have on CEO pay-performance relationship in China’s listed
firms. I found that firms with higher proportion of independent board directors have a
stronger positive CEO pay-performance relationship and this positive relationship only
exists when the firms have a compensation committee. For the sub-sample of firms with
a compensation committee, I showed that those firms with higher proportion of
independent board director have a stronger pay-performance relationship than those
with lower proportion of independent board directors. When any director in the
compensation committee is paid, the pay-performance relationship becomes weaker and
this negative impact is more evident when the proportion of independent board director
is higher. Furthermore, I found that CEO pay-performance relationship and the impact
of board independence on this relationship improved dramatically after a compensation
committee was formed. My results suggest there is a complementary relationship
between board independence and compensation committee/compensation committee
independence in enhancing pay-performance relationship because the compensation
committee, particularly an independent one, gives information to the directors and helps
them design relevant executive pay schemes.
Finally, I examined the impact of ownership structure on earnings management and true
firm performance (a firm performance adjusted for the effect of earnings management)
of listed firms in China and found that private shareholdings (the percentage of A share)
decrease earnings management significantly while state shareholdings increase it. I also
found there is a significant inversed U-shaped relationship between the largest
vi

shareholdings and earnings management. As a result, private shareholdings substantially
increase true firm performance while the state shareholdings decrease true firm
performance due to their effects on earnings management. Moreover, in response to the
inversed U-shaped relationship between the largest shareholdings and earnings
management, the association between the largest shareholdings and true firm
performance indicated a U-shaped relation.
Extant literature reveals mixed results on ultimate ownership, board composition and
CEO pay-performance relationship, which may be due to omitting key variables in
different contexts. This study, however, gives a new perspective to corporate
governance concerning ultimate ownership, board composition, and CEO payperformance relationship in China’s listed firms.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
China has been experienced rapid economic growth and reforms such as remodelling
many large former state-controlled firms towards Anglo-American corporate
governance structures while the state still remains the largest shareholder in most firms.
Chinese listed firms are normally controlled by the state (Li and Naughton, 2007), and
the controlling shareholders of most publicly traded Chinese firms are also state owners
(Claessens and Fan, 2002), which makes state ownership stay at the focus of corporate
governance research. In China’s institutional transition process, highly concentrated
state controlled firms receive considerable government support and are used to facilitate
institutional reform (see, e.g., Yiu et al., 2005), aiming at reaching better corporate
governance, especially in recent years. Moreover, in association with the reform of
ownership in China, the government also encourages the formation of large SOEs (state
owned enterprises) to fill the void in ownership arising from the sudden withdrawal of
direct control by the government (Li, 1997) and to make them world class competitors
who are able to stand on their own. Thus, managerial compensation is believed to be
more competitive in large state-controlled firms. There has been a recent increase in
issues related to CEO pay and the impact of ownership structure on CEO payperformance relationship. Does state ownership enhance CEO pay-performance
relationship in recent years? Will it make any difference for the CEO pay-performance
relationship if the ownership concentration is different in state-controlled firms?
Additionally, how would board characteristics affect CEO pay-performance relationship
1

in different ownership structure? Does the ownership structure also affect earnings
management, and if so, how would it change true firm performance when the reported
firm performance is deprived of the effects of earnings management? These are
important questions that have not been fully addressed in the literature.
First, in response to one of the two key determinants of levels of managerial
compensation and CEO pay-performance relationship in China’s listed firms, ultimate
controlling shareholders, this study investigated the impact of ultimate ownership on
CEO pay-performance relationship in China, where there is controlling state ownership
and relatively weak protection for minority investors. More specifically, the study
empirically examines how ultimate ownership such as state ownership interacts with the
level of managerial compensation and CEO pay-performance relationship. Except for
firms in economies with better shareholder protection, most firms, particularly in
emerging economies, are owned by the ultimate controlling shareholders (La Porta et al.,
1999) that are typically the state. It is claimed that these ultimate owners typically have
control rights in excess of their cash flow rights through the use of pyramids and
management participation. In terms of ultimate controlling ownership, two different
effects can be identified in existing literature, the positive incentive effect and the
negative entrenchment effect. Ultimate owners may strengthen CEO pay-performance
relationship when the positive incentive effects of ownership are strong. In this situation
ultimate owners would gain more from enhancing shareholder wealth than they would
gain in expropriation. But ultimate controlling owners may decouple the CEO payperformance link and then expropriate minority shareholders further when the negative
entrenchment effects of excess control outweigh the positive incentive effects of cash
flow ownership. In this case, the benefit for the ultimate owner from expropriation such
2

as tunnelling is greater than the benefits of maximising the wealth of shareholders.
Therefore, it is predicted that the positive incentive effect, measured as cash flow rights,
will negatively affect managerial pay levels while positively affecting CEO payperformance. However, excess control measured as the divergence between control
rights and cash flow rights, is expected to positively affect the CEO pay level and
negatively affect CEO pay-performance relationship. In terms of the important role
played by the state, I expect diverse positive and negative effects on CEO payperformance relationship when the ultimate owner is the state. Moreover, due to those
changes and reforms in China over last two decades, managerial compensation is
expected to be more competitive in state-controlled firms and hence a positive
significant CEO pay-performance is predicted in state-controlled firms.
Secondly, in order to investigate another one of the two key determinants of managerial
compensation levels and CEO pay-performance relationship, board composition, I
examined the effects of board characteristics such as the independence of the board and
the compensation committee/compensation committee independence on CEO payperformance relationship.
Board monitoring is measured in terms of the percentage of independent directors on a
board and the presence of a compensation committee. Conyon and Peck (1998) found
that CEO compensation is more aligned with firm performance in those firms with
outsider-dominated boards and compensation committees. Furthermore, recent
compensation literature focuses more on the characteristics of the board or
compensation committee, for example, independent directors on compensation
committees, and hence shows different evidence in different contexts. For example, Sun
and Cahan (2009) found that US firms have a stronger CEO pay-performance
3

relationship when their compensation committees have a larger proportion of
independent directors. In this study, I expected to see a stronger positive CEO payperformance relationship in China’s listed firms with a larger proportion of independent
directors. Additionally, due to the useful information and assistance from a
compensation committee, independent directors on boards are predicted to enhance
CEO pay-performance relationship when a compensation committee is present. Also,
independent compensation committees are expected to make the independent board
directors work more effectively to further strengthen the CEO pay-performance link.
Finally, as mentioned above, ownership structure is deemed to be one of the key
determinants of managerial compensation and firm performance in China’s listed firms,
which is typically different from other Western economies. However, unlike the study
on the effects of ownership structure on managerial compensation, existing research has
not provided enough evidence on the impact of ownership structure on earnings
management. Cornett et al. (2008) used US firms to investigate the effects of
managerial compensation and board characteristics on true firm performance, which is
referred to as reported firm performance adjusted for the magnitude of earnings
management. Their studies pointed out that adjusting for the impact of earnings
management significantly decreases the impact of managerial incentive based
compensation on firm performance but it increases the measured importance of other
governance variables such as the proportion of independent directors on a board on firm
performance. Concerning the highly concentrated ownership and state controlling
ownership structure in China, I examine the relationship between specific ownership
structure and earnings management because management compensation is not a main
motivation for earnings management in China’s listed firms. A significant negative
4

effect of private shareholdings on earnings management is expected while a significant
positive effect of state shareholdings on earnings management is predicted. Accordingly,
as with previous evidence from China (i.e., Tian and Estrin, 2008) regarding the largest
shareholding, a non-monotonic relationship between the largest shareholdings and
earnings management is predicted. In other words the relationship is expected to be
inversed U-shaped, i.e., up to a certain threshold earnings management increases as the
largest shareholdings increase, but beyond this it decreases. Thus when its
shareholdings are large, the largest shareholder actually prevents earnings management.
Hence, adjusting corporate performance for earnings management is expected to be
significantly positively related with private shareholdings but significantly negatively
associated with state shareholdings. A U-shaped relationship between the largest
shareholdings and true firm performance is also predicted.
1.2 Institutional background
For the past two decades reform of corporate governance in Chinese firms includes
remodelling many large former state controlled firms towards Anglo-American
corporate governance structures (Lau et al., 2000). As economic growth in China has
been surprisingly rapid, i.e., average annual growth at around 9 percent and GDP
quadrupled, the development of institutional, legal, and financial structures has been
characterised by some distinctive features (Allen et al., 2004). For example, the state
owns large amounts of shares even in those firms which are listed on Western stock
markets. It is also commonly accepted that this rapid economic growth results from the
reform of economic and corporate governance and the relative decline of state
ownership, as well as SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) and the rise of private ownership.

5

1.2.1 Managerial compensation
Agency issues arise where there is a separation of management and ownership so one
solution is to provide managerial pay contracts 1 to align management interests with
shareholders. A vast empirical literature has investigated the relationship between
managerial compensation and firm performance (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2005). The extant
literature suggests that CEO pay should be positively related to firm performance.
However, many existing studies find a weak or even non-existent link between
executive pay and firm performance. In response to this inconclusive evidence,
researchers have begun to examine the impact of corporate governance on CEO payperformance.
Likewise, when recent governance reforms brought Chinese CEO incentive schemes
much closer to the West, there was a growing number of studies on CEO compensation
and firm performance using Chinese data. For example, Kato and Long (2006c)
documented a significant positive relationship between executive compensation and
firm performance, as measured by sales growth. A positively significant relationship
was also found between CEO compensation and return on assets (ROA) whilst the
relationship between CEO compensation and stock returns was much less significant
(Rui et al., 2002). On the other hand, Mengistae and Xu (2004) found little evidence of
a link between firm performance and CEO compensation. Firth et al. (2006) also
claimed there was a weak CEO pay-performance relationship when their sample periods
were earlier than 2002. Overall, little evidence from China relates CEO pay-

1

The managerial pay contracts can be bonus, shares, or executive stock options, however, in China, longterm incentives such as shares and executive stock options are only used in a few firms since 2006. Thus,
the CEO cash compensation mainly composes of salaries and bonus incentives.

6

performance with corporate governance variables when more updated data-sets were
used.
1.2.2 Ultimate ownership
La Porta et al. (1999) argued that “the theory of corporate finance relevant for most
countries of controlling shareholders to both benefit and expropriate the minority
shareholders”. That is, the ultimate owners could affect a firm in a positive incentive
way and a negative entrenchment way.
One feature of China’s listed firms is the highly concentrated ownership. According to
data from 2003, the five largest shareholders own 58.5 percent2 of the total equity on
average, compared to 25.4 percent in the US and 33.1 percent in Japan (Prowse, 1992).
Additionally, the largest shareholder owns 42 percent 3 of total shares in China’s listed
firms on average. This highly concentrated ownership structure determines the
importance of large shareholders and the nature of the agency problem in China. In
other words, when ownership in the US and UK is widely held the agency problem
arises from a conflict of interests between shareholders and management (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). While in most other countries around the world, ownership is
concentrated in the hands of an ultimate owner (La Porta et al., 1998), then the nature of
the primary agency problem is the conflict of interests between the controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders.
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) suggested that private ownership is beneficial to corporate
governance and state ownership is detrimental to firm performance because the
2

Source: Chinese stock market database of Wind Co Ltd (www.wind.com.cn)

3

Source: Chinese stock market database of Wind Co Ltd (www.wind.com.cn)
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government sometimes pursues a political agenda instead of maximising shareholder
wealth. For example, privately owned firms are believed to be more efficient and more
profitable than non privately owned firms, while state owned firms are believed to be
less efficient and profitable than their non state owned counterparts (Megginson and
Netter, 2001).
Over the past two decades however, corporate governance of China’s listed firms does
not appear to be entirely consistent with the arguments above. Furthermore, even
foreign investors such as Warren Buffett and George Soros intended to invest in state
controlled listed firms in China rather than non state controlled firms. Following
reforms of corporate governance in listed firms, most former state controlled enterprises
have been restructured into joint corporations to encourage owners to maximise
corporate value (Li, 1997). There is evidence that the Chinese government may enhance
corporate governance as well as firm value (for example, Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001;
Qian, 2003).
Compared to government shareholdings in other countries (see Claessens et al., 2000
for detail), state controlled shareholdings are evident in China’s listed firms so it is
worth examining the significant effect of state ownership on them.
1.2.3 Board characteristics
In the early 1990s, in order to clearly identify property rights in corporations and
improve the structure of corporate governance, most of China’s state controlled
enterprises were restructured. In 1994, Company Law was introduced to encourage
firms to better corporate governance and performance. For example, a Company Law
of 1994 stipulates that directors on boards are de jure elected at a shareholders’ general
8

meeting via a one-share-one-vote system. The board of directors are usually composed
of representatives from the large shareholders who can nominate managers as board
members. Specifically, a former party secretary or bureaucrat is typically appointed to
be the chairman of board.
The amount of executive compensation and the extent of CEO pay-performance for
managers have been a controversial topic in academic and business communities.
Critics of executive compensation practices argue that the board does not design
executive compensation schemes to maximise the value of shareholders because of
CEO power on the board (Core et al., 1999). However, independent directors are more
inclined to monitor management because they are less influenced by CEO power and try
to protect their reputations in the labour market (Fama and Jensen, 1983). However,
when independent directors are too busy, have insufficient information pertaining to the
firm, or are appointed by the CEO, then they may not perform as effectively (Jensen,
1993).
Before 2001, many directors of China’s listed firms found it difficult to exert anything
other than figure influence on the firm they serve. A survey in 1999 by Tenev and
Zhang (2002) showed that only 3.1 percent of directors had some independence, so as a
consequence the role of the board and independent directors has attracted more concern
in China. In August 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
released statement 102, “Guidelines for establishing an independent directors system for
listed companies” in which listed firms are required to have one third independent
directors by June, 2003. Independent directors are referred to as those who have no
affiliation with the firm other than their directorship (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). Thus,

9

they are more inclined to balance the power of large shareholders (Guan, 2007), and
restrict their expropriation of minority investors.
Like Western countries, a compensation committee in China’s listed firms determines
executive pay schemes or makes recommendations to the board of directors, which
inclines the board to adopt these recommendations, with possibly small modifications.
If the compensation committee does not exist the board of directors assumes the role of
determining executive compensation. Thus, it is believed that a compensation
committee may enhance the board’s power, especially when the CEO is not a member
of the committees (see, for example, Andjelkovic et al., 2002). The important role
played by the compensation committee in CEO compensation decisions is also
supported empirically (e.g., Belliveau et al., 1996).
Meanwhile, the independent directors on a board intend to represent shareholders’
interests and alleviate the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. The
compensation committee, a sub-committee under the board of directors, assesses
executive performance, determines appropriate compensation packages, and reports to
the board. Therefore, the establishment of compensation committees, more specifically
independent compensation committees, has the potential to design executive
compensation to align the interests of shareholders and managers by providing
appropriate information to the board. From previous research, a possible explanation for
the mixed impact of board independence on CEO pay-performance relationship is the
independence of the compensation committee/compensation committee.

10

1.2.4 Earnings management and its effects on corporate performance
Earnings management has long been of interest in academic literature (e.g., Stolowy and
Breton, 2004). Earnings management is also a research field in which corporate
governance studies make a major contribution. Schipper (1989) defined earnings
management as a “purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process,
with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say, merely facilitating the
neutral operation of the process)”.
Tremendous research in Western countries has found that top executive managers are
likely to manage their earnings aggressively via accounting sleight-of-hand and policies
that change their bonus related performance. The separation in western countries
between ownership and management and free-rider problems are believed to be the
main incentives for executive managers to manage earnings. In other words when stock
options and other incentive plans are provided, management are more inclined to
engage in earnings management to adjust firm performance, which are based on a bonus.
However, these motives may no longer be relevant in some emerging economies. In
countries such as China, listed firms typically have a highly concentrated ownership
structure and hence executive managers have less discretion to manage earnings for
compensation purposes only, or even worse, sometimes managers are appointed by the
controlling shareholders to represent the interests of the controlling shareholders. In
addition, there is almost no long term incentive for managers when stock options only
started in 2006 in a few firms, so CEO compensation is not closely linked with stock
price like Western countries. This again explains why managers in China’s listed firms
have less motivation to manage earnings for their own compensation but for the
controlling shareholders. However, to gain authorisation for IPO, to issue new shares,
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and meet earnings requirements or avoid delisting, earnings management is still
prevalent in China’s listed firms (Jian and Wong, 2004).
In response to Jensen and Meckling’s research (1976), the traditional corporate
governance mechanisms are to address the conflicts of interests between shareholders
and management. In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that one of the two
most effective solutions to this kind of agency problem is concentrated ownership when
the other one is legal protection of shareholders.

The fact that the protection of

shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, is relatively weak in emerging
economies like China, concentrated ownership becomes the most important solution for
addressing this agency problem. However, recent corporate governance theory suggests
another agency issue, the conflict of interests between large shareholders and minority
shareholders. In other words, actions such as transferring resources out of a company to
their own firms, are taken by the controlling shareholders for their own benefits at the
expense of minority shareholders, which is defined as tunnelling (Johnson et al., 2000).
Some scholars have documented an inverted U-shaped relationship between earnings
management and ownership concentration in Chinese listed firms. This is known as
entrenchment versus alignment effect (e.g., Ding et al., 2007). However, the sample
they used is relatively small and not recent. Morck et al. (1988) argued that increased
shareholdings below a certain threshold by controlling shareholders encouraged
entrenchment against minority shareholders. Thus, to cover the expropriation of
controlling shareholders, they would manage earnings upward or make their executives
manage earnings upwards. This is known as the entrenchment effect. In other words,
controlling shareholders will pursue their private interests at the expense of other
shareholders and thus lower firm value. However, ownership concentration of the
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largest shareholdings can mitigate agency issues by aligning the interests of controlling
shareholders with those of the firm. Highly concentrated largest ownership is
considered as a signal to build a reputation by not expropriating minority shareholders
(Gomes, 2000). Thus, the alignment effect suggests that increasing the largest
shareholdings above a certain level for effective control reduces the opportunity of the
largest shareholders’ expropriation and their incentive to manage earnings.
Consequently, combining entrenchment and alignment are expected to show nonmonotonic relations for controlling shareholders.
Recent research has begun to use corporate governance to explain firms’ accounting and
financial behaviour. The impact of state ownership on corporate performance is
believed to be an important issue for China’s listed firms, and more generally in the
transitional literature, although extant literature provides inconclusive findings (Estrin et
al., 2007). Some scholars fail to find any significant negative relationship between state
ownership and firm performance (e.g., Wang et al., 2004), while others find a higher
incentive to manage earnings in state controlled firms than non state controlled ones
(Shleifer, 1998; Ding et al., 2007). Private shareholdings are found to have less serious
agency issues in firms than non private shareholdings, in other words, private
shareholdings are believed to lower the incentive for managing earnings. Moreover, in
terms of largest ownership, Bai et al. (2004) and Wei et al. (2005) both found a nonmonotonic relationship between largest shareholdings and corporate performance, even
though their sample periods were smaller.
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1.3 Motivation and contributions
Most professionals and practitioners with interests in management reward systems, as
well as researchers from different disciplines, have been concerned with modelling the
determinants of managerial compensation to enhance CEO pay-performance, as an
indicator of good corporate governance.
However, so far no one has attempted to combine the effects of those two crucial
governance variables in China, ultimate ownership and board characteristics, on
managerial compensation and CEO pay-performance, into a coherent framework in
China’s listed firms. Therefore, the specific features in China, an emerging economy
with weak shareholder protection, make China a good example to study these corporate
governance variables. By examining a large sample in China to identify the impact of
ultimate ownership and board composition on managerial compensation and CEO payperformance relationship, this research will help fill the gap.
This study makes several contributions to literature; first it contributes to the existing
literature by providing evidence on ownership structure, board composition, firm
performance, and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity by using recent samples of
China’s listed firms.
It also complements the extant literature by suggesting that state owner can improve
corporate performance in China’s listed firms, particularly when its shareholdings are
large enough. Likewise, it supports some previous research on China’s corporate
governance where in the context of China, large government ownership may be superior
to dispersed ownership structure.
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Secondly, by providing evidence of board characteristics from China, this study
provides a possible explanation for previous mixed results that independent board
directors are more likely to enhance CEO pay-performance relationship with assistance
from a compensation committee.
Thirdly, the study adds to the literature by identifying earnings management as
indicative of agency problems. As noted above, the conflict of interests between
ultimate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is a key issue in China’s
listed firms. Therefore, I argue that the agency issue between controlling and minority
shareholders determines the level of earnings management of China’s listed firms to a
large extent.
Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study investigating the effects
of ownership structure on true firm performance. This study shows that an inverted Ushaped relation exists between the largest shareholdings and earnings management.
Consequently the U-shaped relation (De Miguel et al., 2005) is predicted to exist
between the largest shareholdings and true firm performance.
Finally, the main research of this study helps to enrich the growing map of ultimate
ownership around the world (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio
and Lang, 2002).
1.4 Structure of the study
Governance systems differ across countries. Managerial incentive mechanisms vary as a
function of ownership structure, board composition, market and economic contexts. To
examine the managerial pay and the effects of ownership structure on CEO payperformance relationship, first, I investigate the impact of ultimate owners, specifically,
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the state ownership, on CEO pay and pay-performance relationship. This is the subject
of Chapter 2. Further research on ownership structure focus on whether positive
incentive effects are positively related to stronger CEO pay-performance while negative
entrenchment effects are negatively associated with weaker CEO pay-performance. If in
the meantime those two actions affect CEO pay-performance relationship in different
directions, then how do the net results influence the relationship between managerial
compensation and firm performance? In response to the fact that state control plays a
key role in Chinese listed firms, what is the difference between CEO pay-performance
relationship in state controlled firms and non state controlled firms? Secondly, in
Chapter 3, I investigated whether independent directors are more likely to enhance CEO
pay-performance relationship when a compensation committee is present. In other
words I test whether independent directors and a compensation committee work as
complementary mechanisms and jointly increase CEO pay-performance relationship.
Additionally, the independence of a compensation committee is evaluated to see
whether insider directors decrease CEO pay-performance relationship, as expected.
Like Chapter 2, sample data is also divided to state-controlled and non state-controlled
firms to further investigate the effects of state ownership. Thirdly, the effects of
ownership structure and board characteristics on earnings management and hence true
firm performance are examined in Chapter 4 to see to what extent the effects of
ownership variables on reported firm performance are covered by earnings management.
To conclude this study, I also examine the difference in state-controlled and non statecontrolled firms when the effects of ownership structure, board characteristics, and CEO
pay are examined on true firm performance. This represents an extension of the past
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research and in the specific ownership structures, I use data sets from China for such
analysis. Chapter 5 is the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EFFECTS OF ULTIMATE
OWNERSHIP ON CEO PAY-PERFORMANCE
RELATIONSHIPS: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of ultimate ownership on firms’
CEO pay-performance relations using data from listed Chinese firms. Chinese Stock
Exchanges have now become the fifth largest in the world, with a USD3.2 trillion
market capitalisation in 2007. Meanwhile, China has been working for the last two
decades on enhancing its corporate governance, but is proceeding in a different way
because its unique ownership structure is quite different from Western countries.
It is believed that the effectiveness of internal governance may be dependent on the
quality of external governance and institutional context (Judge et al., 2008), which is
more important for emerging economies that lack sufficient institutional control (Peng,
2003). Moreover, it is well documented that emerging economies do not have welldeveloped external governance structures such as merger and acquisition laws, and law
enforcement (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Singh and Gaur, 2009). This makes it more
difficult to govern firms and standardise corporate governance practices (Judge et al.,
2008). This lack of external institutional control raises several theoretical and empirical
questions that have not been studied in the extant literature. For example, in addition to
an agency problem between shareholders and managers, (Dharwadkar et al., 2000), a
different type of agency problem exists where controlling shareholders exploit minority
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shareholders because they have no protection and there are no enforcement mechanisms;
this is common problem for emerging economies such as China (Claessens et al., 2000).
Chinese listed firms are normally controlled by the state (Li and Naughton, 2007), and
the controlling shareholders of most publicly traded Chinese firms are also state owners
(Claessens and Fan, 2002), which makes studying the effect of ultimate ownership in
China, very worthwhile. One example is Chen et al. (2005), who investigated state and
foreign ownership of China’s listed firms and found that state ownership had a
significantly negative impact on the performance of publicly listed firms, whereas
foreign ownership positively increased performance.
I intend to examine a primary outcome of corporate governance: namely, CEO payperformance relationship and to test the effects of ultimate ownership on such
relationship of China’s listed firms. Firth et al. (2007) used data before 2001 and
documented that the positive relationship between CEO pay and firm performance is
weaker in those firms whose controlling shareholder is the state. Kato and Long (2006c)
supported their results and also suggested that state ownership weakens the CEO payperformance relationship, but again, only data before 2001 was used in their studies. In
addition, Chen et al. (2009) found that non state-controlled listed firms were not
necessarily superior to certain types of state-controlled firms.
My study differs from previous studies in a number of ways. Firstly, I examine the
effects of positive incentive and negative entrenchment of ultimate ownership on the
CEO pay-performance relationship, which have not yet been investigated in the
literature. Secondly, previous research used data from China mostly before 2002, during
which the disclosure of CEO compensation was voluntary, not mandatory, which
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contributed to significant selection issues and potential biases. Additionally, the
requirement to disclose the ultimate owner only commenced from 2003 so that data
limitations existed for studies earlier than that. I used data from 2003 to 2007, during
which CEO compensation and ultimate ownership were both required to be revealed,
which lead to less sample selection biases. Last but not least, my research fills a void in
literature by providing evidence for the ultimate ownership of CEO pay-performance
relationships, and finds a non-monotonic association between state control and CEO
pay-performance relationship, from an important emerging market.
I examined both the determinants of CEO compensation and CEO pay-performance
relationship in China by measuring the positive incentive effects and negative
entrenchment effects by using cash flow rights and excess control, which is the
divergence between control rights, respectively. According to Bebchuk et al.’s study
(1999), an agency cost (which damages the value of the firm) occurs when there is a
discrepancy between control rights and cash flow rights. I found that excess control
positively significantly affects the level of CEO compensation whilst negatively
significantly affecting the CEO pay-performance relationship at better than the 0.1%
level, which is consistent with the negative entrenchment effect. Additionally, cash flow
rights have a significant negative effect on the level of CEO compensation and a
significant positive effect on the CEO pay-performance relationship, which is consistent
with the positive incentive effect. Secondly Tian and Estrin (2008) found a nonmonotonic effect of government ownership on corporate value and pointed out the
importance of state control and ownership concentration. I found that state controlled
firms had a significantly positive CEO pay-performance relationship while the effect of
government ownership was non monotonic. This suggested that state controlled firms
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have an improved governance structure, particularly when the government ownership
was large. My results further indicated that cash flow rights in state-controlled firms
almost doubled those in non state-controlled firms, while excess control in state-owned
was only one third of non-state controlled. On one hand, cash flow rights have a strong
positive impact on the pay-performance relationship in both state and non-state
controlled firms. On the other hand, the negative entrenchment effect of excess control
on the CEO pay-performance relationship is only found in state-controlled firms, which
suggests that tunnelling problems are more serious in state-controlled firms when there
is excessive control. When the positive incentive effects were combined with the
negative entrenchment effects, the net results suggest that state-controlled firms have a
higher pay-performance relationship than non state-controlled firms.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2 I describe previously
existing literature and the corporate governance background in China, and then develop
testable hypotheses. Section 3 depicts the data and the variables. Section 4 explains the
results of my study, and Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Theory and testable hypotheses
This section provides institutional background on China’s corporate governance
structures and develops hypotheses to be tested in the chapter.
2.2.1 Corporate governance in China
All Chinese listed firms are required to have a shareholder general meeting which
represents controlling shareholders, the board of directors, and board of supervisors.
Typically, this meeting authorises the board of directors to make decisions which
include setting executive pay, appointing and replacing managers, when the board of
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supervisors is composed of shareholder representatives and employee representatives
aiming at overseeing the board of directors.
However, due to one of the fundamental corporate governance issues which exist in
China, the expropriation of large shareholders, the corporate governance structures in
China’s listed firms are different from their Western counterparts even though they
resemble Western governance structures in some respects. Additionally, the legal
system in China does not have relevant civil and criminal penalties for corporate
malfeasance, and is likely to provide different incentives to executive managers.
Chinese listed firms are often characterised by highly concentrated ownership and large
state-controlled

shareholdings.

Although

state-controlled

shareholdings

have

increasingly changed to individual shares and reduced significantly since non-tradable
shares were reformed in 2005, the state still owns large shareholdings in the share
markets (Watanabe, 2010). In other words, at the end of 2007 about 43% of shares were
still held by the state. La Porta et al. (2000) claim that this concentration of control and
cash flow rights, especially state ownership, is prevalent in countries with weak
protection for investors, which is believed to be the rational response by private
entrepreneurs. As a result, critics question whether the corporate governance structures
in China provide adequate protection for investors (see, for example, Li, 2004) and why
firms perform better when the state is the ultimate owner.
Typically, both internal and external corporate governance structures would influence
the way executive incentives were set. However, China lacks institutional control as an
external governance mechanism (Fan et al., 2007a) because institutional investors are
still new concepts. Therefore, it is unrealistic to set an appropriate compensation for
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CEOs by depending on external governance mechanisms and institutional investors.
Thus, it is not very clear who the decision maker is in designing executive pay schemes
in terms of the limited roles that boards of directors and supervisors actually play.
Concerning the specific ownership structure, the determinants of executive
compensation in China’s listed firms would much depend on the specific ownership
structure of a firm (e.g., ultimate ownership, control rights, and cash flow rights), which
is deemed as an important internal governance mechanism.
2.2.2 CEO compensation and firm performance
A key issue of corporate governance is to determine the compensation of management.
Many previous studies on CEO compensation and firm performance have been done in
the US, UK, and elsewhere4. Agency theory states that CEO pay should be positively
related to a firm’s performance so empirical studies seek to confirm this relationship.
For example, the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance was examined
and supporting empirical evidence proved that there is a positive association between
CEO compensation and firm performance as measured by stock price volatility (Iyengar
et al., 2005). Prior research provides plenty of evidence that executive compensation is
related to firm performance (e.g., Conyon and He, 2008). However, many existing
studies find a weak or even non-existent relationship between executive pay and firm
performance. In response to this inconclusive evidence, researchers have turned their
attention to examining the impact of corporate governance on CEO pay-performance
relationship. Core et al. (1999) supported the effects of corporate governance on
executive compensation theoretically and empirically, and stated that firms with weaker
4

See Conyon and Murphy (2000) for an example, the authors review and compare the prior empirical
evidence on CEO pay in the US. and U.K in detail.
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governance structures have greater agency problems and weaker CEO pay-performance
relationships. Existing literature also showed that executive compensation is generally
payed in line with the interests of shareholders (Coughlan and Schmide, 1985) so that
the divergence between control and cash flow rights is likely to negatively affect the
level of CEO compensation substantially (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Likewise, when recent governance reforms brought Chinese CEO incentive schemes
much closer to the West, there was a growing number of studies on CEO compensation
and firm performance using Chinese data. For example, Kato and Long (2006c)
documented a significant positive relationship between executive compensation and
firm performance as measured by sales growth. A positively significant relationship was
also found between CEO compensation and return on assets (ROA), whilst the
relationship between CEO compensation and stock returns was much less significant
(Rui et al., 2002). On the other hand, Mengistae and Xu (2004) found little evidence of
a link between firm performance and CEO compensation. Firth et al. (2006a) also
claimed that a weak CEO pay-performance relationship had lead to questions about how
effective the incentive system was for CEOs in China.
In China’s listed firms the board of directors or compensation committees typically
determine executive compensation. The most popular executive pay scheme consists of
a cash salary and a performance-contingent bonus (Firth et al., 2006b), but whether
these improved incentives or the ultimate owner such as state can align the interests of
shareholders with managers, better leaves an open question.
Overall, the existing literature provides more positive evidence that firms with good
governance structures such as outsider dominated boards are more likely to have their
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executive compensation linked with performance (see Core et al., 1999), making the
CEO pay-performance relationship a good indicator of how effectively a firm solves the
conflict of interests among shareholders and managers. It is also the case for China’s
firms where Fan et al. (2007a) and Kato and Long (2006c) both provide empirical
evidence on a positive significant CEO pay-performance relationship, which again
suggests that it does describe how effectively the governance mechanisms work.
2.2.3 Ultimate ownership
One important governance mechanism rests on the ownership structure, including
factors such as ownership concentration (Fan et al., 2007a, 2007b) and ultimate
ownership. It is suggested that ultimate ownership plays an important role in stimulating
executives to further effort (Core et al., 1999).
In terms of the relationship between executive compensation and ownership structure,
Conyon and He (2008) found in 2008 that executive compensation is significantly
higher in privately controlled firms than state owned firms but it is lower in highly
concentrated firms. The relationship between performance and ownership structure has
been well studied and documented. For example, Li et al. (2008) suggested that in the
context of China, the impact of CEO political connection on performance depends upon
the type of ownership. Qi et al. (2000) and Hovey et al. (2003) found a negative
relationship between performance and the level of direct state shareholdings, while no
such evidence was provided after 2003 when the Chinese government started putting
more effort into improving the corporate governance and performance of state
controlled firms. Interestingly, Ma et al. (2006) used a sample of 1,119 listed firms in
2004, and found that an affiliation between a business group affiliation and state
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ownership has a significantly positive effect on performance. Chen and Gong (2000)
supported their findings and documented a positive correlation between corporate
performance and state shareholdings. More recently, Tian and Estrin (2008) argued that
there might be a U-shaped relationship between government ownership and corporate
performance. That is, state controlled firms are more likely to provide stronger
incentives for executive managers to maximise shareholder value than non state
controlled firms. Consequently, the CEO pay-performance relationship is expected to
be closer when the largest shareholder is a state controlled business group.
In the study by Claessens et al. (2002) and Claessens and Fan (2002), they disentangled
the positive incentive and negative entrenchment effects of ultimate ownership. They
suggested that a firm’s value increases with the cash flow ownership of the controlling
shareholder, which is deemed as a positive incentive effect, whilst a firm’s value
decreases if the control rights of the controlling shareholder exceed its cash flow
ownership, which is considered as a negative entrenchment effect. La Porta et al. (1999)
investigates the patterns of ownership of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies
and find that most firms are controlled by the state or family. Their findings showed that
controlling shareholders typically have control rights that far exceed their cash flow
rights, primarily through pyramidal structures and participation in management, which
is believed to be detrimental to minority shareholders. Yeh (2005) provided Taiwan’s
evidence that negative entrenchment effects decrease a firm’s value. Likewise, Yeh and
Woidtke (2005) attempted to measure the effects of negative entrenchment by the
divergence in control and cash flow rights as well. On the other hand, when controlling
shareholders have substantial cash flow rights they are inclined to monitor managers
and maximise a firm’s value. Moreover, these substantial cash flow rights also mitigate
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the diversion of resources from the controlling shareholders to minority shareholders
and enhance the minority shareholders value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1986). For example, Claessens et al. (2002) investigated 1,301 publicly listed
firms in eight East Asian economies and claimed that the cash flow ownership of the
controlling shareholder increases a firm’s value, which is referred to as a positive
incentive effect. Therefore, I expect better corporate governance when there is a positive
incentive effect and weaker governance when there is a negative entrenchment effect.
Hence, a much closer relationship between CEO compensation and performance would
be expected with a positive incentive and a weaker CEO pay-performance relationship
when there is a negative entrenchment effect.
Claessens et al. (2002) and Claessens and Fan (2002) claimed that the separation of
control and cash flow rights deriving from pyramid and cross holding ownership
structures provided the ultimate owner with an incentive to expropriate from minority
shareholders or tunnel resources out for their own interests. Moreover, Watanabe (2010)
found evidence of expropriation in state controlled firms even though the excess control
of these firms is much less than non state controlled firms, and suggested studying the
joint effects of the type of ultimate ownership and the positive and negative effects
together.
Furthermore, in terms of ultimate ownership, it should be pointed out that when the
ownership concentration is different there should be different corporate governance. In
other words, the ownership concentration may make a difference in the CEO payperformance

relationship.

In

China’s

institutional

transition

process,

highly

concentrated state controlled firms receive considerable government support and are
used to facilitate institutional reform (see, e.g., Yiu et al., 2005), aiming at reaching
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better corporate governance, especially in recent years. Moreover, in association with
the reform of ownership in China, the government also encourages the formation of
large SOEs (state owned enterprises) to fill the void in ownership arising from the
sudden withdrawal of direct control by the government (Li, 1997) and to make them
world class competitors who are able to stand on their own. From an institutional
perspective there are several benefits associated with highly concentrated SOEs for
emerging economies. First, they can help firms to address issues arising from
inadequate institutional control because they fill institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu,
1997, 2000). Secondly, they also offer member firms easier access to capital, raw
materials, and new markets, and allow economies of scale across affiliated firms.
Consequently, I expect there will be a closer relationship between CEO compensation
and performance in state controlled firms.
Owing to the problem of free riders, the motivation of individual investors to monitor
the behaviour of management when shares are widely held is often weak, and it is more
difficult for them to influence important decisions such as CEO compensation schemes.
Jensen (1983) suggested that a larger ownership may provide controlling shareholders
with stronger incentives to monitor management. Therefore, a highly concentrated
ownership may be a signal of more effective shareholder monitoring. Consequently I
expect there will be a stronger CEO pay-performance relationship in state controlled
firms, especially highly concentrated state controlled firms in China.
Overall, due to the diversity of ultimate ownership and ownership concentration,
different ownership structures are expected to have a variety of effects on the CEO pay
performance relationship. Previous literature only gave empirical evidence for the
effects that positive incentive and negative entrenchment have on a firm’s value.
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However, there was no previous evidence of the effects of ultimate ownership on CEO
pay performance relationship from either Western countries or China. Therefore, an
investigation into the relationship between ultimate ownership and CEO pay
performance relationship in China is worthwhile, which is why it is one of the focuses
of my study.
2.3 Data and models
2.3.1 Sample selection
In order to perform my analysis, I used data from the CCER database developed by
SinoFin Information Services5 and the China Stock Market and Accounting Research
Database (CSMAR) developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company6.
And the stock return from the Tsinghua Financial Database (THFD) developed by
Tsinghua University is also used. Like previous studies (e.g., Firth et al., 2007), I
excluded financial firms because those firms have different characteristics. Therefore,
the sample includes non-financial Chinese firms publically listed from 2003 to 2004.
Firms listed from 2003 and 2004 were used in an earlier section of my study because
since 2003, they were all required to disclose their ownership and control rights in their
annual reports, and therefore earlier data was not available. In a later section, a sample
between 2005 and 2007 was used to confirm the results when the reform of nontradable shares in 2005 were considered.

5

Prior research has used SinoFin data set in their studies on China’s corporate governance, for example,
see, Kato and Long, 2006a.
6

Prior research has used CSMAR data set in their studies on China’s corporate governance, for example,
see, Bai et al. (2003, 2004).
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I looked at factors affecting executive compensation in “normal” times when high and
low performing firms were influenced. That is, firms which received special treatment
and particular transfer7 during the sample window were deleted. After these adjustments,
I was left with an unbalanced panel of 1821 firm-years between 2003 and 2004, and
2,590 firm-years between 2005 and 2007. In the following analysis, I winsorise all
variables at the top and bottom 1% of observations8.
2.3.2 Executive compensation and performance relation
The findings of Firth et al. (2007) showed a positive CEO pay-performance relationship
when the performance was measured as a return on assets (ROA). That is, in order to
examine the CEO pay-performance relationship, performance should be measured by
accounting measurements. Moreover, Lambert and Larcker (1987) used return on assets
as an accounting measurement and stock returns as a financial measurement. Following
previous research by Zhou (2000), the ROA in my study was calculated as the net
income 9 divided by the average assets of the current and previous year, to mitigate
potential causal and endogenous problems.

7

CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) released the Special Treatment (ST) regulation in
1998 that firms are specially treated if they make losses for two successive years. Additionally, one more
year of loss makes the ST firms “Particular Transfer” (PT) firms. PT regulation was effective over the
period 1999 to 2001. After 4th Dec 2001, firms with consecutive three year losses will be suspended and if
it persists until the first midterm reports those firms would be delisted (CSRC, 2001).
8

I also try eliminating rather than winsorizing extreme data points and find that my results are robust in
these variations.
9

Using pre-tax income for my tests gives similar results.
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I focus on cash compensation, i.e., the total compensation recorded in the annual reports
of China’s listed firms, because I am interested in the reward portion 10 . The cash
compensation can be viewed as ex-post compensation depending on past and current
performance (see, for example, Gaver and Gaver, 1998; Comprix and Mueller, 2006).
Following Leone et al. (2006), I use the sum of bonus and salary, which is the total cash
compensation, as the measurement of executive cash compensation. Moreover, I
employ the natural log of cash compensation, like most previous studies (see, e.g.,
Lambert and Larcker, 1987). The natural log can mitigate the difference in executive
compensation across firms and hence reduce heteroskedasticity. Among the alternative
measures of executive compensation provided in the SinoFin database, the average pay
of the top three highest paid executives, which comprises salary and bonus, resembling
most previous studies of executive compensation, and will thus be the focus of my study.
(Insert Table 2.1 here)
The descriptive statistics of CEO compensation are presented in Panel A, of Table 2.1
where all compensations are in 2003-constant Yuan. Over the whole period of 2003 to
2007, the cash compensation of executive managers was on average about 179,369
Yuan (or approximately 22,421 dollars) at 2003-constant Yuan, which is much lower
than their counterparts in the U.S. and Japan11. The mean compensations were 167,365
Yuan, 204,067 Yuan, 155,775 Yuan, 191,599 Yuan, and 178,037 Yuan in 2003, 2004,

10

In China, only the cash compensation for CEO is required to report in annual reports. In addition, stock
option and other long-term incentives are only provided to CEOs since 2006 when most companies still
paid their CEOs cash compensation. Therefore, cash compensation mainly composes of the total
compensation in China’s listed firms.
11

For example, Core et al. (1999) report an average of cash compensation of $ 614,000 for a sample of
205 firms between 1982 and 1984.
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2005, 2006, and 2007 respectively. The pay ranges from 7,667 Yuan to 1,628,234 Yuan,
9,600 Yuan to 1,716,667 Yuan, 1,000 Yuan to 1,827,000 Yuan, 8,000 Yuan to
1,848,030 Yuan, and 1,000 Yuan to 1,836,200 Yuan in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and
2007, respectively. As shown in Panel B Table 2.1, the mean compensations were
186,350 Yuan and 184,094 Yuan in state controlled and non state controlled firms. That
is, from 2003 to 2004 the CEOs in state controlled firms got paid a little more than non
state controlled firms but alternatively, from 2003-2004 there was no big difference for
ROA in the full sample and those two sub-samples.
Like Kaplan (1994), I used the widely employed semi-elasticity12 model to examine the
CEO pay performance relationship, which takes the following form:
ln(CEOpay)     ( ROA)   (other var iables )  

(1)

I use ln(CEOCOM) because ln(CEOCOM) is more likely to be normally distributed
than CEOCOM.
2.3.3 Cash flow versus control rights
The shareholdings of the state serve as the main point of my research. Panel B of Table
2.1 shows the summary statistics of ownership variables for the full sample, the statecontrolled sample and non state-controlled sample. Like the studies of Claessens et al.
(2000), I measured the ownership structure in terms of cash flow rights and control
rights and hence computed excess control, the divergence between control and cash
flow rights. I therefore carefully followed the chain of ownership and used pyramiding
structures and cross-holdings to distinguish between control rights and cash flow rights.
12

The term “semi-elasticity” represents the relationship between the logarithm of CEO pay and firm
performance. See Kaplan (1994) for details.
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I defined the ultimate owner as the state with the largest control rights 13 when summing
direct and indirect rights (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005), the same as CCER.
(Insert Figure 2.1 here)

Take Xiamen Haoshiguang Co. as an example. The diagram of Xiamen Haoshiguang
Co. in Fig. 1 illustrates the complexity of computing cash flow and control rights
separately when ownership pyramids are present. Following the method in Claessens et
at. (2000), voting rights were computed on the weakest link in the chain of shares
owned by entities that are in turn controlled by the ultimate owner14. Additionally, if
there are two parallel controlling chains connecting one firm and its controlling
shareholders, the sum of the weakest links in each of the chain of shares was measured
as control rights. I therefore calculated Huang Shaoliang’s control rights to be 14.57%,
which equals the weakest link in the chain of control through Xinwang Co., Xufei Co.,
Xudao Co., Guangcaihong Co. and Xufei Group Co. In contrast, the cash flow rights of
Huang Shaoliang in Xiamen Haoshiguang Co. was calculated to be 1.08%, which
equals 14.57%*(32%*69.97%+29%*51%)*50%*40%.
For ownership structure, I separated the listed firms into state-controlled and non statecontrolled firms depending on whether the ultimate controller is the state. Hence, the
pyramid structure is normally defined as organisational in form in which at least two
legally independent firms are controlled by the same ultimate owner, for example, statecontrolled firms.
Panel B in Table 2.1 presents the measures of ownership which are defined as the cash
13

Following La Porta et al. (1999), I classify the largest shareholder as the ultimate owner. Take a look at
the ownership structure in China’s listed firms, a singular ultimate owner mostly likely presents.
14

Following Claessens et at. (2000), I use 10% cut-off to identify the controlling shareholdings.
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flow rights of the largest shareholder, and control rights for the full sample and two subsamples. Control rights are defined as the voting rights of the largest shareholders.
Excess control is defined as control less cash-flow rights, and Cash-flow/Control is the
ratio of cash flow rights to control rights for the largest shareholder. Like the ownership
structure in many other countries, ownership is concentrated, especially in statecontrolled firms (46.47%) when the average concentration in non state-controlled firms
was 33.03% and 43.04% in the full sample. The average cash flow rights for the whole
sample was 38.34%, in which average control was 43.76% and 22.47% in statecontrolled and non state-controlled firms. Additionally, the largest shareholder normally
has control rights that exceed cash flow rights. The difference results in excess control
of 5.52%, 3.33%, and 11.93% in full sample, state-controlled firms, and non statecontrolled firms, respectively, which was consistent with Claessens et al. (2000) when
the separation between control rights and cash flow rights was most pronounced among
non state-controlled firms. Obviously, state-controlled firms have higher ownership
concentration and cash flow rights and hence less excess control (control rights minus
cash flow rights). In other words the cash flow rights in state-controlled firms are almost
twice of those of non state-controlled firm, whereas excess control is only one third
more in the state-owned than non-state controlled. Moreover, a large (cash-flow/control)
ratio (84%, 92%, and 61% for full sample, state-controlled, and non state-owned firms,
respectively) was present in a different sample.
Claessens et al. (2002) disentangled the effects of incentive and entrenchment of large
ownership. That is, the value of a firm increases with the cash flow ownership of the
controlling shareholder, which is deemed as a positive incentive effect, whilst the value
decreases if the control rights of the controlling shareholder exceeds its cash flow rights,
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which is considered as a negative entrenchment effect. Therefore, I looked at the CEO’s
pay and the firms’ performance across different ranges of excess control. Like Yeh and
Woidtke (2005), in Panel C Table 2.1 I present values according to the degree that
control exceeds cash flow rights. For example, excess control is 0% when the
controlling shareholder controls 30% of a firm’s votes and owns 30% of its cash flow.
Like the Taiwanese sample used by Yeh and Woidtke (2005), excess control is 0% for
the majority of firms. The ownership for this group of firms was 46.60% and CEO
compensation was the lowest. Unlike the studies of Claessens et al. (2002), trend in cash
flow rights, CEO compensation and firm performance were not clear, suggesting further
tests on the impact of state controlling shareholdings, which will be done in a later
section.
2.3.4 Other firm characteristics
A set of control variables are included in my models to reduce possible confounding
effects (Conyon and He, 2008). Iyengar et al. (2005), found a different association
between executive compensation and performance in different capital structures.
Executive compensation in high levered firms acts as a pre-commitment mechanism in
addition to the conventional role of aligning management interests with shareholder
interests due to agency costs of debt. Therefore, leverage is expected to play an
important role in executive pay-performance relationship due to the potential costs of
agency debt. Consequently, the leverage ratio (LEV) is calculated as the book value of
debt divided by the book value of shareholder equity, is included in my analysis.
LN (ASSETS) refers to as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets.
Existing literature has shown that the size of a firm is positively associated with
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executive compensation (for example, Firth et al., 2007). Thus, I use LN (ASSETS) as
my proxy for the size of a firm.
Firm risk is the measure of a firm’s information environment and it's the risk of its
operating environment (Core et al., 1999) and thus is a potential determining factor of
the level of executive compensation. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) documented a
significant decrease in CEO pay-performance sensitivity with a decrease in the variance
of firm performance, owing to the trade off of executive incentives against the
allocation of performance risk. High firm risk is passed to managers and thus higher
compensation is demanded. In my study, firm risk is defined as the standard deviation
(STDRET) of the monthly stock returns over the previous 12 months. Furthermore, a
dummy variable (LAGNEGPROFIT) is defined to indicate whether a firm made a loss
in the previous year.
The studies of Lambert et al. (1993) and Boyd (1994) suggested that in firms with a
higher proportion of independent directors on the board, executive compensation is
linked more with performance. Therefore, I use BOARDIND as a measurement of the
board independence, calculated as the proportion of independent directors 15 on the
board.
One specific feature of Chinese listed firms is the predominance of state ownership
(Kato and Long, 2006b). Therefore, the dominance of state ownership would be
examined by splitting up my sample in later sections, into state-controlled and non
state-controlled firms.
15

Independent directors have no affiliation with the firm other than their directorship (Byrd and Hickman,
1992). Therefore, they are likely to effectively balance the strong power of large shareholders (Guan,
2007), and hence restrict their expropriation of minority investors.
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Panel B in Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the firm characteristics in my
sample of listed companies. The mean leverage rate was 1.48 over the sample period
and it was much lower for state-controlled firms than for non state-controlled firms
(1.29 vs. 2.00). State controlled firms were larger than non state controlled (21.35 vs.
20.95) in log of book value of assets. STDRET shows that the risk faced by all Chinese
firms was similar (average 0.09). Probably because of the corporate governance rule in
2002, all firms have more than 30% of independent directors on board and vary from
30% to 100%. Panel B also shows that the probability of making a loss in the previous
year was 11% on average, while state owned firms were less likely to obtain negative
earnings in previous years than non state firms (10% vs. 13%).
In addition, my analysis contains a set of industry dummy variables to control industry
heterogeneity in managerial labour markets16 and year dummies to capture the macroeconomic effects.
2.4 Results
In this section, I used uni-variate and multivariate analysis to test my hypotheses, and I
examined how state control affects the levels of executive compensation and CEO payperformance relationship.
2.4.1 Ownership structure and CEO pay-performance relationship
The regression results of the two year unbalanced panel are shown in Table 2.2.
Parameter estimates are given along with the corresponding Heteroskedasticity-robust

16

There are 22 different standard industrial classifications according to the Standard Industrial
Classification Codes of CSRC. Financial institutions are not included in my study and therefore the
overall industry classifications in my analysis are 21.
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standard errors17. I used return on assets (ROA) and tested the model18 estimates for the
impact of cash flow rights and excess control on executive pay-performance. Model 1
shows the results of firm performance (ROA) in terms of excess control when firm
specific characteristics were not included. Model 2 adds firm specific characteristics
when industry and year control variables were further added to Model 3. The
coefficients for the year and industry indicator variables were not reported in the tables
because they were not relevant to this study.
(Insert Table 2.2 here)
I then computed correlations for the main variables and they were all below 0.5. These
diagnostic statistics suggested that multi-collinearity was not a major problem in my
models.
In regression model 3 the sign of the estimated coefficients on firm performance (ROA)
is expected to be positive, that is, the better the performance, the higher the executive
compensation. The excess of control rights upon cash flow rights is considered as a
negative entrenchment effect contributing to lower firm value as well as worse
corporate governance (Claessens et al., 2002). Also Core et al. (1999) suggested that
firms with weaker governance structures have more agency problems. In other words,
the weaker the corporate governance the higher the level of CEO compensation, while
the lower the CEO pay-performance relationship. According to my hypothesis, the
expected sign on the coefficient of the interaction term ROA*excess control is negative,
17

To test for autocorrelation at the panel level, the approach outlined in Wooldridge (2002) as
implemented by Drukker (2003) is used. For all the regression analyses this test shows that
autocorrelation is not evident.
18

I employ fixed effects unbalanced panel models rather than OLS models due to the results from F-test,
LM test and Hausman test.
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that is, executive pay-performance relationship is weaker in firms with larger
discrepancies between control rights and cash flow rights than in firms with less excess
control. In accordance with most of the published literature, the signs on LN(ASSETS)
and STDRET are expected to be positive while the sign on negative profit in previous
year (LAGNEGPROFIT) is expected to be negative. I do not make a priori predictions
regarding the signs of the proportion of independent directors on board (BOARDIND)
and LEV because existing evidence is neither compelling nor mixed.
Table 2.2 summarises the regression estimates of entrenchment effect for my sample. I
hypothesized that corporate governance weakens which is representing by decreased
executive pay-performance and an increased level of CEO compensation, if the control
rights of the controlling shareholder exceeds its cash flow rights. The signs of all
estimated coefficients in the last three columns are consistent with my hypotheses.
Model 1 shows that the coefficient on the interaction of firm performance and the
divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights is negative and significant, with a
magnitude of -0.16, suggesting a 16% drop in CEO pay-performance19 relationship for a
1% increase in excess control. And the coefficient on CEO pay-performance
relationship was positive and significant. Consequently, the results support my
hypotheses that excess control weakens CEO pay-performance relationship, which is
consistent with the negative entrenchment effect. Similar results applied when other
control variables were included in model 2 and 3, which supported my negative
entrenchment hypothesis.

19

My dependant variable is the log compensation, therefore the 16% drop is ln(CEOpay)-performance
relation.
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In terms of the study of Claessens et al. (2002), higher cash flow rights were associated
with better governance and hence were expected to strengthen the CEO payperformance link. To test my hypotheses and see if the results from the research of
Claessens et al. (2002) can also be generalised to China’s firms, I used several models
to run the regressions. Both the cash flow rights and the cash-flow/control ratio were
used in my analysis to represent the level of cash flow rights. The results are presented
in Table 2.3 where ROA was used as the measure of firm performance. The signs of all
coefficient estimates were consistent with my expectations. In particular, the cash flow
rights showed a positively significant effect on executive pay-performance at better than
the 5% level. When the cash-flow/control ratio was considered the results suggested that
the cash-flow/control ratio significantly positively affected the relationship between
executive compensation and firm performance to a large extent (  =3.21). The results
show that the higher the cash flow rights, the stronger the CEO pay-performance
relationship and hence, the better the governance mechanism. The results were
consistent with the positive incentive effect and therefore similar to other ownership
studies in Western nations.
(Insert Table 2.3 here)
2.4.2 State-controlling shareholders
To examine whether state ownership affects the ownership structure, executive
compensation and firm performance, differing from other controlling shareholders, I
have presented CEO compensation, firm performance, and other characteristics
separately for firms controlled either by the state or non state in Table 2.4. Table 2.4
shows that state owners control a larger proportion of shareholdings than non state
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owners (46.47% vs. 33.03%). Likewise, state controlled firms have more cash flow
rights than their non state counterparts (43.76% vs. 22.47%) when (cash-flow/control)
ratio is 0.92 for state controlled firms and only 0.61 for non state controlled firms, while
there was a larger degree of separation of cash flow rights and control rights in non state
controlled firms than state controlled firms (11.93 vs. 3.33). Firm performance was
slightly larger for state controlled shareholders than for non state controlled
shareholders. With the exception of CEO pay, the difference in means was significant
for all variables. Thus, the divergence in control and cash flow rights appeared to occur
primarily in non state controlled firms, while non state controlled firms performed
worse. Consistent with my expectations and the results of Claessens et al. (2002), the
univariate results suggested there were less cash flow and control rights but more excess
control in non state controlled firms.
In order to further investigate CEO pay-performance relationship in state-controlled
firms, a model adapted from Eq.1 is presented as follows:
ln(CEOpay)    1 State   2 ROA   3 State * ROA  

(2)

The results of my regressions using Eq.2 are presented in Table 2.5. Given the different
univariate results found for state controlled firms, I included an Owner-State dummy,
which equals 1 when a firm has a controlling shareholder that is a state and 0 otherwise.
Moreover, the Owner-State dummy was interacted with the firm performance (ROA) to
see whether the CEO pay-performance was stronger for state controlled firms.
The results indicated that state control was significantly associated with positive CEO
pay-performance relationship, with a magnitude of 1.82, which was consistent with my
hypothesis that state controlled firms have better governance structures. In other words,
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state control enhances the link between managerial compensation and firm performance
but does not affect the level of executive compensation significantly.
(Insert Table 2.5 here)
According to Tian and Estrin (2008), the effect of government ownership on firm
performance value is non-monotonic. Therefore, to examine whether the positive effect
of government ownership on CEO pay-performance in state controlled firms was also
non-monotonic, I divided the state controlled sample into two sub-samples in terms of
the percent of government ownership. Table 2.6 indicates that ROA was positively
significantly associated with CEO compensation only in the upper quartile government
ownership. There was a weaker CEO pay-performance relationship in all the state
controlled firms but no significant CEO pay-performance relationship either in the
lower quartile government ownership sub-sample or the non state controlled sub-sample.
Consequently, my results are consistent with existing literature and suggest a nonmonotonic effect of government ownership on CEO pay-performance as well.
(Insert Table 2.6 here)
2.4.3 Positive incentive, negative entrenchment effects and state-control
To examine the effect of state control further, I again divided the sample according to
whether the ultimate owner was the state. The results are presented in Table 2.7. All the
regression analyses focussed on the return on assets (ROA). To start with state
controlled and non state controlled sub-samples, the Chow test in row 8 rejected the null
hypotheses that there is no significant difference in my variables of interest across the
sub-sample (Chow, 1960). The coefficient of the interaction of excess control and firm
performance was different among the sub-samples because the full sample point
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estimate of excess control was significantly negative, and hence consistent with the
negative entrenchment effect. The estimates of coefficient for ROA*excess control were
higher in state controlled firms than all the sample firms. However, excess control did
not affect CEO pay-performance relationship in accordance with the negative
entrenchment effect in the non state controlled sub-sample. The results suggested that
although state controlled firms have less excess control they are more motivated to
tunnel and transfer resources out of the firm, which was why excess control was highly
entrenched in state controlled firms.

The results of regression showed that the

entrenchment effect of divergence between cash flow rights and control rights on CEO
pay-performance relationship was driven mainly by state controlled firms rather than
non state controlled firms, because of the motivation for tunnelling. In other words, non
state controlled firms have less motivation for tunnelling so the entrenchment effect of
excess control did not show in those firms even though the level of excess control was
higher.
(Insert Table 2.7 here)
Table 2.8 compares the positive effect of cash flow rights on CEO pay-performance
between the state controlled and non state controlled sub-samples. In terms of the
Chow test, I could identify the different excess control variables between state
controlled and non state controlled firms. It can be seen from Table 2.8 that cash flow
rights were positively significantly related with CEO pay-performance relationship in
state controlled and non state controlled firms when the coefficient on ROA*cash-flow
was higher in state controlled firms than non state controlled firms.
(Insert Table 2.8 here)
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2.4.4 Additional recent evidence
From 2005 the non-tradable shares reform20 was intended to change the status of nontradable shares into tradable shares. Since most of the non-tradable shares were state
owned, the reform of non-tradable shares helped to transform many state owned firms
into widely held firms. These changes have the potential to significantly alter the whole
corporate governance structures of listed firms in China. Therefore, my study also
focused on investigating the possible changes to the ownership structure post-sharesreform, so further research was done on the sample between 2005 and 2007. In this
section I used an unbalanced panel of 2,590 non-financial firm-years from 2005 to 2007.
Like Table 2.5, Table 2.9 represents the effects of state control on CEO payperformance relationship from 2005 to 2007. Compared to the results from Table 2.5,
all the variables remained the same while all the coefficients become smaller. That is,
there was a positively significant relationship between firm performance (ROA) and
CEO compensation. In other words, even when the ultimate owner was state there was a
significant increase in CEO pay-performance relationship from 2005 to 2007.
(Insert Table 2.9 here)
The results of the positive incentive and entrenchment effects from 2005 to 2007 are
presented in Table 2.10. Most of the estimates in Table 2.10 were insignificant and
hence do not oppose the results from 2003 to 2004. A robustness test from more recent
years showed consistent results from my sample period of 2003 to 2004, which suggests

20

The reform started from August, 2005 and I refer to the data at the end of 2005 as the data of the first
year after shares reform commencement.
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that the evidence from my analysis during the share reforms was consistent with my
earlier analysis.
(Insert Table 2.10 here)
2.4.5 Additional test of potential endogeneity and reverse causality
According to prior empirical research on corporate governance, endogeneity issue is
considered as a serious potential problem which might distort the final results. To
address the issue, first I employ Hausman test (1978) to test for the endogeneity of my
models and find that endogeneity problem is not significant in my studies. However,
recent empirical evidence suggests that firm performance and CEO compensation are
endogenously determined. Therefore, I use instrumental variables to deal with the
potential problems. I use ownership concentration, CEO/chair duality and natural log of
board size as instruments for ROA. These instruments will be correlated with operating
performance, but are not subject to reverse feedback from short variation in CEO
compensation. The results from 2SLS of Table 2.11 show that the sign and significance
of ROA on CEO compensation remain the same when endogenous issue is controlled.
Combined the test results of Hausman test and model using instrumental variables,
endogenous problem will not be a serious issue in the models. Furthermore, the reverse
causality21 from CEO compensation to firm performance (Firth et al., 2007) was also a
potential issue so the same two stage least squares model is also developed. Table 2.11
provides 2SLS estimates for the main model where most independent variables had the
same signs as my longitudinal models above, specifically, the significant negative effect

21

By using Hausman test (1978), no serous endogeneity issue is found in my models.
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of excess control on CEO pay-performance relationship, which was consistent with the
regressions results discussed above.
2.5. Conclusions
I examined whether ultimate ownership was indicative of its CEO pay-performance
relationship where ownership was concentrated in China’s listed firms, state ownership
dominates, investor protection is relatively weak, and identifying the exact degree of
separation between ownership and control was difficult. All the existing literature
indicated that ownership structures in most countries, other than the US, tend to be
concentrated. Yet studies on CEO pay-performance relationship are generally restricted
to US firms where investor protection is strong and ownership is largely dispersed.
Moreover, the positive and negative effects were only studied for their effects on firm
performance, not for CEO pay-performance relationship. Thus more detailed
investigations on the effects of ultimate ownership on CEO pay system still needs to be
done.
My results suggested that controlling shareholders affect CEO pay-performance
relationship so this relationship also indicates the quality of its corporate governance. In
particular, state controlled firms have a stronger CEO pay-performance relationship and
better corporate governance than their non state counterparts. And all the firms in my
sample which have more excess control were associated with weaker CEO payperformance, which is referred to as negative entrenchment effects. In contrast, firms
with higher cash flow rights were associated with a stronger CEO pay-performance
relationship, which was called the positive incentive effect. My results also showed that
the stronger CEO pay-performance relationship in state controlled firms was driven
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mainly by those with a highly concentrated ownership. A robustness test using more
recent data (from 2005 to 2007) was also provided, and it supported my hypotheses and
my main results from 2003 to 2004.
My results further indicated that cash flow rights in state controlled firms were almost
twice of those in non state controlled firms, while excess control was only one third in
state owned than in non-state controlled. I then found that cash flow rights have a strong
positive impact on the pay-performance relationship in both state and non-state
controlled firms, while excess control rights only have a negative impact on the payperformance relationship in state controlled firms. I also argued that the net results
between the positive incentive and negative entrenchment effects that state controlled
firms have on higher pay-performance relationship were higher than non state
controlled firms.
In order to investigate China’s data, two common features of their listed firms should be
emphasised, the high concentration of ownership and the predominance of state
ownership (Kato and Long, 2006b). These findings highlight the importance of studying
the “agency problems” that state ownership presents for itself and minority shareholders.
Nonetheless, samples in my analysis were only limited to publically listed firms when
the fact is that more state controlled firms in China are not yet listed publically.
Therefore the samples should include non-publically listed firms because this data
would shed more light on the management practices and ownership structure of state
controlled firms as well as the positive and negative effects of ownership structure.
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CHAPTER THREE: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION,
BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND FIRM
PERFORMANCE IN CHINA: THE IMPACT OF
COMPENSATION COMMITTEE

3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 I examined the effects of ultimate ownership on CEO pay-performance
relationship and found that state control is positively significantly associated with CEO
pay-performance relationship. In this chapter I continue to study CEO pay-performance
relationship while focussing on board characteristics. Existing literature provides mixed
evidence for the impact of board characteristics on CEO pay-performance link so in this
chapter I investigated board composition in more detail and tested whether its effects in
China’s listed firms are linked to CEO pay-performance relationship.
Recent scandals related to executive compensation have attracted public attention to the
debate about restricting executive compensation and reforming the associated
governance structure. Executive compensation plays a key role in corporate governance
because it motivates executives to perform their duty to maximise shareholders’ wealth
(Andersen and Bizjak, 2003). With firms in Western countries, the specific design of
executive compensation is delegated to a sub-committee of the board of directors; the
compensation committee (CC). The board of directors approve final executive pay
schemes set by a compensation committee, so the boards and their compensation
committees both play an important role in linking executive pay to firm performance
and thus aligning the interests of managers with shareholders (Sun and Cahan, 2009).
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Similar to its Western counterparts, the board of directors in Chinese listed firms also
delegates executive remuneration setting to its compensation committee, which means
both play a key role in determining executive compensation. The code of corporate
governance implemented in 2003 for listed firms in China stipulates that executive
compensation should reflect firm performance. This means enhancing CEO payperformance relationship and emphasising the role of executive compensation
governance mechanisms from the standard setters’ viewpoint. Though corporate
governance has improved since then, there are still several fundamental issues regarding
corporate governance in China, for example, cooperation between the board and subcommittees. Thus, the monitoring role of the independent board of directors and
executive compensation, whether or not it is set by the compensation committee, will
affect corporate governance and relative agency issues to a large extent. Furthermore,
unlike those Western countries such as the US and UK, a compensation committee is
strongly recommended 22 but not compulsory in China’s listed firms 23 , which makes
investigating how a voluntary formation of compensation committee affect CEO payperformance worthwhile. Additionally, the independence of compensation committees
has been studied extensively in Western countries but not in China because of the
limited availability of data. In order to investigate the compensation committee and
CEO pay-performance relationship further, the independence of this committee will also
be one of the focuses in my study.

22

The compensation committee was recommended for all listed firms by the Corporate Code 2001 in
China by CSRC.
23

Although the formation of compensation committee is not compulsory in countries such as France, my
research focuses on CEO pay-performance relationship, which is different from those countries.
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My study contributes to the literature in the following ways.

First, the existing

empirical evidence on the ability of an independent board of directors to enhance CEO
pay-performance relationship is still mixed and gives little coherent support to the shape
of an optimal governance structure (e.g., Conyon and Peck, 1998; Dahya and
McConnell, 2007). Unlike extant literature, my study focuses on the role of the
compensation committee and suggests a stronger relationship between board
independence and CEO pay-performance relationship when the compensation
committee presents, contributing to a possible explanation for previously mixed results.
Even though there are many studies on executive compensation in US firms 24 ,
systematic research into the composition of a board and CEO pay-performance
relationship outside the US is limited because of a paucity of data. My study also fills
this void by providing recent evidence on board composition and CEO pay-performance
relationship in China’s listed firms. Second, despite the limited data, the independence
of a compensation committee has not been studied much in China. Moreover, in most
CC firms about 60% of the directors on compensation committee are independent which
makes any investigation difficult due to an insufficiently data variability. Instead of the
proportion of independent directors on compensation committee, I used a new dummy
variable, insider directors on a compensation committee (whether any directors on
compensation committee get paid), to examine how their independence impacts on CEO
pay-performance relationship, and thus provide empirical evidence on compensation
committees from China.

24

See, for example, Murphy (1999) reviews empirical studies on executive compensation when Gibbons
(1997) reviews the pertinent theoretical literature.
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My results indicated that a higher proportion of independent board directors results in a
stronger CEO pay-performance relationship, and this association was driven by those
firms with a compensation committee (β=4.24 and .β=0.89 for firms with compensation
committee and firms without compensation committee, respectively). Moreover, in the
sub-sample of firms with a compensation committee, a higher proportion of
independent board directors is also related to stronger CEO pay-performance
relationship. I also found that insider directors on a compensation committee weakened
the CEO pay-performance relationship, especially when there were more independent
directors than required by Corporate Governance Code. That is, a compensation
committee was more likely to set executive pay to their own interests when at least one
director was paid and the proportion of independent board directors was higher. Further
tests showed that independent directors set executive pay more effectively in the time
periods after (β=5.33, p-value=0.01) than before a compensation committee was formed
(β=1.52, p-value=0.3).
This chapter focuses on the structure of a board and the effect of compensation
committee/compensation committee independence. I examined the relationship between
CEO compensation and corporate performance and investigated the joint role played by
the board of directors and the compensation committee on CEO pay-performance
relationship by using a sample of 5,869 observations from 2001 to 2006.
In the next section, I begin with a literature review and hypotheses development of
China’s CEO pay-performance relationship and characteristics of a board, with a
particular emphasis on the compensation committee, and then introduce the data and
describe my empirical strategy in Section 3. The results are presented in Section 4,
followed by a concluding section.
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3.2 CEO compensation, firm performance, and board characteristics

Interest in the specific governance structures of China’s publicly listed firms has been
growing in response to the increasing stock market in China (see, for example, Schipani
and Liu, 2002) and the subsequent need for better governance structures. The board, as
well as its sub-committees, plays a key role in enhancing corporate governance in light
of the specific governance structures in China. Therefore, research on the association
among executive compensation, corporate performance and board composition has
recently increased, and it will therefore be the focus of my empirical analysis.
3.2.1 CEO compensation and firm performance

The CEO pay-performance relationship should be strong because a CEO must maximise
the wealth of shareholders (Murphy, 1999), and therefore their compensation should be
tied to firm performance (Fung et al., 2001). Baker (1992), Dechow and Sloan (1991)
and Kaplan (1994) all suggested that CEO pay-performance relationship is the essence
of principal-agent theory. Therefore, the determinants of executive compensation show
how effectively a firm addresses the divergent interests between management and
shareholders. In order to confirm CEO pay-performance relationship, empirical studies
have been done in different contexts where the most recent focus has been to examine
the impact of corporate governance on the setting of CEO pay. In publicly listed firms
the decisions on CEO compensation are generally made by the board of directors and
hence which is why existing literature has emphasised the key role played by the board.
52

For example, Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) suggested that lack of oversight by the
board can contribute to over compensation of a CEO.
Numerous studies on CEO pay-performance relationship using data from Western
countries have resulted in inconclusive results. For example, Gregg et al. (2005)
examined executive pay-performance relationship of some large UK firms over 19942002 and found that over time there was a very small relationship between executive
pay and performance. However, in their studies on listed firms in Korea, Kato et al.
(2007) stated that there was a significant positive relationship between executive cash
compensation and stock market performance.
Kato and Long (2006b) affirmed two types of acute principal-agent issues in China: the
diverging interests between managers and shareholders and between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders. They supported the notion that tying the wealth
of managers to firm performance can align the interests of shareholders and managers.
Hence, linking a manager’s personal fortune to the firm, breaks the “ligament” between
the controlling shareholders and managers, and thus helps to protect the interests of
minority shareholders.
There is not much research on the link between CEO compensation and firm
performance in China and the results are mixed. Kato and Long (2006a) examined 937
listed firms from 1998 to 2002 and found there was a positive executive payperformance relationship. Rui et al (2002) supported the study of Kato and Long (2006a)
by proving there was a significant association between the return on assets and CEO
compensation in China’s listed firms, but there was not relationship between stock
returns and CEO compensation. However, Mengistae and Xu (2004) used a sample of
400 Chinese state owned enterprises in the 1980s and found that CEO pay-performance
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sensitivity decreased with the variance of performance. They also found that executive
pay-performance sensitivity increased with managerial control when a firm faced
market competition. Moreover, Firth et al (2006a) pointed out that the CEO payperformance relationship in China’s listed firms was weak on average compared to
Western counterparts, but they documented a positive relationship between CEO cash
compensation and firm performance in another study a year later (Firth et al., 2007). In
their recent research they provide evidence that ownership and governance factors are
determinants of CEO pay schemes.
In summary, although some extant research find little or no evidence on executive payperformance relationship, many existing theoretical and empirical studies document a
positive relationship between executive compensation and firm performance, suggesting
that performance plays an important role in setting executive compensation contracts.
Therefore, CEO pay-performance relationships can be deemed as one indicator of good
corporate governance structures (Conyon and He, 2008) and hence other governance
mechanisms can be investigated in light of the CEO pay-performance relationship.
3.2.2 Board composition

The amount of executive compensation and extent of CEO pay-performance
relationship for managers have been controversial topics in academic and business
communities. Critics of executive compensation practices argue that the board does not
design the executive compensation schemes to maximise the value of shareholders
because of CEO power on a board (Core et al., 1999). Independent directors are more
inclined to effectively monitor management because they are less affected by a CEO
and aim at protecting their reputations in the labour market (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
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However, when independent directors are too busy, have insufficient information
pertaining to the firm or managers, or are appointed by the CEO, they may not perform
effectively (Jensen, 1993).
There is a growing volume of literature suggesting that boards or independent directors
are ineffective in some respects. Conyon and Peck (1998) used data from the UK and
found that the influence of outside directors on executive compensation was limited.
Crystal (1991) pointed out that because CEO’s sometimes appoint independent directors
they are sometimes unwilling to confront them, especially about executive
compensation, so these boards may be unable to set appropriate executive compensation
and hence maximise shareholder value. However, Dahya and McConnell (2007) argued
that boards with more outside directors can make better decisions, particularly on the
appointment of CEO’s.
In spite of the important and pivotal role played by boards in setting executive
compensation there has been comparatively little Chinese research into this issue. This
contrasts with the US, where there are many studies on the role of a board, including the
relationship with the CEO overpaid compensation. Examples of such research include
the studies of Lambert et al. (1993) and Boyd (1994) who suggested that executive
compensation linked to performance was better in firms with more outside directors.
However, the exclusive focus on economies like the US makes it far from apparent how
an independent board would influence executive compensation and CEO payperformance relationship in emerging economies such as China. This leads to my
investigation of the relationship between an independent board and CEO payperformance relationship in China, an economy which, despite its increasing importance
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in global economy, lacks sufficient empirical research on its corporate governance
structures.

Before 2001 many directors of China’s listed firms found it difficult to exert anything
other than figurative influence on the company they served. A survey in 1999 by Tenev
and Zhang (2002) showed that only 3.1 percent of directors had some independence, so
as a consequence, the role of board and independent directors has recently attracted
more attention in China. In August 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) released statement 102 “Guidelines for establishing an independent directors
system for listed companies” in which one third of directors required for listed firms by
June, 2003 had to be independent. Independent directors are those who have no any
affiliation with the firm other than their directorship (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). Thus,
they are more inclined to balance the power of larger shareholders (Guan, 2007), and
restrict their expropriation of minority investors.
However, there is a difference between China’s boards and US boards because of their
legal and institutional contexts, even though the boardroom in China is getting much
closer to its US counterpart. Independent directors in the US focus more on the problem
of solving agency costs while those in China aim at protecting shareholders, especially
minority shareholders (Kato and Long, 2006a). Furthermore the US has stronger
securities regulation than China, and more severe punishment for wrong doing, resulting
in higher costs when directors break security laws and regulations. As Finkelstein and
Hambrick remarked, “Boards have long been considered to play an important role in the
establishment of executive pay” (1996). However, as noted earlier, those studies on
board structure and CEO pay-performance relationship provide mixed evidence,
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suggesting that further investigation is warranted. This idea gave rise to my first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Companies with more independent directors on the board will have a
stronger link between their top managers’ pay and corporate performance than other
companies.
3.2.3 Compensation committee

Today compensation committees are getting more engaged in corporate decisions. In
terms of the effectiveness of boards, it is of importance to understand that most board
functions are performed by sub-committees. As noted by Lorsch and Maclver (1989),
“the work of the board is done in committees”. With respect to the design of an
executive pay scheme, a compensation committee is the most important sub-committee
under the board of directors. Since the early 1990s compensation committees attracts
more and more concerns from shareholders. From 1991 to 1995 there were 161
shareholder proposals related to CEO compensation (Johnson and Shackell, 1997),
among them twenty concerning the issue of a compensation committee. In the absence
of a compensation committee there exists an opportunity for top management to
compensate themselves but not maximise shareholder value. Williamson (1985)
commented that managers in firms without compensation committees are more likely to
write their own pay contracts with one hand and sign them with the other. Main and
Johnston (1993) pointed out that a compensation committee is expected to influence top
executive pay, which should be set in the interests of shareholders. However, to simply
reduce the pay of self serving managers is not the only purpose of a compensation
committee because economic and agency theories suggest that directors on a
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compensation committee determine the appropriate design of executive pay and align
the interests of management and shareholders (Conyon et al., 1995; Main and Johnston,
1993).
Long used in the U.S., this compensation committee governance mechanism is
comparatively new in China. Before 2001, critics argued that most boards and
committees in Chinese firms lack independence because politicians and owners
controlled by the state sit on most boards as a response to highly concentrated
ownership. Therefore the corporate governance code of 2002 for China’s listed firms
states: “Boards of listed firms are recommended to appoint compensation committees,
consisting wholly or mainly of independent directors and chaired by an independent
director and suggesting the board the compensation of the executive managers”.
As noted above, most large companies in the U.S. and U.K. delegate the decision
executive pay to a compensation committee which is a sub-committee of the board of
directors. Consequently, compensation committees play an important role in
determining CEO pay schemes in the best interests of the firm. However, limited extant
evidence is provided on the characteristics and effectiveness of compensation
committees on CEO pay schemes. For example, Newman and Mozes (1999) focussed
on the relationship between a compensation committee and executive compensation
using a sample of 161 U.S. firms, and found that the sensitivity of executive pay to
performance was lower when at least one member of the compensation committee was
an insider. That is, the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance is
more favourable to managers (at shareholders’ expense) in firms with insiders on the
compensation committee. Vafeas (2003), and Perry and Zenner (2001) found that CEO
pay-for-performance was weaker and the level of executive compensation higher in
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firms where the compensation committee was dominated by insiders. However, by
using a sample of 200 firms from Fortune 500 in 1992, Daily et al. (1998) did not find
any evidence that the proportion of insider directors lead to a greater level of executive
compensation. In addition, the findings of Anderson and Bizjak (2003) showed some
evidence that the more outside directors there were on a compensation committee the
higher the levels of CEO compensation and the higher the pay-performance sensitivity.
Interestingly, after ownership was controlled they found no relationship between the
independence of a compensation committee and total managerial compensation. In the
UK Conyon and Peck (1998) did not find any relationship between the presence of a
compensation committee and level of CEO compensation, but they did provide
evidence that firms with outsider dominated compensation committees have their CEO
compensation more aligned with firm performance.
Evidence is also provided from countries other than the US and UK. Through their
study on large Canadian corporations, Chowdhury and Wang (2009) document a
significant effect of compensation committee independence on CEO contingent
compensation, i.e., the CEO pay-performance relationship. On the other hand Conyon
and He (2004) found no evidence to prove that insiders on a compensation committee
increased CEO pay.
If inside directors intend to act in the interests of managers instead of shareholders, I
expected that more compensation committee independence would be associated with a
more sensitive CEO pay-performance relationship. According to the Listed Company
Rules and Corporate Governance Code in 2002, a compensation committee should
comprise a majority of independent directors and have an independent director as the
chair. Thus, I could reasonably expect a stronger CEO pay-performance relationship
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when there was more independent compensation committee. This contributed to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. CEO pay-performance relationship is expected to be weaker in firms that
have at least one director on their compensation committees being paid.

Like Western countries, the role of a compensation committee in China’s listed firms is
to determine executive pay schemes or make recommendations to the board of directors.
Hence, the board are more inclined to adopt recommendations from the compensation
committee with possible modest modifications but if there is no compensation
committee then the board of directors determines executive compensation. Thus, it is
believed that a compensation committee may enhance the board’s power, especially
when the CEO is not a member of the committees (see, for example, Andjelkovic et al.,
2002). The important role played by the compensation committee in CEO compensation
decisions is also supported empirically (e.g., Belliveau et al., 1996).
Meanwhile, independent directors on a board intend to represent shareholder interests
and alleviate the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. The
compensation committee assesses executive performance, determines appropriate
compensation packages, and then reports to the board. Therefore, the establishment of
compensation committees, more specifically, independent compensation committees,
has the potential to design executive compensation and align the interests of
shareholders and managers by providing appropriate information to the board.
Combined together, a possible explanation for why an independent board less influence
on CEO pay-performance relationship, from previous research, is that an independent
compensation committee does not exist. This leads to my last hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 3. The CEO pay-performance relationship is stronger in firms with more
independent directors on a board when there is a compensation committee.
3.3 Variables and models
3.3.1 Data and sample

The sample consisted of 5,869 observations over a six-year period (from 2001 to 2006)
for publicly traded Chinese firms in the Shanghai security exchange (SHSE) and
Shenzhen security exchange (SZSE). Most previous research of CEO pay in China used
sample windows where the disclosure of executive compensation was voluntary, which
lead to selection effects and bias. Therefore, following Conyon and He (2008), I used
data after 2001 because after 1998 it was compulsory to disclose executive
compensation in annual reports, which mitigated the sample selection effects.
Specifically, I constructed a dataset by merging the following three databases. First, I
used accounting, CEO compensation and other corporate governance data from the
database developed by SinoFin Information Services25. Second, I assembled basic data
on compensation committees from China Stock Market and Accounting Research
Database (CSMAR) developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company26.
Third, I collected data on stock returns from the CCFR database developed by Tsinghua
University. Because data from the composition of a compensation committee was not

25

Prior research has used SinoFin data set in their studies on China’s corporate governance, for example,
see, Kato and Long, 2006a.
26

Prior research has used CSMAR data set in their studies on China’s corporate governance, for example,
see, Bai et al., 2003 and 2004; Sun and Tong, 2003.
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provided by any database, I collected the relevant information from annual reports by
hand.
The final sample consists of data from 21 non-financial industries in terms of standard
industrial classification codes of CSRC from 2001 to 2006. And I deleted observations
where executive compensation, accounting data, financial data, and corporate
governance data were not available, leaving a final sample of 5,869 firm-year
observations. All the variables are defined in Table 3.1.
(Insert Table 3.1 here)
3.3.2 CEO compensation and firm performance

I focussed on cash compensation, i.e., the total compensation recorded in annual reports
in China’s listed firms because I was interested in the reward portion of total
compensation27. Hence, the cash compensation can be viewed as ex-post compensation
depending on current performance (see, for example, Gaver and Gaver, 1998; Comprix
and Mueller, 2006). Following Leone et al. (2006), I used the sum of bonus and salary,
which is the total cash compensation, as the measurement of executive compensation.
Moreover, I used the natural log of cash compensation like most existing studies (see,
e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987). The natural log can mitigate the difference in
executive compensation across firms and hence reduce heteroskedasticity. Among the
alternative measures of executive compensation provided in the SinoFin database, the
average pay of the top three highest paid executives, which comprises salary and bonus,
27

In China, only the cash compensation for CEO is required to report in annual reports. In addition, stock
option and other long-term incentives are only provided to CEOs since 2006 when most companies still
paid their CEOs cash compensation. Therefore, cash compensation mainly composes of the total
compensation in China’s listed firms.
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resembling most of the previous studies on executive compensation, and are thus the
focus of my study. In Table 3.2, I present summary statistics concerning financial
variables, CEO characteristics, board and firm-specific measures. Descriptive statistics
for CEO compensation are summarised in panel A where all compensations are in 2001constant Yuan 28 . Over the sample period of 2001 to 2006 the average cash
compensation for executive managers was about 165,342 Yuan (or approximately USD
20.668) at 2001-constant Yuan, which was much lower than that of their counterparts in
the U.S. and Japan29. The mean CEO compensations were 105,921 Yuan, 127,369 Yuan,
170,529 Yuan, 210,237 Yuan, 163,854 Yuan and 192,370 Yuan in 2001, 2002, 2003,
2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively. That is, the average CEO compensation almost
increased by 100% in 6 years. The pay ranges from 3,177 to 6,296,667 Yuan, 6,600 to
913,333 Yuan, 11,424 to 1,706,667 Yuan, 10,267 to 1,716,667 Yuan, 1,000 to
4,443,467 Yuan and 8,000 to 1,393,567 Yuan in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and
2006, respectively.
(Insert Table 3.2 here)
Panel B shows how the proportion of independent directors on boards changed over the
years. The average yearly percentage of independent directors were 6%, 24%, 32%,
34%, 34% and 35% from 2001 to 2006. In columns 5, 6, and 7, the number of firms
with approximately one third independent directors on boards increased considerably,
whilst many firms still had boards with more or less than one third independent

28

I consistently express both CEO compensation amount and sales in 2001-constant Yuan. All price
changes are made according to CPI (Consumer Price Index) in China between 2001 to 2006.
29

For example, Core et al. (1999) report an average of cash compensation of USD 614,000 for a sample
of 205 firms between 1982 and 1984.
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directors. That is, the proportion of independent directors on board varies statistically
enough in their governance structure to be investigated.
Lambert and Larcker (1987) used the return on assets (ROA) as accounting
measurement and stock returns (RET) as financial measurement. As they noted, the
return on assets, as one of the accounting numbers were subject to earnings management,
while stock returns are harder to manipulate. However, stock returns involve the
variability of stock market and macro-economics which are outside the control of
management. More recently, it has become more popular to use the market or industry
adjusted market performance as the benchmark for firm-specific performance
measurements. I used the return on assets (ROA) as my accounting performance
measure and the industry-adjusted stock returns (RET) as my financial performance
measure to verify the robustness of my results. I defined ROA as the ratio of net income
to the book value of assets 30 . My measure of industry-adjusted stock return was
measured as annual stock returns minus industry mean stock returns. Contemporaneous
and lagged firm performance measures can both impact executive cash compensation
and I used contemporaneous performance in my study. As a sensitivity test, I repeated
my analyses with lagged performance measurements and received similar results. Panel
C of Table 3.2 shows that the average rate of return on assets (ROA) was 3% over the
sample period and it was significantly different for firms with and without CC (3% vs.
2%). That is, firms with CC grew faster than firms without CC. To further examine
whether a compensation committee affected CEO compensation, board characteristics
and firm performance differently, I also presented CEO compensation, firm
performance, and other firm characteristics separately for firms with and without CC. In
30

Using operating earnings for my tests gives similar results.
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terms of the Wilcoxon test, CEO compensation, firm performance and board
characteristics in firms without CC are all significantly smaller than those with CC,
while only LAGNPROFIT was similar between firms with and without CC.
Most empirical studies on CEO compensation used data for individual executives from
U.S. firms while the closest studies to ours are Kaplan (1994) and Kato et al. (2007)
who used average executive compensation data for Japanese and Korean firms. Like
Kaplan (1994), I began by estimating the pay-performance semi-elasticity equations.
That is,
LCEOCOM     Performance  u

(1)

ROA and stock returns (RET) provided different indicators of a firm’s performance. I
used LCEOCOM because the natural log of CEO compensation was more likely than
CEOCOM to be distributed normally.
3.3.3 Board characteristics

There are numerous studies on the impact of board independence on CEO payperformance relationship but they give mixed evidence, which suggests that further
investigations are warranted. To examine my first hypotheses I collected data on the
board characteristics, in particular, the proportion of independent directors31, size of the
board, and number of board meetings. As shown in Panel C Table 3.2, the proportion of
independent directors on the board was about 29% in full sample when firms with CC

31

Independent directors are referred to as those directors who have no any affiliation with the firm

other than their directorship (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). Thus, they incline to effectively balance the
strong power of large shareholders (Guan, 2007), and hence restrict their expropriation of minority
investors.
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have a much higher percentage of independent directors than firms without CC (32% vs.
25%). The mean size of the board was 9.74, which was smaller than the average board
of 13 in U.S. firms (Core et al., 1999). In terms of diligence, the average number of
annual board meetings was 7.66 over the sample period and more frequently for firms
with than without CC (7.95 vs. 7.39).
I followed my baseline model to investigate the impact of board independence on the
pay-performance semi-elasticity equations, which is an adaptation of the model in
Kaplan (1994). That is,
LCEOCOM    1 Performance   2 BOARDIND   3 BOARDIND * Performance  u
(2)

Where LCEOCOM is CEO compensation, calculated as the sum of the top three highest
paid executive compensation divided by three; Performance is return on assets (ROA)
and stock return (RET); BOARDIND is the proportion of independent directors on
board. The value of  3 indicates the impact of board independence on CEO payperformance relationship and is my interest of variable.
3.3.4 Compensation committee

I followed my baseline model again to test the impact of insider directors on the
compensation committee on the CEO pay-performance semi-elasticity equations, an
adaptation of the model in Kaplan (1994). That is,

LCEOCOM    1 Performance   2 CCPAID   3CCPAID * Performance
  4 Other var iables  u

(3)

I defined an indicator variable CCPAID to be equal to one, if at least one member on the
compensation committee was paid by the firm they serve, and zero otherwise. CCPAID
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was used as a proxy for the effect of inside directors on a compensation committee,
contrary to compensation committee independence32.
As indicated in Panel C Table 3.2, an average of 48% of firms formed their
compensation committees over the sample period. Moreover, I could see from Panel D
of Table 3.2 that over the sample period 57, 310, 474. 579, 662 and 746 firms set up
their compensation committees in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively.
The percentage of firms that have at least one director on a compensation committee
being paid by the firm was 70%, 67%, 63%, 62%, 61% and 62% in 2001, 2002, 2003,
2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively.
3.3.5 Other variables

I included several control variables in the regression analysis to account for firmspecific characteristics that influenced executive compensation. First, the size of a firm
was measured by LASSETS. Existing literature has shown that the size of a firm is
positively associated with executive compensation (for example, Firth et al., 2007).
Thus I used ln(assets) (LASSETS) as my proxy for firm size.
Firm risk is a measure of the firm’s information environment and the risk of its
operating environment (Core et al., 1999) and thus is a potential determinant of the level
of executive compensation. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) documented a significant
decrease in sensitivity to CEO pay-performance relationship with a decrease in the
variance of performance, owing to the trade-off of executive incentives against the
32

The mean proportion of independent directors on compensation committee (CCIND) increased a little
in 2002 and then remained constant (58.7%, 60.8%, 61.2%, 61.2%, 61.3% and 61.4% in 2001, 2002,
2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively). Therefore I do not include the proportion of independent
directors on CC in my studies because of insufficient variability.
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allocation of performance risk. High firm risk is passed to managers and thus higher
executive compensation is demanded. In my study, firm risk is defined as the standard
deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous 12 months (STDRET).
Iyengar et al. (2005) find a significant positive relationship between performance and
executive compensation for all-equity firms while no such relationship was discerned
for high-levered firms. Therefore, it was expected that leverage would play an important
role in CEO pay-performance relationship in terms of the potential cost of agency debt.
I therefore included leverage rate as a control variable, measured as the book value of
debt to the book value of shareholder equity (LEV).
Sun and Cahan (2009) found that the positive effect of compensation committee on
CEO pay-performance relationship was less for high growth firms than those making a
loss. In order to include the impact of growth opportunity in executive compensation I
used lagged market value to book value of assets as a proxy for growth opportunities
(GROWTHO), like previous studies (e.g. Firth et al., 2007). Moreover, a dummy
variable was defined to indicate whether or not a firm made a loss in the previous year
(LAGNPROFIT).
The data in Panel C of Table 3.2 shows larger natural log of assets for firms with CC
than without CC (21.34 vs. 21.26). The mean leverage rate was 1.38 over the sample
period which was higher for firms without CC than for firms with CC (1.45 vs. 1.31).
With regard to stock return variance (STDRET), firms with CC experienced almost the
same risk as those without, but they also experienced a lower growth opportunity than
their counterparts (3.09 vs. 4.07). Finally, the average likelihood of making a negative
pre-tax profit was about 9% for all firms. The percentage of firms making a negative
pre-tax profit, were the same for firms with and without CC (9%).
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Other factors are included in my study to account for industry and year effects (see
Table 3.1 for the definitions). Industry is defined in terms of the securities exchange
classifications and year is measured by five indicator variables.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 The CEO pay-performance relation
In this section, I used multivariate analysis to test my hypotheses. I examined how
board characteristics and the composition of compensation committees affect the levels
of executive compensation and CEO pay-performance relationship, and whether the
presence of CC was associated with more effective independent board directors as well
as a more sensitive CEO pay-performance relationship.
3.4.1.1 Board results

The cross-sectional multiple regression results are shown in Table 3.3. Parameter
estimates are given along with the corresponding heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors and p-values33. In panel A, I used the return on assets (ROA) and then tested the
robustness of the model34 estimates of the impact of board independence on CEO payperformance relationship using the alternative performance measures (RET) in Panel B.
Model 1 shows the results for firm performance, board independence and an interactive
term between performance and board independence when other firm-specific
33

I report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors because the Breusch Pagan (1979) test is significant
(p-values<0.05) for the test models of hypotheses. To test for autocorrelation at the panel level, the
approach outlined in Wooldridge (2002) as implemented by Drukker (2003) is used. For all the regression
analyses this test shows that autocorrelation is not evident.
34

I employ fixed effects unbalanced panel models rather than OLS models due to the results from F-test,
LM test and Hausman test.
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characteristics were not included. Model 2 adds firm-specific, industry and year control
variables. The coefficients for the year and industry indicator variables were not
reported in the tables because they were of no direct interest to this study.
I then computed variance inflation factors (VIF) for main variables, and they are all
below 2. These diagnostic statistics suggested that multicollinearity was not a major
problem in my models.
The regression model 2 also contains five indicator variables that control the year in
which executive compensation was paid, and 20 indicator variables that control the
industry35.
(Insert Table 3.3 here)
The signs of the estimated coefficients on the accounting performance measure (ROA)
and the financial performance measure (RET) were expected to be positive, that is, the
better the performance the higher the executive compensation. According to my
hypothesis the sign on the coefficient of the interaction term ROA*BOARDIND (or
RET*BOARDIND) was expected to be positive, that is, CEO pay-performance
relationship is stronger in firms with more independent directors on the board than those
with less. In accordance with most of the published literature, the signs on
LBOARDSIZE, BMEETING, LASSETS, STDRET and GROWTHO were expected to
be positive while the signs on LAGNPROFIT were expected to be negative. I did not
make a priori predictions regarding the signs of the estimated coefficients on
BOARDIND and LEV because prior evidence was neither compelling or was mixed.
35

The regression analysis makes several important assumptions. First of all, I include only non-financial
firms in my sample and thus the regression coefficients are reasonably assumed to be identical across
firms. And I partially control for potential industry and year differences by incorporating indicator
variables to capture mean shifts for the dependent variable. Second, the error terms are assumed to be
independent.
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Table 3.3 summarises the regression estimates of Eq.(2) for my sample. Model 1
focused on how board independence could impact the level of executive compensation
and CEO pay-performance relationship. The proportion of directors on board has
significant effects on CEO pay-performance relationship statistically and economically,
as I expected (P-value=0.01).
Model 2 examines the main effects of board independence on executive compensation
and CEO pay-performance relationship controlling all other main possible determinants
of executive pay. The effect of board independence on executive pay-performance
relationship remains significant statistically and economically after controlling the main
factors (P-value=0.05). Interestingly, the coefficient on board independence changed
from positively significant to insignificant and the sign also changed. Thus, board
independence has no significant effect on executive compensation but has a significant
effect on CEO pay-performance relationship. In other words, firms with a larger
proportion of independent directors on board will not change the level of executive
compensation but will strengthen the relationship between executive pay and firm
performance and thus enhance internal corporate governance. Therefore, Hypothesis 1
is strongly supported. The sensitivity test in Panel B provided similar results by using
stock return (RET) as firm performance.
3.4.1.2 Compensation committee results

Next, to test the hypothesis developed in a previous section where the CEO payperformance relationship were stronger for firms both with a larger proportion of
independent board directors and a compensation committee, I classified full sample into

71

firms with and without CC and estimated the impact of board independence on CEO
pay-performance relationship separately.
(Insert Table 3.4 here)
The results of my regressions using Eq. (2) are presented in Tables 4. The results for
control variables are not reported because they are of no direct interest to my analysis.
In Panel A of Table 3.4, the beta of ROA*BOARDIND for full sample was 2.21, which
indicated a positive significant effect of board independence on CEO pay-performance
relationship statistically and economically. With respect to the firms with CC, the point
estimates of coefficient on ROA*BOARDIND was 4.24 significant at better than the
5% level, which was more evident than the full sample. However, the proportion of
independent directors on a board in firms without CC does not show any significant
effect

on

CEO

pay-performance

relationship

(the

beta

of

coefficient

on

ROA*BOARDIND is 0.89). That is, the effect of board independence on CEO payperformance relationship in the full sample was mainly driven by firms with CC, which
offered strong support for Hypothesis 3. Then I used the alternative performance
measurement RET to test the robustness of my results in Panel B, it showed similar
results. Consequently, the results strongly support Hypothesis 3, which suggested that
independent directors were likely to work more effectively on setting executive
compensation when they have a compensation committee.
The questions to which I now turn are whether CEO pay-performance relationship is
affected by the characteristics of compensation committees.
(Insert Table 3.5 here)
Table 3.5 summarises the regression estimates of Eq. (3) to test Hypotheses 2 for my
panel sample. I estimated separate regressions using ROA as my performance measures
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when heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. The
dependent variable is the natural log of executive cash compensation and the insider
effects on a compensation committee were tested on CEO pay-performance relationship
for the CC sample. The estimates on coefficients of control variables are not reported
here because they are of no direct interest to my study. In the second column, whether
directors get paid (CCPAID) was examined on the CEO pay-performance relationship.
An expected negative relationship can be seen and is significant at better than the 1%
level. That is, insiders on compensation committees were negatively associated with
CEO pay-performance relationship, which was consistent with my hypothesis 2.
To further examine the effect of insiders on a compensation committee and how they
affect CEO pay-performance relationship, I divided the CC firm sub-sample again
according to whether the proportion of independent directors were less than or greater
than 33%36. That is, the CC firm sub-sample was further divided to two sub-samples
with regard to different board independence.

Interestingly, the coefficient on the

interaction term ROA*CCPAID was negative statistically and economically significant
in firms with greater than one third independent directors on board (P-value=0.01). It
can be seen from Table 3.5 that the coefficients on ROA are all significantly positive at
better than the 0.01 level, suggesting a positive strong CEO pay-performance
relationship in the whole CC sample. In terms of CCPAID, even though the coefficient
on ROA*CCPAID was -1.01 (p-value=0.05) for firms with greater than 33%
independent directors, the coefficient on ROA was 2.73 (p-value=0.01), which still lead
to a net positive effect (2.73-1.01=1.72) on CEO pay-performance relationship. This
36

In August 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released statement 102
“Guidelines for establishing an independent directors system for listed companies” in which one third
independent directors are required for listed firms by June, 2003.

73

was consistent with my expectation that CC can improve the CEO pay-performance
relationship.
In response to the results from the regressions in previous sections, I intend to further
examine whether the existence of CC can reinforce the effectiveness of independent
directors on board in linking CEO pay with firm performance.
(Insert Table 3.6 here)

In Table 3.6, I added a new term ROA*BOARDIND*CC in my model to investigate the
joint effect of CC and board independence on CEO pay-performance relationship. I can
see from Table 3.6 that the joint effect of board independence and CC was statistically
and economically significant on CEO pay-performance relationship (P-value=0.05).
Moreover, I tested the effect of existence of compensation committee on CEO payperformance relationship by including an interactive term ROA*CC in my regression.
The coefficient on ROA*CC was significantly positive, which supports hypothesis 3
again.
3.4.2 Further tests on the effect of compensation committee and board
characteristics

In terms of the results from a previous section, the hypothesis that when a compensation
committee is present a larger portion of independent directors on board enhances CEO
pay-performance relationship was supported. To further test the effects of a
compensation committee, following Wild (1994), I examined the effect of board
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independence on executive pay-performance relationship before and after the formation
of a compensation committee37.
The primary test of the hypotheses of my study focussed on the magnitude of the slope
parameter from the regression of executive compensation on firm performance and
board independence. Specifically, the following regression was executed:
LCEOCOM    1 ROA1   2 BOARDIND   3 BOARDIND * ROA1  u

(4a)
Where LCEOCOM and BOARDING are as defined in Table 3.1,  1 is the payperformance relation and  3 is the variable of interest in my study, indicating the
impact of board independence on executive pay-performance relationship. In order to
eliminate the tax impact, I used the pre-tax profit to calculate ROA-1 (return on assets,
lagged one year) instead of net income and contemporary ROA in the regressions.
The regression results for Eq. (4a) are reported in Panel A of Table 3.7. As expected, the
parameter  3 on ROA-1*BOARDIND, when using data from every period, was positive
(5.16) and significantly greater than zero at the 0.001 level. The central hypothesis to be
examined was whether or not the effect of board independence on executive payperformance relationship was greater after a committee had been formed than before.
The second and third rows in Panel A of Table 3.7 present regression results for the
periods before and after their formation. Consistent with increased board effectiveness,
a larger proportion of independent directors on board was positively associated with
stronger executive pay-performance relationship (p=0.002) for the periods after the
37

The CSRC recommended all the listed firms in China to form compensation committee since 2003 and
thereafter compensation committees are increasingly formatted. Thus, year dummies are used to control
the possible effects of years. My study employs two years before and two years after 2003 to investigate
the effects of formation of compensation committee.
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committee was formed, while no significant relationship between board independence
and executive pay-for-performance was found before the committee was formed.
As another test of the hypothesis, a second regression equation was formulated as
follows:

LCEOCOM    1 ROA1   2 BOARDIND   3 BOARDIND * ROA1
  4 ROA1 * Post   5 BOARDIND * ROA1 * Post  u
(4b)
In this case, Post equals one if it is in the time period after the committee was formed,
and equals zero otherwise. A test of the primary hypothesis is equivalent to a test of the
alternative hypothesis that the coefficient  5 is significantly greater than zero.
The estimation results for the regression in Eq. (4b) are reported in Panel B of Table 3.7.
The estimated coefficient  5 , in a test for a change in the effect of board independence
on executive pay-performance relationship from the periods before to the periods after
formation, was positive (6.49) and marginally significant (p=0.065). The evidence
indicates that the effect of board independence on executive pay-performance
relationship was significantly greater after formation than before. That is, the hypothesis
that greater board independence can strengthen the relationship between executive
compensation and firm performance when a compensation committee exists was
supported again by testing time periods before and after the committee was formed.
Finally, in terms of state controlling shareholder, the results from the previous chapter
indicate that CEO pay-performance relationship in state-controlled firms is stronger
than its non state-controlled counterparts. The results in Table 3.8 are consistent with
the previous chapter, suggesting that state control can significantly enhance the link
between CEO compensation and firm performance and hence is associated with better
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corporate governance. Therefore, I intend to investigate how effectively compensation
committees assist independent directors enhance CEO pay-performance relationship
under state control. To examine the positive effect of state-controlling shareholder, I
divided a full sample into state-controlled and non state-controlled sub-samples. Table
3.8 shows that the coefficient of CEO pay-performance relationship was larger in statecontrolled firms than non state-controlled firms, which supports the results from the
previous chapter. Also the estimates of coefficient on ROA*BOARDIND*CC is 3.34 at
better than the 0.01 level in state-controlled firms whilst the coefficient on
ROA*BOARDIND*CC was 0.51 and not significant in non state-controlled firms at all.
These results were consistent with my expectations as well as the results from the
previous chapter.
3.4.3 Additional test of potential endogeneity and reverse causality
A potential issue is the reverse causality38 from CEO compensation to firm performance
(Firth et al., 2007). In order to address the problem of reverse causality, a simultaneous
equations model containing CEO compensation and firm performance equations was
developed. Table 3.9 provides 3SLS estimates for the simultaneous equations model
that most independent variables have the same signs as my longitudinal models above,
which is consistent with the regressions results discussed above. Consequently, reserve
causality is not considered as a serious issue in my studies.
3.5 Summary and conclusions

38

By using Hausman test (1978), no serious endogeneity issue is found in my models.
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As Finkelstein and Hambrick remarked, “Boards have long been considered to play an
important role in the establishment of executive pay” (1996). However, those studies on
board characteristics and CEO pay-performance relationship provided mixed evidence
in Western countries and transitional economies such as China. This chapter has
provided the first rigorous estimates on the effect that independents boards and
compensation committees have on the executive pay-performance relationship of
China’s listed firms. To achieve this I assembled the unbalance panel data (that provide
information not only on executive compensation and firm performance but also on
compensation committee composition) from 5,869 observations from the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock markets from 2001 to 2006.
Contrary to a popular belief that China’s corporate governance, specifically the board
and executive compensation scheme, does not work effectively, I provided new
empirical evidence. I found that executive cash compensation is related more to
accounting and stock market performance when there are more independent directors on
the board. These independent directors are more likely to set executive compensation to
maximise shareholder wealth if they have a compensation committee to offer them help
and information. Further analysis revealed for the first time that the overall link between
an independent board and executive pay-performance relationship is driven by firms
with a compensation committee while no such relationships in firms without a
compensation committee were found. As such, my study complements earlier works
which tend to point to the significant impact of board independence on CEO payperformance relationship in general.
These extended findings clarify that an independent board is positively significantly
associated with a stronger CEO pay-performance relationship after a compensation
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committee has been formed, certainly not before, which again supports the important
role played by a compensation committee.
Interestingly, insiders on a compensation committee negatively affect CEO payperformance relationship in firms with more than one third of independent board
directors, whilst the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance still remains
positive after adjusting for the negative effects of insiders.
To the best of my knowledge there is no previous research on the complementary
relationship between board characteristics and a compensation committee which
focused on CEO pay-performance relationship. In future I will investigate the impact
that this change of ownership structure has on this complementary relationship. To do
so I will need to continue to collect board, ownership movement, and executive
compensation data in the coming years as non-tradable share reforms progress, in
particular the adoption of the compensation committee and how its composition is
implemented.
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CHAPTER FOUR: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE IMPACT OF
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN CHINA
4.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters I investigated how ultimate ownership and board
characteristics affected CEO pay-performance relationship in China’s listed firms. In
order to further test the impact of corporate governance, I extended my studies to firm
performance. Instead of investigating the effects of corporate governance on CEO payperformance relationship, in this chapter I will examine how ownership structure, board
characteristics, and managerial compensation affect firm performance.
Corporate governance has been of concern in Asia after the 1997 Asia economic crisis.
Global corporate scandals such as WorldCom, Enron, Adelphia, and Tyco also
highlighted deficiencies in corporate governance systems, in order to enhance corporate
governance, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released a new
corporate governance code in 2002 suggesting many additional requirements and
recommendations such as boards must now comprise not less than 30 percent 39
independent directors.
In the mean time China has begun a crucial transformation of their economy over the
past decade as corporate governance reforms now proceeds. Many state owned
enterprises (SOEs) have had their operating units privatised and then listed on stock
exchanges. Moreover, China’s market capitalisation is now ranked sixth in the world
39

In August 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released statement 102
“Guidelines for establishing an independent directors system for listed companies” in which one third
independent directors are required for listed firms by June, 2003.
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because there are more than 1500 Chinese firms listed on local stock exchanges. In
2006 China became the second largest economy in the world following the US, based
on purchasing power parity (PPP) (CIA, 2007). In terms of the report from the
Economist (2008), China’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 11.4% on
average at a yearly base to 24.66 trillion yuans (or approximately 3.43 trillion US
dollars) in 2007. Thus, how corporate governance improves China’s economy, or more
specifically, the performance of individual firms, becomes an open question and
accordingly needs more empirical evidence.
On the other hand, the research of Black (2001), Black et al. (2002), Gompers et al.
(2003), and Joh (2003) showed a significantly positive relationship between firm
performance and corporate governance. Cornett et al. (2008) pointed out that the impact
of corporate governance on firm performance changes when true firm performance 40 is
measured. To extend the studies of Cornett et al. (2008), I empirically analysed the
effects of corporate governance on the true firm performance of listed firms based on an
eight year panel data set. I controlled a number of variables that are typically included in
the research of corporate governance and payed particular attention to the key
characteristic of Chinese firms, the type of ownership shareholders and relative
ownership structure.
The specific characteristics of corporate governance which differentiate China from its
Western counterparts are a highly concentrated ownership and state control.
Additionally, institutional investors are believed to play an important role in western
countries (Chung et al., 2002) but they basically hold a small number of shares in
40

True firm performance is referred to as reported firm performance adjusted for the effect of earnings
management in my studies.
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Chinese listed firms and therefore cannot play an important role in monitoring
management. Therefore, large shareholders are believed to determine firm performance
so I focussed on the effect that ownership structure has on firm performance, with a
particular interest in the largest shareholder.
Extant literature suggests that corporate governance structures such as the type of
shareholders and board independence can significantly influence both corporate
performance and earnings management. For example, Lai (2005) investigated the
relationship between board independence and earnings management and found that
firms which voluntarily adopt an independent board fail to manage their earnings while
other firms do not show similar results. Interestingly, Cornett et al. (2008) argued that if
both earnings management and corporate performance are equally affected by
governance mechanisms then their influence on reported firm performance is probably
partly cosmetic. Therefore, if the specific ownership structure in Chinese listed firms
affected both reported firm performance and earnings management, does ownership
structure affect true firm performance the same way? Since there is no evidence on
Chinese firms regarding true firm performance, my studies fill the void and hence offer
empirical evidence from an emerging economy.
With respect to the effect of corporate governance on firm performance, my study
focussed more on the largest shareholder, private ownership (percentage of A share) and
state ownership than Cornett et al. (2008), who focussed on the effect of CEO
compensation and board independence. Furthermore, in contrast to Cornett et al. (2008),
my study was based on a panel data set which mitigates a possible endogeneity problem
by estimating fixed effects models.
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Previous studies on the corporate governance of Chinese listed firms have suggested
that the type of shareholders is responsible for firm performance. Likewise, many
studies suggested different relationships between ownership structure and firm
performance (see Denis and McConnell, 2003, for a review), but they failed to identify
true firm performance properly, which is adjusted for the effects of earnings
management. The aim of this chapter is to compare and investigate the effects of
ownership structure and other corporate governance on firm performance, with or
without the effects of earnings management to see whether the effects are real or
cosmetic.
This study empirically examines the relationship between ownership structure and
earnings management, and then true firm performance. I found that private ownership
was negatively significantly associated with earnings management while state
ownership was positively significantly associated with earnings management. I also
found there was an inverse U-shaped relationship between the shareholdings of the
largest shareholder and earnings management. That is, the coefficient on the largest
shareholdings was positively significant both statistically and economically (Pvalue=0.05) and the coefficient on the squared largest shareholdings was negatively
significant both statistically and economically (P-value=0.1). Therefore, in terms of true
firm performance I found a positive significant relationship between private ownership
and true performance, but a negative significant relationship between state ownership
and true performance. The effect of largest shareholdings on earnings management
resulted in a U-shaped relationship between the largest shareholding and true firm
performance. Except for private ownership, the effects of ownership structure I
investigated in my studies only appeared when true firm performance was measured,
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but no significant influence was found for the reported firm performance. Private
ownership was also better at influencing corporate performance when true firm
performance was considered. My results suggested that state ownership is responsible
for poor performance, which is consistent with most previous literature
This chapter has five sections. The next section reviews the literature on corporate
governance and earnings management. Section 3 introduces the data used in my study,
presents the models used to identify earnings management and discusses the empirical
approach. Section 4 presents the empirical results and further robustness tests, and the
final section concludes and discusses directions for future research.
4.2 Corporate governance, ownership structure and earnings management
4.2.1 Earnings management
It has been recognised for years in accounting and finance literature that managers use
the latitude in accounting rules to manage accounting numbers and serve their own or
the firm’s interests in a wide variety of contexts (see, for example, Chen and Yuan,
2004). In Healy and Wahlen (1999)’s review article they concluded that the evidence is
consistent with earnings management “to alter financial reports to either mislead some
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. ” The
review of earnings management by Healy and Wahlen (1999) also pointed out that if
financial reports are used to convey management information on their firms’
performance, managers must be allowed to exercise judgment in financial reporting.
However, under certain circumstances, management discretion on judgment leads to
earnings management, even fraud.
84

The use of accruals, especially discretionary accruals, to increase or decrease reported
income temporarily is one way to manage earnings. Total accruals are components of
earnings that are not reflected in current cash flows so managerial discretion determines
their accruals.
In previous literature Klein (2002), Dechow et al. (1996) and Beasley (1996) all found
that earnings management can be restrained by well designed corporate governance
structures. For instance Bedard et al. (2004) suggested that the proportion of
independent directors on a board of directors decreases the magnitude of discretionary
accruals.
4.2.2 Corporate governance
Extant literature on how corporate governance affects corporate performance and how
corporate governance influences earnings management have been globally numerous.
For example, Dechow et al. (1996) and Beasley (1996) examined the impact of board
independence on financial fraud but they did not focus on the use of discretionary
accruals. Jiraporn and Dadalt (2007) investigated the relationship between founding
family control and earnings management and showed that family firms managed
earnings less than non-family firms.
4.2.2.1 Ownership structure
China has a complex political economy that represents a hybrid of private ownership
and state control. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) stated that shareholders with large
concentrated shareholdings have numerous economic incentives to mitigate agency
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costs41 and monitor managers. This can reduce the free rider problem usually associated
with small dispersed shareholders. As a result, highly-concentrated large shareholders
are more likely to monitor management effectively and thus constrain managers to
manage earnings.
In Chinese listed firms, one major owner usually holds a substantial percentage of
shareholdings. Hence, several corporate scandals of large shareholders expropriating
minority shareholders suggest that large shareholders probably transfer resources out of
the firm to themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. But when the ownership
concentration is high enough there may well be a positive effect (bai et al., 2004).
Tunnelling wastes resources and is therefore inefficient for all the shareholders.
However, when the largest shareholder holds a sufficiently large stake, then their
interests are reasonably aligned with that of the firm so they are less likely to engage in
tunnelling. In fact, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm
performance is controversial. At first, increasing ownership concentration from a low
level is negative because it increases the likelihood of tunnelling resources from other
shareholders without them noticing but as this concentration increases above a certain
level the effect becomes positive, addressing the free rider problem among shareholders.
Bai et al. (2004) found a U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and
firm value in Chinese listed firms. Tian’s (2002) research supported them and also
found a U-shaped relationship between ownership shareholdings of the largest
shareholder and firm value.

41

When the shareholders and the board make poor decisions due to managed biased accounting numbers,
earnings management is classified as agency cost (Singh and Davidson, 2003).
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To sum up, previous research on Chinese corporate governance provides evidence on
the non-linear relationship between the largest shareholdings and firm value but does
not show whether this relationship remains when firm value is deprived of the effects of
earnings management.
On the other hand, the majority of publicly listed firms are state owned (Claessens and
Fan, 2002). In terms of concentrated state shareholdings in China, several studies
provide empirical evidence on the impact of state shareholdings upon variables such as
corporate performance. Previous research shows that corporate performance is inversely
related to the level of direct state ownership (e.g., Qi et al., 2000; Hovey et al., 2003),
however the sample period of their dataset was mostly pre 2003. Some studies have also
suggested that poor performance was attributable to the state shareholdings. For
example, Sun and Tong (2003) and Tian (2002) both examined the effect of state
shareholdings and both found that state shareholdings have a negative impact on firm
performance. However, none of them compared the impact of state shareholdings on
reported and true firm performance.
Bai et al. (2000) suggested that state ownership with controlling shareholdings is likely
to achieve other policy goals at the expense of shareholder interests because in some
respects the state has goals such as social stability rather than maximising profit.
Therefore, state shareholdings are expected to have a negative effect on firm
performance and an even more serious effect when true performance is measured.
Typically, a single dominant shareholder whose shareholdings exceed the second largest
shareholder actually owns the company. Chen et al. (2008) classified the dominant
shareholder into state shareholders and private shareholders and found that the type of
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the controlling shareholder determines the relationship between the largest
shareholdings and firm performance. On average, almost 40% of the shareholdings of a
listed firm are held by private individuals and private institutions, and these shares are
actively traded on Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges (Chen et al., 2006). Private
investors used consolidated or equity accounting to include the earnings of the firm to
their own income statement, when they are paid cash dividends by listed firm. Therefore,
previous literature suggests there are smaller agency problems when private
shareholders are the dominant shareholders (Chen et al., 2006). Likewise, I expected a
positive relationship between private ownership and true firm performance.
Consequently, previous studies on ownership structure emphasized the important role
that ownership structure plays in determining firm performance and earnings
management. This idea leads me to expect that ownership structures, e.g., state
ownership and ownership concentration, significantly impacts corporate performance
when it is adjusted for the effects of earnings management.
4.2.2.2 Board independence and executive compensation
Dechow and Sloan (1991) and Kaplan (1994) suggested that CEO pay-performance
relationship is the essence of the principal agent theory. In order to confirm this
relationship, empirical studies have been done in different contexts. For example Kato
et al. (2007) documented a significant positive relationship between executive cash
compensation and stock market performance in Korean listed firms. Evidence was also
provided from China where most literature shows a significant positive relationship
between CEO compensation and firm performance (e.g., Kato and Long, 2006c).
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On the other hand, according to Healy and Wahlen (1999), the return on assets (ROA) is
used to monitor the pay contracts between shareholders and managers. Explicit and
implicit executive compensation contracts are used to align the interests of shareholders
and management which results in managers using accounting judgment to increase their
earnings based bonuses. Previous studies in accounting literature concentrated on
earnings management by managers aiming to meet targets explicitly linked to bonuses
for reported earnings, or to increase their bonuses (Darrough et al., 1998).
Overall, existing literature suggests that the level of discretionary accruals (as a proxy
for earnings management) is associated with the level of management incentives.
However, previous findings on the relationship between executive compensation and
reported earnings are inconclusive and incomplete. Interestingly, Cornett et al. (2008)
found that a positive CEO pay-performance relationship was mostly cosmetic when
firm performance was deprived of earnings management.
Boards of directors are generally believed to play an important role in corporate
governance, particularly monitoring managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Beasley (1996)
and Dechow et al (1996) claimed that independent directors42 are more likely to oversee
and disclose due to their desire to maintain their reputations. Therefore, the board of
directors, more specifically the outside directors, are believed to monitor top
management and constrain earnings management.

42

Independent directors are referred to as those directors having no affiliation with the firm
other than their directorship (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). Thus, they intend to effectively balance
the strong power of large shareholders (Guan, 2007), and hence restrict their expropriation of
minority investors.
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Extant papers provide evidence suggesting that board independence is associated with
effective governance and good firm performance (Brickley et al., 1994) when others
document a negative relationship between outside directors and the incidence of
earnings management (Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley, 1996). Evidence is also provided
from China that improving the monitoring role of a board will reduce the occurrence of
earnings management. For instance, Lai (2005) suggested that Chinese firms which
choose to voluntarily increase their board independence more than required by
Corporate Governance Code are less likely to manage their earnings. Therefore, if the
independent directors perform effectively in China’s listed firms, then I can expect that
earnings management decreases in according to more board independence and true firm
performance increases.
4.3 Data and models
4.3.1 Sample
Previous research found that earnings management was more prevalent in poorly
performing firms (e.g., Kothari et al., 2005) but when applied to firms with extreme
corporate performance, the standard models of discretionary accruals may not be
reliable (Dechow et al., 1995). Here, following Cornett et al. (2008), I looked at factors
that affected earnings management in “normal” times when even good performing firms
are influenced. That is, firms which received special treatment (ST) and particular
transfer (PT) 43 during the sample window were deleted. In this study therefore, the

43

CSRC released the Special Treatment (ST) regulation in 1998 that firms are specially treated if they
make losses for two successive years. Additionally, one more year of loss makes the ST firms “Particular
Transfer” (PT) firms. PT regulation was effective over the period 1999 to 2001. After 4 th Dec 2001, firms
with consecutive three year losses will be suspended and if it persists until the first midterm reports those
firms would be delisted (CSRC, 2001).
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potential limitations of empirical discretionary accruals models can be ignored because
the sample of firms used were free of financial distress.
Specifically, I constructed the dataset by merging the following three separate databases.
First, I used accounting and other corporate governance data from the database
developed by SinoFin Information Services44. Second, I assembled basic data on stock
returns from the CCFR database developed by Tsinghua University. Thirdly, I used
CEO compensation data from China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database
(CSMAR) developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company.
I then excluded all financial firms45 because they are subject to fundamentally different
regulatory regimes and internal governance structures. The final sample consists of data
on 5 non-financial industries from 2000 to 2007.
Furthermore, I deleted observations without the availability of executive compensation,
accounting and financial data, and corporate governance data that this study needs.
After these adjustments, I was left with a sample of 5,701 firm-years from 2000 to 2007.
Unlike the study of Cornett et al. (2008), the variables of the economic determinants of
firm performance and earnings management are contemporary concerning the ex-post
effect of contemporary corporate governance. Table 4.1 defines all the variables in my
panel regression analysis.
(Insert Table 4.1 here)

44

Prior research has used SinoFin data set in their studies on China’s corporate governance, for example,
see, Kato and Long, 2006.
45

My industry classification follows Chen et al. (2006), listed Chinese firms are classified to 6 industries:
Finance, Utilities, Property and Construction, Conglomerates, Industrial and Manufactory, Commercial.

91

4.3.2 Discretionary accruals
Dechow et al. (1995) claimed the so-called “modified Jones (1991) model” as the model
best able to detect earnings management after they compared several models of
discretionary accruals. Furthermore, Bartov et al. (2001) advocated the use of the
modified Jones model when it is estimated the cross section using other firms in the
same industry. Most models of discretionary accruals refer to discretionary accruals as
the difference between actual and “normal” accruals, estimated by a regression formula.
Firstly, the modified Jones model estimates normal accruals as a fraction of lagged
assets from the following equation:
TA jt
Assets jt 1

Where TA jt

 0

1
Assets jt 1

 1

Salesjt
Assets jt 1

 2

PPE jt
Assets jt 1

(1)

is total accruals for firm j in year t. Total accruals are calculated as

earnings before interests and tax (EBIT)46. Assets jt is total assets for firm j in year t,
Sales jt is change in sales for firm j in year t, and PPE jt is property, plant, equipment

for firm j in year t.
In response to the research of Hribar and Collins (2002), a cash flow statement is better
than a balance sheet for computing total accruals when there are events such as mergers
and acquisitions which change the balance sheet but not the income statement.
Following Cornett et al. (2008), I also computed total accruals as operating income
(proxy for earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations) minus

46

EBIT is not required to be reported in income statement of China’s listed firms. Therefore, I employ
operating income as proxy for EBIT.
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operating cash flows from continuing operations. Discretionary accruals as a portion of
the book value of assets, %DA, were calculated as:

%DA 

TA jt
Assets jt 1

 (ˆ 0

1
Assets jt 1

Salesjt   Re ceivables jt
 ˆ1
 ˆ2
Assets jt 1

PPE jt
Assets jt 1

)

(2)

Where hats are referred to as estimated values from regression in Eq.1, the modified
Jones model adds  Re ceivables jt , which attempts to identify the amounts of
aggressive recognition of questionable sales in sales changes, to the original Jones
model. Following previous research on earnings management (e.g., Bergstresser and
Philippon, 2006) the value of discretionary accruals is normally used as a proxy for the
magnitude of earnings management. I ran fixed effects regressions 47 in the sample
period when the results of regressions will be discussed in detail in a later section.
(Insert Table 4.2 here)
In Table 4.2, I present summary statistics concerning earnings management, ownership
structure, CEO compensation and board and firm specific measures. Panel A, B, and C
describe the yearly summary of three ownership structure variables. Basically, private
shareholdings are increasing while state shareholdings and largest shareholdings are
decreasing. A spearman correlation table among independent variables is given in Panel
D of Table 4.2. Correlations between each individual variable are less than 0.6, thus the
statistics suggest that multi-collinearity is not a major problem in my models.
Panel E of Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics of firm performance from 2000 to
2007. The average signed value and absolute value of discretionary accruals are both
47

I employ fixed effects panel models rather than OLS models due to the results from F-test, LM test and
Hausman test.
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presented because discretionary accruals must be reversed at some point. The signed
value is 0.73% on average, which is smaller than the signed discretionary accruals in the
US (0.39%), while the average absolute value is about 5.4% which is much higher than
their US counterparts (0.61%48). Although the absolute value is significantly greater
than the signed value, I still focussed on signed value in examining the effects of other
corporate governance, following Carter et al. (2005). The reason for this is that
corporate governance has different effects on discretionary accruals when they are
positive or negative.
(Insert Table 4.2 here)
4.3.3 Firm performance
The work of Cornett et al (2008) is the closest to mine so I also measured the reported
firm performance as ROA (operating income/assets) which are used most often in other
research to measure firm performance. However, as a result of managers’ influence over
accruals (for example, accounts receivable) as well as the treatment of amortization,
ROA is more likely to be manipulated by a CEO (Dechow et al., 1996). In order to
measure true firm performance without management manipulation, I used the difference
between operating income/assets and %DA as a proxy for true performance. Therefore
the exclusion of a discretionary component makes this firm performance truer than the
reported ROA, which might be cosmetic due to management discretion.
Two measurements of firm performance were reported in Table 4.2, Panel E: operating
income/assets

and

(operating

income/assets)-%DA.

The

average

operating

income/assets based on reported earnings was 5.08%, and the mean performance
48

See Cornett et al. (2008) for details.
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measurement based on true earnings (i.e., the effect of discretionary accruals on
reported performance is removed) was 4.35%.
I then investigated whether industry adjustment makes any difference in firm
performance. I identified comparable industry firms because all the firms listed on stock
exchanges were from the same industry49. Industry adjusted performance is the firm’s
operating income in any year minus the average industry value for that year. I measured
firm performance alternatively as reported ROA, operating income/Assets, or
performance adjusted for discretionary accruals, operating income/Assets-%DA.
Industry adjusted performance was zero by using either operating income/assets or
operating income/assets-%DA
4.3.4 Ownership structure
In order to investigate China’s data, several common features of their listed firms
should be included, the highly concentrated ownership, the impact of state ownership
(Kato and Long, 2006c), the effects of largest shareholder ownership, and private
ownership. Accordingly, I denoted the shareholdings of the state as STATESHARE and
private ownership as INDIV. In addition, one of the specific characteristics of Chinese
firms is a stockholder whose shareholdings far exceed the second largest stockholder
(Xu, 2004). The propensity to manage earnings may be higher or lower for the largest
stockholder according to the percentage of shares they own. To control the largest
shareholder I used an ownership concentration variable (TOP), the first largest
shareholder shareholdings in my regressions.

49

My industry classification follows Chen et al. (2006), listed Chinese firms are classified to 6 industries:
Finance, Utilities, Property and Construction, Conglomerates, Industrial and Manufactory, Commercial.
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The descriptive statistics for ownership variables are summarised in Panel A, B and C
of Table 4.2. Over period from 2000 to 2007 average private ownership was about 44%.
The mean private ownership were 37.8%, 40.1%, 39.8%, 39.9%, 40%, 42.1%, 50% and
57.1% in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively. The mean
state ownership were 35.7%, 33.7%, 33.9%, 34.6%, 34.8%, 34.2%, 28.6% and 26.7% in
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. Accordingly, the yearly average
ownership of the largest shareholder decreased from 46.4% to 36.3%.
4.3.5 CEO compensation and board characteristics
I focussed on cash compensation, i.e., the total compensation recorded in annual reports
in China’s listed firms, because I was interested in the reward portion 50. Hence, cash
compensation can be viewed as ex-post compensation depending on current
performance (see, for example, Comprix and Mueller, 2006). Following Leone et al.
(2006), I used the sum of bonus and salary, which is the total cash compensation, as the
measurement of executive compensation. Moreover, I used the natural log of cash
compensation like most previous studies (see, e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987) to
mitigate the difference in executive compensation across firms and reduce
heteroskedasticity. I also used the natural log of board size and assets for the same
reason. Among the alternative measures of executive compensation provided by the
CSMAR database, the average pay of the three highest paid CEOs , which comprises
salary and bonus, is more likely to identify the whole profile of executive compensation
in China’s listed firms and is therefore used in my study to measure CEO compensation.
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In China, only the cash compensation for CEO is required to report in annual reports. In addition, stock
option and other long-term incentives are only provided to CEOs since 2006 when most companies still
paid their CEOs cash compensation. Therefore, cash compensation mainly composes of the total
compensation in China’s listed firms.
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Stock options and other long term incentives are rare in Chinese listed firms so that they
were not included in my models.
To examine my hypotheses in terms of board characteristics, I collected data on the
proportion of independent directors (BOARDIND) and board size (LBOARDSIZE).
Because free riding among directors increases with board size (Jensen, 1993), smaller
boards should be more effective monitors, but large boards are more likely to be
effective monitors because they are harder for management to control and are better
able to protect shareholders’ interests (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Most U.S. studies used
two proxies for board independence, the proportion of outside directors, and a dummy
variable showing whether the board has a majority of outside directors (Bedard et al,
2004; Abbott et al., 2004). However, the percentage of independent directors on the
board of China’s listed firms is seldom greater than 50%, which is quite different from
their U.S. counterparts so I only used the proportion of independent directors as a proxy
for board independence.
Panel F of Table 4.2 presents summary statistics on CEO compensation and board
characteristics. On average, the boards of directors seat 9.68 members when these seats
are filled by 2.81 independent directors, which is much less than US firms. 75 percent
of firms have about 33% independent directors on the board and a minimum percent is
of 0%. So unlike their western counterparts, China’s listed firms do not normally have a
majority of independent directors, although the proportion on a board varies statistically
enough to be investigated in governance structure.
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4.3.6 Other variables
I included several control variables in the regression analysis to account for firm
specific characteristics that influence performance. First, firm size was measured by the
natural log of assets (LASSETS). Previous literature has shown that firm size is
positively associated with performance (for example, Cornett et al., 2008), so I used
LASSETS as a proxy for firm size.
Firm risk is a measure of a firm’s information environment and its operating
environment (Core et al., 1999) and is therefore a potential determinant of the value of
performance. In my study firm risk is defined as the standard deviation of the monthly
stock returns over the previous 12 months (STDRET).
Auditors are believed to play an important role in deterring earnings management.
Palmrose (1988) suggests that the “Big Eight” (now “Big Four”) auditing firms provide
higher quality audits so they are sued less frequently. However, independent audits are
quite new in China and thus their quality may vary and could lead to incidences of fraud.
It’s very difficult to measure audit quality, particularly in China (DeAngelo, 1981). One
possible method is to deem accounting firms as firms providing high quality audits
when they have joint ventures with the international Big 4, and also when they rank
high on the market share of clients’ assets. I followed DeAngelo (1981), Chen et al.
(2001) and Chen et al. (2006), and used a similar approach which was to identify the
Big 10 auditors based on the 10 highest market shares. In China the foreign accounting
firms cannot audit local companies directly, therefore most of the large international
accounting firms set up joint ventures with local accounting firms and offer training and
western context accordingly. Consequently, previous research also used Chinese
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accounting firms that have joint ventures with the international Big 4 as a proxy for
higher quality firms (Qiu, 2004). Therefore, in my study, I included those Chinese joint
ventures with Big 4 in my Big 10 (BIG10) and select the remaining 6 auditors in terms
of their market share. I reviewed and identified the names of auditors from the annual
reports of listed firms.
The Big 10 auditors are PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhongtian, Ernst&Young Huaming,
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Huayong, KPMG Huazhen, RSM, Shu Lun Pan, Shinewing,
Daxin, Wan Long, Reanda. These auditors had the 10 largest market shares with regard
to client assets.
Leverage was also expected to play an important role in determining firm performance
in terms of the potential agency costs of debt (Iyengar et al, 2005). I therefore included
the leverage rate (LEV) as a control variable, which is measured as the book value of
debt to the book value of shareholders equity.
Panel F of Table 4.2 represents the summary statistics of firm specific characteristics.
On average, the leverage was 1.24 and the average natural log of assets was 21.4. The
standard deviation of the monthly stock returns averaged 0.11. 26% of the listed firms
in China are served by the Big 10 accounting firms.
4.4 Empirical results
I estimated two sets of regressions51. The first set investigated earnings management
and treated the value of discretionary accruals divided by assets as the dependent
51

I report standard errors because the Breusch Pagan (1979) test is not significant for the test models of
hypotheses, suggesting that heteroskedasticity is not a serious issue in my research. To test for
autocorrelation at the panel level, the approach outlined in Wooldridge (2002) as implemented by
Drukker (2003) is used. For all the regression analyses this test shows that autocorrelation is not evident.
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variable. The explanatory variables are corporate governance variables (described in
Table 4.1) related to ownership structure, CEO compensation, board characteristics, and
firm-specific control variables. The second set of regressions examined the way firm
performance relates to the same set of variables, both with and without adjustment for
earnings management.
4.4.1 Earnings management
Table 4.3 shows the fixed effects results of the earnings management proxied by
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals were computed from the modified Jones
model, using Eq. 2 above. Column 1 describes coefficient estimates of Eq. 2. and
standard errors of a fixed effects longitudinal regression model.
(Insert Table 4.3 here)
As shown by Table 4.3, and unlike the results from Cornett et al. (2008), earnings
management was not increased significantly by CEO compensation. The coefficient of
board independence was -0.032, decreasing earnings management at better than the 5%
level, which is consistent with U.S. evidence. In terms of ownership structure variables,
private shareholdings significantly decreased earnings management (P-value=0.1),
while state shareholdings substantially increased earnings management (P-value=0.01),
both coefficients were consistent with my expectations. As discussed above, I expected
the relationship between firm performance and largest shareholdings to be U-shaped
and therefore I included the square of largest shareholdings to examine the non-linear
relationship. The point estimates of the coefficients were 0.15 for TOP (P-value=0.05)
and -0.14 for TOP square (P-value=0.1), respectively. Those two estimates of
coefficients were both statistically and economically significant. For example, using a
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coefficient estimate of .15 for TOP, an increase of one sample standard deviation of
TOP (i.e., in Panel F of Table 4.2, an increase in TOP of 0.17) would increase the
magnitude of assets-weighted discretionary accruals by approximately 0.15*0.17=0.03,
or 3 percent. Likewise, TOP square decreases the magnitude of earnings management
significantly. Hence, I found the expected U-shaped relationship between earnings
management and the proportion of shares held by its largest shareholder52.
4.4.2 Firm performance
Table 4.4 gives the regression results of reported and true firm performance on
ownership variables, CEO compensation, and board characteristics. I used reported firm
performance (operating income/assets), which can be referred to as unadjusted
performance, as the dependent variable in the second column of Table 4.4. The reported
performance reflects managers’ discretionary accounting treatment. The third column of
Table 4.4 represents the regression results using the same model but the dependent
variable was measured as the true performance, operating income/assets-%DA. True
performance was expected to exclude management discretions. I also include firm size
(log of book value of assets), equity structure (leverage), firm risk (standard deviation of
the last year monthly stock returns), and accounting quality (whether has a Big10
accounting firm) as control variables for firm performance in these regressions.
(Insert Table 4.4 here)
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I also test the effect of the concentration of shares in the hands of the second to the tenth largest
shareholders. Following Bai et al. (2004), I take the natural logarithm of the sum of squares of the
percentage points of shareholding by the 2nd to the 10th largest shareholders, however, insignificant results
are found in my research. Therefore, I do not report the results in my studies.
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In Table 4.4 the log of the executive compensation significantly positively increased the
reported performance (P-value=0.01). The results suggested that higher executive
compensation was associated with improved firm performance, which was consistent
with previous research that CEO compensation is an effective incentive for managers to
improve performance. Compared to true performance, the coefficient on CEO
compensation decreases to 0.0107 and is still significant at the 1% level. That is, the
coefficient on CEO compensation remains positively significant both on reported and
true firm performance. My results were different from Cornett et al. (2008) when they
found a positively significant relationship between CEO compensation and reported
firm performance while that relationship disappears when true performance was
considered
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. Because ownership structure is the main determinant of CEO

compensation in China’s listed firms, managers are not motivated to engage in earnings
management for their own compensation purpose like their Western counterparts.
Therefore, earnings management for CEO compensation purposes is insignificant in
China’s listed firms so the relationship between firm performance and CEO
compensation would not be substantially affected by earnings management. That is, the
coefficient on CEO compensation is still positively significant even after adjusting for
earnings management.
With respect to the proportion of board independent directors, the coefficient of the
independent directors on a board was -0.02, which was significantly negative at better
than the 1% level. Thus, an increase in the proportion of independent directors does not
improve the reported firm performance, as predicted, but it reduces their performance.
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In the research of Cornett et al. (2008), the coefficient on CEO compensation is 0.1495 at better than
the 1% level when reported firm performance is measured while the coefficient on CEO compensation is
-0.0019 when true performance is considered.
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When true performance was measured the significant negative impact of board
independence on firm performance disappeared as a result of the significantly negative
effect that board independence had on earnings management. Those results were
partially consistent with my expectations that independent directors decreased earnings
management substantially and changed the sign from significantly negative to positive
when true firm performance was used.
All the point estimates of coefficients on ownership variables were insignificant when
reported firms performance was used, expect for private ownership (INDIV), which was
0.01 and significant at better than the 10% level. In stark contrast to the results for
reported performance, the impact of ownership structure becomes significant in the third
column of Table 4.4 using true firm performance. The estimates of coefficient on
private ownership (INDIV) increased from 0.01 to 0.04 at better than the 5% level when
true performance was used, which supported my expectation that more private
ownership mitigates agency problems and increases true performance. In addition, the
estimates of coefficient on state ownership (STATESHARE) changed from 0 in
reported performance to -0.03 in true performance. The significance also changed from
insignificant to significant at better than the 1% level. Those results were also consistent
with my expectations.
The state owner is likely to achieve other policy goals at the expense of shareholder
interests so state ownership was expected to be positively related to earnings
management and negatively related to true firm performance.
On the other hand, the U-shaped relationship between the shareholdings of largest
shareholder and firm performance were only found when true firm performance was
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used in Table 4.4. The coefficient of the shareholdings of the proportion of shares held
by the largest shareholder (TOP) was negative and statistically and economically
significant (P-value=0.1). The coefficient of TOP square was positive and statistically
and economically significant (P-value=0.1). Thus, the effects of the shareholdings as a
proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder are non-linear. I could see that the
non-linear relationship between the largest shareholder’s ownership and true firm
performance resulted from the non-linear relationship between the largest shareholder’s
ownership and earnings management, which was also consistent with my expectations.
Look also at the coefficients on the control variables; in terms of reported firm
performance, the coefficient of firm size was only negative statistically but not
economically significant. The point estimates of leverage were significantly negative,
suggesting that higher leverage increases the default risk and devalues the firm. The
estimates of coefficient on firm risk (STDRET) were positively significant at better than
the 1% level. The economic impact of firm risk was relatively modest, suggesting that a
higher risk is normally associated with better firm performance. The coefficient on
Big10 was statistically and economically insignificant. All the control variables of true
firm performance were insignificant except for ln(Assets).
4.4.3 Further tests54
Shaw and Zhang (2008) found that CEO cash compensation was less sensitive to poor
performance than better performance, however Leone et al. (2006) documented contrary
results, that CEO cash compensation was more sensitive to poor stock returns than good
stock returns when the board of directors enforced an ex post settling up on CEOs. In
54

By using Hausman test (1978), no serious endogeneity issue is found in my models.
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order to examine the sample firms in more details, as well as the possibly different CEO
pay-performance relationship according to different performance, I used one indicator
variable to indicate whether the reported ROA was the highest (in the highest half of
ROA) or lowest (in the lowest half of ROA), which resulted in two sub-samples.
The results in Table 4.5 show a substantial increase in the coefficient and significant
ownership variables in firms that performed well in true performance, whilst the
coefficients on ownership variables in poorly performing firms proceeded in the same
direction but were not as significant as their better performing counterparts.
Interestingly, the results of the four sub-samples showed that CEO pay-performance
relationships were all positively significant, while poor and well performing firms
substantially increased their sensitive CEO pay-performance relationship when true firm
performance was used. That is, my results are consistent with Shaw and Zhang (2008)
in that CEO cash compensation is not punished for poor firm performance.
(Insert Table 4.5 here)
In more detail, the point estimates of coefficient on private ownership (INDIV) in the
well performing subset increased from 0.02 to 0.08 (P-value=0.1 and P-value=0.01,
respectively), suggesting that the positive effect of private ownership was more evident
when firm performance was adjusted for earnings management. Additionally, the
coefficient of state ownership (STATESHARE) changed from 0 to -0.04 at better than
the 5% level, which supported my main results as well. In terms of the non-linear
relationship between the ownership of largest shareholder and firm performance, Table
5 shows that the largest shareholder’s ownership (TOP) is negatively significantly
related to true firm performance (P-value=0.05) and TOP square is positively
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significantly related to true performance (P-value=0.05). Surprisingly, the proportion of
independent directors on a board becomes positively significant when firm performance
is adjusted for earnings management (P-value=0.05), which suggests that an
independent board is more efficient in firms that perform well. However, apart from
private ownership, there were none of my expected results for ownership variables in
the poor performing subset. Consequently, the effects of ownership structure in my full
sample are likely to be driven by those well performing firms.
Beginning from 2005, the reform of non-tradable shares aims at changing the status of
non-tradable shares into tradable shares. These changes were supposed to meliorate the
governance structure of most Chinese listed firms characterised by highly concentrated
ownership of the State. Therefore, it was reasonable to expect similar results after the
reform of non-tradable shares commenced. Table 4.6 shows the results from 2005 to
2007. It can be shown that private ownership is positively significantly related to true
performance and state ownership is negatively significantly related to true performance.
Interestingly, the U-shaped relationship between the ownership of largest shareholder
and true performance was even more remarkable when true firm performance was
considered, because the coefficient on TOP was -0.33 and the coefficient on TOP
square was 0.35. Both are significant at better than the 5% level.
(Insert Table 4.6 here)
As noted in previous chapters, state-controlled firms have a stronger CEO payperformance relationship than non state-controlled firms. I can logically deduce that
since CEOs in state-controlled firms have been more financially motivated by firm
performance, everything be equal, I may expect CEOs in state controlled firms to work
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harder to increase their compensation. To further investigate the potential effect of CEO
compensation on firm performance in state controlled and non state controlled firms, I
divided full sample into state controlled and non state controlled sub-samples. The
results of the regressions are shown in Table 4.7.
(Insert Table 4.7 here)
It can be seen from Table 4.7 that the relationship between CEO compensation
(LCEOCOM) and reported firm performance (ROA) are both significantly positive in
the two sub-samples (β=0.011 and 0.009 for the state controlled sub-sample and for non
state controlled sub-sample, respectively). However, after excluding the effect of
earnings management from reported firm performance, the relationship between CEO
compensation and true firm performance were still positively significant for two subsamples (β=0.009 and 0.015 for state controlled sub-sample and for non state controlled
sub-sample, respectively). Interestingly, the coefficient on LCEOCOM decreased from
0.011 to 0.009 in the state controlled sub-sample while the beta on LCEOCOM
significantly increased from 0.009 to 0.015 in the non state controlled sub-sample. In
addition, Table 4.3 shows that the relationship between CEO compensation and
earnings management was positive in state controlled firms and negative in non state
controlled firms. With regard to the results from chapter 2, state controlled firms are
more likely to engage in tunnelling than their non state controlled counterparts when
there is a divergence between cash flow rights and control rights.

Therefore, after

adjusting for earnings management, the relationship between CEO compensation and
true firm performance becomes weaker in state controlled firms than non state
controlled firms, which supports the results from chapter 2.
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4.5 Conclusions
My analysis suggests that private shareholdings significantly reduce the magnitude of
earnings management (proxied by discretionary accruals) whilst state shareholdings
significantly increase the level of earnings management. It also suggests that the
relationship between the largest shareholdings and earnings management is non-linear.
Furthermore, the proportion of private shareholdings increasingly improves firm
performance when true performance is considered due to mitigated agency problems. In
stark contrast, the proportion of state ownership increasingly reduces firm performance
when it is adjusted for earnings management. Concerning the non-linear effects of the
largest shareholdings on earnings management, there is a U-shaped relationship
between the ownership of the largest shareholder and true firm performance. However,
most impact of ownership structure on firm performance is covered by earnings
management when firm performance is not deprived of managed earnings. Further tests
showed that the effects of ownership structure on true firm performance are mainly
driven by firms that perform well. But similar results for CEO compensation and board
independence do not show up in Chinese listed firms like the U.S. evidence provided by
Cornett et al. (2008).
In order to investigate China’s data in more detail, more firms should be studied;
however, samples in my analysis were limited to publically traded firms when the fact is
that more firms in China are not yet traded publically. Therefore, samples should be
extended to include non-publically traded firms motivated by normal earnings
management so their data will shed light on the impact of ownership structure on
earnings management and hence, true firm performance.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

In the context of China this study has attempted to investigate the role that ultimate
ownership plays on corporate performance and CEO pay-performance relationship, and
the extent to which board characteristics are related to managerial compensation and
firm performance. In the beginning I examined how ultimate ownership affects CEO
pay-performance relationship, and after that, board composition, particularly the
composition of a compensation committee, to see whether it could improve corporate
governance. Finally, to further investigate ownership structure, which is the determinant
of corporate governance in China, I compared the effects of ownership variables on
reported firm performance with true performance (which is deprived of the effects of
earnings management). Sub-samples of state controlled and non state controlled firms
were included to study the effectiveness of different corporate governance. Earlier
empirical research (with some exceptions) ignored the potential reverse causality of
managerial compensation and firm performance suggested by theories, which resulted
in potentially biased estimates. I acknowledged reverse causality and specified a
simultaneous three equation model, where CEO pay and firm performance are
endogenous, to control any reverse causality in a contracting environment.
5.1 The role of ultimate owner
In Chapter 2, I examined the impact of ultimate ownership on the CEO payperformance relationship, controlling firm-specific variables in a sample of China’s
listed firms, which was identified as positive incentive effects and negative
entrenchment effects. Cash flow rights were used to measure the effects of positive
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incentive whilst excess control, the divergence between control rights and cash flow
rights, was used to measure the effects of negative entrenchment. The empirical results
showed that when the managerial pay-performance link represents good corporate
governance, cash flow rights increased CEO pay-performance relationship significantly
while decreasing the level of CEO pay. Alternatively, excess control decreased CEO
pay-performance relationship significantly while it increased the level of CEO pay. All
the results were consistent with my hypothesised relations that cash flow rights are
likely to enhance corporate governance whilst excess control tends to deteriorate a
firm’s governance structure.
In terms of the possible impact of the type and concentration of ultimate owners, I
focussed on state ownership. To determine whether state ownership affects the
executive compensation, firm performance and the relationship between them
differently than other controlling shareholders, I ran the regressions for CEO
compensation, firm performance and other characteristics separately for firms controlled
by state and those controlled by non state owners. The results showed that CEO payperformance was more positively sensitive in state controlled firms than their non state
controlled counterparts. I then divided a sub-sample of state controlled firms into an
upper and lower quartile of state shareholdings. The results indicated that higher statecontrolled firms have stronger CEO pay-performance relationship than those with less
state control. More specifically, no matter which state controlled sub-samples were
chosen, they all had a stronger CEO pay-performance relationship than non-state
controlled firms.
Interestingly, summary statistics show that cash flow rights in state controlled firms
almost doubled those in non state controlled firms, whereas excess control was only one
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third in state-controlled firms. The results of the regressions showed that cash flow
rights have a strong positive impact on CEO pay-performance relationship in both state
and non-state controlled firms. However, excess control only has a negative impact on
CEO pay-performance relationship in state controlled firms while no such relationship
was found in non state controlled firms. It seems clear from the results that state control
still has the potential to expropriate minority shareholders when excess control rights
exist. I also found that there was much smaller amount of excess control in state
controlled firms than non state-controlled firms. Therefore, I argue that the net results of
positive and negative effects are positive for state controlled firms, so even though statecontrolled firms are likely to engage in expropriation, they have a higher CEO payperformance relationship than non state controlled firms.
5.2 Board characteristics and CEO pay-performance relation
As noted in previous chapters, ultimate ownership and the board characteristics of
China’s listed firms continue to play an important role in corporate governance. In
Chapter 2, I tested the effect of ultimate ownership; in Chapter 3 this study examined
the effect of independent directors of a board and an independent compensation
committee on CEO pay-performance relationship by using returns on assets (ROA) and
stock returns (RET) as performance measures. Existing literature gives mixed evidence
for the effectiveness of independent directors. This study included the variable of the
proportion of independent directors in the models and indicated that firms with more
independent directors have a stronger positive CEO pay-performance relationship. Next,
to test the hypothesis developed in Chapter 3 that CEO pay-performance relationship is
stronger in firms with more independent directors as well as a compensation committee,
I classified a full sample into firms with and without CC and estimated the impact of
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board independence on CEO pay-performance relationship separately. The empirical
results showed that this relationship only exists when firms have a compensation
committee. The results suggested that these committees increase the effectiveness of
independent directors, that is, they complement independent directors.
I further divided the sub-sample of firms with a compensation committee into an upper
and lower half of board independence and found that those firms with more independent
directors had a better CEO pay-performance relationship than boards with less
independent directors. These results reinforced the complementary function of a
compensation committee.
When I investigated the compensation committee further I found that insiders55 weaken
CEO pay-performance relationship. More specifically, where there were more
independent directors, insiders on a compensation committee had significantly negative
effect on CEO pay-performance relationship because they protect their own benefits by
attempting to destroy the link between managerial compensation and firm performance.
The results indicated that independent directors and independent compensation
committees complement each other.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence showed that CEO pay-performance relationship
and board independence improved this relationship after a compensation committee had
been formed. Those results suggested a complementary relationship between board
independence and compensation committee/compensation committee independence in
enhancing CEO pay-performance relationship because the compensation committee,

55

Dummy variable, equals to one if any director gets paid in the compensation committee, zero
otherwise.
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particularly an independent one, provides directors with information and assists them in
designing relevant executive pay schemes.
5.3 True firm performance
Chapter 4 examined the impact of ownership structure on earnings management and
hence true firm performance (firm performance adjusted for the effect of earnings
management) of listed firms in China. In this Chapter, state shareholdings, private
shareholdings (percentage of A share), the largest shareholdings, the largest squared
shareholdings, and board independence and CEO pay, were added to the models. I first
found that private shareholdings decreased earnings management significantly and state
shareholdings increased them substantially, and there was also evidence of an inverse
U-shaped relationship between the largest shareholdings and earnings management.
More specifically, the relationship between earnings management and the largest
shareholdings in China’s listed firms is shaped like an inverted U. That is, an increase in
the largest shareholdings induces earnings management from a low level but once they
reach a threshold there is a significant negative relationship between them so when the
proportion of the largest shareholdings becomes large enough, its subsequent effect on
earnings management becomes significantly negative. All the results from ownership
variables were consistent with my hypotheses. Additionally, I found that CEO
compensation did not increase earnings management while board independence was
negative in relation to earnings management.
None of the other three variables reported on a firm’s performance, except for private
shareholdings, showed any significant relationship to true firm performance. However,
as a result of earnings management, private shareholdings increased true firm
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performance but state shareholdings decreased it because of their effect on earnings
management. Moreover, the association between the largest shareholdings and true firm
performance showed a U-shaped relationship.
Because the ownership structure in China’s listed firms is the main determinant of CEO
compensation, managers do not have much motivation to engage in earnings for their
own compensation-related purpose like their Western counterparts. Therefore, earnings
management for CEO compensation-related purpose in China’s listed firms was
insignificant, thus the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation
would not be affected, which is of course much different from research in the US
(Cornett et al., 2008). That is, the coefficient on CEO compensation is positively
significant even after adjustments for earnings management. When true performance
was measured, the significant negative impact of board independence on firm
performance disappeared because the effect of board independence on earnings
management was negative. These results were partially consistent with my expectations
that independent directors substantially decrease earnings management and thus change
the sign from significantly negative to positive when true firm performance is used.
In this Chapter I was able to examine whether and how ownership concentration and
type of owners affected the earnings management practices by selecting a sample
consisting of state ownership and non state ownership. My study provided evidence to
show that earnings management practices were influenced by the type of the largest
shareholder.
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5.4 State controlled versus non state-controlled firms
As stated earlier (Chapter 2), this study considered the significant positive coefficients
of CEO pay-performance relationship in state controlled firms and non state controlled
firms and the key role played by the state, and thus this study divides samples from each
Chapter into state controlled and non state controlled firm sub-samples to investigate
the effect of state owners.
In Chapter 2, the descriptive statistics indicated that cash flow rights almost doubled in
state controlled firms than in non state controlled firms while excess control was only
one third in state-owned firms. Additionally, cash flow rights had a strong positive
impact on CEO pay-performance relationship in both state and non-state controlled
firms while excess control only had a negative impact on the pay-performance
relationship in state-controlled firms. Thus the results suggested that the net results
between cash flow rights and excess control make state-controlled firms a higher CEO
pay-performance relationship than non state-controlled firms.
In terms of board characteristics, the results from Chapter 3 were consistent with
Chapter 2, which suggests that state control can significantly enhance the link between
CEO compensation and firm performance and hence is associated with better corporate
governance. Furthermore, I intend to investigate how compensation committees help
independent directors enhance CEO pay-performance relationship when under state
control. To examine the positive effect of state-controlled shareholders, I divided full
samples into state-controlled and non state-controlled sub-samples and found that the
estimates of coefficient on the joint effect of board independence and compensation
committee on CEO pay-performance relationship were significantly positive in state
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controlled firms but there was no such relationship in non state controlled firms at all.
Those results were consistent with my expectations and the ownership results from the
previous Chapter.
Due to the stronger CEO pay-performance relationship found in state controlled firms I
could logically deduce that since CEOs in state controlled firms were financially more
motivated by firm performance, other things being equal, I would expect CEO’s in state
controlled firms to work harder to increase their remuneration. The relationship between
CEO compensation and firm performance was significantly positive for state controlled
and non state controlled sub-samples. Moreover, after excluding the effects of managed
earnings management from firm performance I could see that the relationship between
CEO compensation and true firm performance were still positively significant for two
sub-samples. Interestingly, the coefficient of CEO pay-performance relationship
decreased slightly in the state controlled sub-sample but it increased in the non state
controlled sub-sample. In addition, the results also showed that the relationship between
CEO compensation and earnings management was positive in state controlled firms and
negative in non state controlled firms. Concerning the results from Chapter 2, state
controlled firms were more likely to engage in tunnelling when there was a divergence
between control rights and cash flow rights than their non state-controlled counterparts.
Therefore, after adjusting the effects of earnings management the relationship between
CEO compensation and true firm performance became weaker in state controlled firms
than non state controlled firms, which supports the results from Chapter 2.

116

5.5 Summary and conclusions
China continues on its own unique economic reform path from earlier privatisation of
those large former SOEs (State Owned Enterprises). In order to improve corporate
governance and corporate performance, China’s listed firms have experienced many
changes due to their specific contextual background. On one hand the highly
concentrated state ownership and its influential effect on performance and CEO payperformance relationship has attracted much publicity, particularly in recent years. On
the other hand, independent board directors and its sub-committee and compensation
committee became the focus of research into corporate governance since scandals such
as Enron appeared. Thus, in this study, I focussed on the effects of ownership structure
and board characteristics on managerial compensation, firm performance, and CEO payperformance relationship, which are considered to be a measure of good corporate
governance.
The main results supported the agency theory and showed a significantly positive
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance in China’s listed firms.
In terms of ultimate ownership the results showed there were positive incentives
associated with stronger CEO pay-performance relationship whereas negative
entrenchment were related to weaker CEO pay-performance relationship, which were
consistent with my hypotheses of ultimate ownership. .
The results also indicated that state ownership has been playing an important role in
China’s corporate governance. I found that although state controlled firms were more
likely to engage in tunnelling when excess control exists, state controlled firms still
have stronger CEO pay-performance relationship than their non state-controlled
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counterparts, as a result of the net results of positive incentive and negative
entrenchment effects. Likewise, the number of independent directors on a board was
much more positively related to CEO pay-performance relationship in state controlled
than non state controlled firms. Furthermore, I found that independent directors work
better with a compensation committee to set CEO pay schemes than non state owners.
The empirical results also showed that the relationship between true firm performance
and CEO pay was weaker even though it was still significantly positive in statecontrolled firms, due to the potential propensity for earnings management.
I found with respect to board characteristics that firms with more independent directors
have a stronger positive CEO pay-performance relationship which only exists when
these firms have a compensation committee. When any director in a compensation
committee gets paid the pay-performance relationship becomes weaker and this
negative impact was more evident when there are more independent directors on a
board. Consequently, the results were consistent with the complementary effects of
board

independence

and

compensation

committee/compensation

committee

independence.
Furthermore, I extended my study to include the effects of ownership structure and
board characteristics on the analysis of firm performance. The effects of corporate
governance variables on reported and true firm performance and on the effects of
earnings management were examined. All my ownership variables held significant
coefficients in the regressions for true firm performance but not for reported firm
performance, which suggested that ownership variables were covered by earnings
management when reported firm performance was used. Their impact was evident when
the firm performance was deprived of the effects of earnings management. Moreover, I
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also found that private shareholding (percentage of A share) lowered earnings
management whereas state shareholding increased it considerably. The results also
support the hypothesized U-shaped relationship between largest shareholdings and
earnings management. As a result, private shareholdings increased true firm
performance substantially while state shareholdings significantly decreased true firm
performance due to their effects on managed earnings. Moreover, in response to the
inverse U-shaped relationship between largest shareholdings and managed earnings, the
association between largest shareholdings and true firm performance also indicated a Ushaped relationship. It seems clear from the results that state shareholdings still have the
potential to harm corporate value, particularly when there was a divergence between
control rights and cash flow rights. Therefore, the results suggested that solving
“pyramidal ownership structures” which facilitate excess control as well as
expropriation of state owners is important agenda item in the context of China.
5.6 Limitations and suggestions for future research
Despite the usefulness of both fixed effects models and 2SLS (or 3SLS) techniques, the
fact that I have missing observations in my sampling (unbalanced panel) could bias the
results. Specifically, if the reason why certain variables were not observed and
observations omitted are in some way correlated with the level of managerial
compensation or with firm performance, my estimated parameters would be biased.
Therefore, moderate caution should be exercised when interpreting the results.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning of one important limitation of this study relates to
the measurement of earnings management, of the dependent variables in Chapter 4. I
used the “modified Jones (1991) model” and discretionary accruals as a proxy for
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managed earnings. Existing literature shows that many measurements can be used to
examine managed earnings, for example, related-party transactions are sometimes used
as one measurement. In future research it would be very interesting to investigate the
relationship between corporate governance and managed earnings by using
measurements such as related-party transactions.
Two other common ownership features should be considered in any future research in
of China’s listed firms, highly concentrated ownership and state controlled ownership
(Kato and Long, 2006b). Additionally, the “agency problems” between ultimate owner
and minority shareholders is believed to be the key determinant of Chinese corporate
governance. However, samples in my analysis were limited to publically listed firms
because many state controlled firms in China are not yet publically listed. Consequently,
samples should include non publically listed firms to further investigate the impact of
ownership structure on corporate performance, as well as CEO pay-performance
relationship. The data from non publically-listed firms help shed more light on
ownership structure and board composition.
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics, CEO compensation
The sample consists of 1821 firm-year observations between 2003 and 2004, and 2590
firm-year observations between 2005 and 2007. Compensation amounts are expressed
in 2003-constant Yuans
Panel A: CEO compensation
Year
No.
Mean

S.D.

Minimum

Maximum

Ceocom

2003

909

167,365

156,686

7,667

1,628,234

2004

912

204,067

198,354

9,600

1,716,667

2005

856

155,775

171,257

1,000

1,827,000

2006

883

191,599

187,279

8,000

1,848,030

2007

851

178,037

217,001

1,000

1,836,200
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics, CEO compensation, firm performance, ownership
structure and firm-specific characteristics in full sample, state-controlled# and
family-controlled firms
Panel B: Summary of CEO compensation, firm performance, ownership structure and firm-specific characteristics in full sample, state-controlled# and family-controlled firms

Full sample

State-controlled sample

Non State-controlled sample

(N=1821)

(N=1334)

(N=487)

Mean

Median

S.D.

Mean

Median

S.D.

Mean

Median

S.D.

Control (%)

43.04

41.82

16.65

46.47

46.94

16.37

33.03

29.33

13.06

Cashflow(%)

38.34

37.16

19.73

43.76

43.45

18.13

22.47

19.88

15.11

Excess control(%)

5.52

0

8.83

3.33

0

9.70

11.93

11.41

9.84

Cashflow/control

0.84

7.27

0.25

0.92

1

0.19

0.61

0.58

0.29

CEOpay

185,746

133,333

179,663

186,350

136,650

175,668

184,094

120,000

190,358

Ln(CEOpay)

11.78

11.80

0.84

11.80

11.83

0.85

11.77

11.70

0.84

0.02

0.03

0.09

0.02

0.03

0.08

0.01

0.02

0.11

LEV

1.48

1.04

3.24

1.29

0.98

1.98

2.00

1.11

5.30

LN(ASSETS)

21.25

21.17

0.93

21.35

21.28

0.94

20.95

20.94

0.82

STDRET

0.09

0.09

0.03

0.09

0.09

0.03

0.10

0.09

0.04

BOARDIND

0.33

0.33

0.06

0.33

0.33

0.07

0.34

0.33

0.05

LAGNEGPROFIT

0.11

0

0.31

0.10

0

0.30

0.13

0

0.34

Ownership and control

CEO compensation

Firm performance

ROA

Firm Characteristics

141

Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics, ownership, control, CEO compensation, and firm
performance across different ranges of excess control
Panel C: Ownership, control, CEO compensation, and firm performance across different ranges
of excess control

Excess
control

Observations

Cashflow(%)

Cashflow/control

Ln(CEOpay)

ROA

0%

671

46.60

1

11.83

0.02

(16.68)

(0)

(0.83)

(0.07)

28.94

0.81

11.92

0.03

(16.82)

(0.17)

(0.86)

(0.09)

20.05

0.49

11.94

0.01

(12.97)

(0.18)

(0.84)

(0.12)

11.64

0.29

12.11

0.03

(9.16)

(0.12)

(0.96)

(0.05)

0-10%

10-30%

>30%

112

272

18

Averages of ownership, ownership control ratio, CEO compensation, and firm
performance are presented for sample firms grouped according to levels of excess control.
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Cashflow is the proportion of cash flow
rights owned and control is the proportion of voting rights controlled by the controlling
shareholder group. Cashflow/control is the ratio of ownership to control. Ln(CEOpay), is
the natural logarithm of average annual cash compensation of CEOs, calculated by
dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid executives by three.
ROA is return on assets, calculated as net income divided by the average book value of
assets of the previous and current year.
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Table 2.2 Regression of CEO compensation on its economic determinants, industry
and year controls, and ownership structure variables
Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)

Variable

Predicted

Model 1

ROA

+

3.39***
(0.60)

2.51***
(0.46)

2.57***
(0.44)

Excess control#

?

0.01***
(0.00)

LN(ASSETS)

+

STDRET

+

LEV

?

BOARDIND

?

LAGNEGPROFIT

-

ROA*excess control

-

-0.16***
(0.03)
No

0.01***
(0.00)
0.28***
(0.03)
1.21
(0.81)
0.03***
(0.01)
0.48
(0.41)
-0.28***
(0.08)
-0.13***
(0.02)
No

0.01**
(0.00)
0.30***
(0.03)
0.51
(0.78)
0.03***
(0.01)
0.21
(0.40)
-0.27***
(0.07)
-0.12***
(0.02)
Yes

No

No

Yes

1076

1076

1076

0.07

0.20

0.30

Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
N
Adjusted R2(%)

Model 2

Model 3

*

***:P<0.01, **: P<0.05, : P<0.1
The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
#: the sample is reduced to 1076 because Excess control has less available observations.
Ln (total cash compensation) is the natural logarithm of average annual cash
compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of
three highest-paid executives by three. ROA is return on assets, calculated as net income
divided by the average book value of assets of the previous and current year. Excess
control is calculated as control rights minus cash flow rights. LN(ASSETS) is natural log
of book value of assets. STDRET is standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the
year. LEV is leverage rate, calculated as total debt/total assets. BOARDIND is the
proportion of independent directors on board. LAGNEGPROFIT equals to 1 for lossmaking firms in previous year and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2.3 Regression of CEO compensation on its economic determinants, industry
and year controls, and ownership structure variables
Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)

Variable

Predicted

ROA

+

Cashflow

-

Cash-flow/control

-

LN(ASSETS)

+

STDRET

+

LEV

?

BOARDIND

?

LAGNEGPROFIT
ROA*Cashflow
ROA* (Cashflow/control)
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
N
Adjusted R2(%)
***:P<0.01, **: P<0.05, *: P<0.1

Model 1

Model 2

-0.02
(0.33)
-0.01**
(0.00)

-0.57
(0.44)

0.32***
(0.02)
0.44
(0.69)
0.02**
(0.01)
0.25
(0.34)

-0.25***
(0.09)
0.30***
(0.03)
0.54
(0.78)
0.03***
(0.01)
0.23
(0.40)

-

-0.21***
(0.07)

-0.28***
(0.07)

+

0.06***
(0.01)
3.12***
(0.72)

+

Yes
Yes
1564

Yes
Yes
1076

0.29

0.30

The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
Ln (total cash compensation) is the natural logarithm of average annual cash
compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of
three highest-paid executives by three. ROA is return on assets, calculated as net income
divided by the average book value of assets of the previous and current year. Cashflow/control is calculated as cash flow rights divided by control rights. LN(ASSETS) is
natural log of book value of assets. STDRET is standard deviation of monthly stock
returns over the year. LEV is leverage rate, calculated as total debt/total assets.
BOARDIND is the proportion of independent directors on board. LAGNEGPROFIT
equals to 1 for loss-making firms in previous year and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2.4 Comparison between cash flow rights, control, CEO compensation, and
firm performance of state-controlled firms and non state-controlled firms
Variables

Control(%)

Cashflow(%)

Excess control

(Cash-flow/Control)

ROA

Ln(CEOpay)

State-controlled

Non-state controlled

Mean

Mean

46.47

33.03

(16.37)

(13.06)

43.76

22.47

(18.13)

(15.11)

3.33

11.93

(7.27)

(9.84)

0.92

0.61

(0.19)

(0.29)

0.02

0.01

(0.08)

(0.11)

11.80

11.77

(0.85)

(0.84)

Test:
means

difference

in

***

***

***

***

**

0

***:P<0.01, **: P<0.05, *: P<0.1.
The average ownership characteristics, CEO compensation, and firm performance are
compared between firms classified in terms of the state controlling shareholders using a
two-tailed t-test. Zero denotes no significant difference.
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses
Excess control is calculated as control rights minus cash flow rights. Cash-flow/control is
calculated as cash flow rights divided by control rights. ROA is return on assets,
calculated as net income divided by the average book value of assets of the previous and
current year. Ln (CEOpay) is the natural logarithm of average annual cash compensation
of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highestpaid executives by three.
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Table 2.5 CEO compensation and firm performance in China’s listed firms: statecontrolled and non state-controlled
Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)

ROA

ROA*owner-state dummy
Owner-state dummy
Size (lnassets)
Adjusted R2(%)
No. of observations
***:P<0.01, **: P<0.05, *: P<0.1.

Fixed effects results
0.24
(0.32)
1.82***
(0.65)
-0.05
(0.04)
0.29***
(0.02)
0.26
1821

The coefficients for the control variables are not reported in the tables because they are
not of direct interest for this study.
The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
Ln (total cash compensation) is the natural logarithm of average annual cash
compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of
three highest-paid executives by three. ROA is return on assets, calculated as net income
divided by the average book value of assets of the previous and current year. Ownerstate dummy equals to 1 for firms with state controlling owner and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2.6 Regression of CEO compensation on its economic determinants and
firm-specific control variables in state-controlled, non state-controlled, lower
quartile state ownership and upper quartile state ownership sub-samples.
Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)
Variable

State-controlled

Lower quartile
state ownership

Upper quartile
state ownership

Non state-controlled

ROA

2.90***
(0.51)

1.46
(0.95)

3.89***
(0.85)

-0.19
(0.24)

LN(ASSETS)

0.26***
(0.03)

0.35***
(0.10)

0.20***
(0.05)

STDRET

0.77
(1.02)

3.01
(2.73)

0.88
(2.01)

0.41***
(0.05)
0.21
(1.43)

LEV

0.02
(0.02)

-0.02
(0.09)

0.01
(0.02)

0.01***
(0.01)

BOARDIND

0.20
(0.47)

0.48
(1.00)

-0.13
(0.87)

-0.04
(0.88)

LAGNEGPROFIT

-0.27***
(0.09)

-0.33
(0.23)

0.11
(0.15)

-0.21*
(0.12)

Industry fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

802

128

247

274

0.41

0.36

0.31

0.32
Adjusted R2(%)
*
***:P<0.01, **: P<0.05, : P<0.1

The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
Ln (total cash compensation) is the natural logarithm of average annual cash
compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of
three highest-paid executives by three. ROA is return on assets, calculated as net income
divided by the average book value of assets of the previous and current year.
LN(ASSETS) is natural log of book value of assets. STDRET is standard deviation of
monthly stock returns over the year. LEV is leverage rate, calculated as total debt/total
assets. BOARDIND is the proportion of independent directors on board.
LAGNEGPROFIT equals to 1 for loss-making firms in previous year and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2.7 Results of CEO pay-performance regressions for state-controlled
subsamples
Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)

ROA*(Excess
control)

-0.12***
(0.02)

-0.15***
(0.05)

0.00
0.01

-0.02
0.03

）

0.01***
(0.00)

）

0.01**
(0.00)

（

Excess control

（

ROA

Ultimate owner: State, non-state
State-controlled
Non-state-controlled
Full sample
subsample
subsample
2.57***
3.43***
0.22
(0.44)
(0.55)
(0.56)

Industry fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

1076

802

274

Adjusted R2(%)

0.30

0.33

0.31

Chow F stat

2.84**
*

***:P<0.01, **: P<0.05, : P<0.1.
The coefficients for the control variables are not reported in the tables because they are
not of direct interest for this study.
The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
Row 8 reports the F-statistic and associated significance from a Chow test with null
hypotheses of no difference on main variables between state-controlled and non-state
controlled firms.
Ln (total cash compensation) is the natural logarithm of average annual cash
compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of
three highest-paid executives by three. ROA is return on assets, calculated as net income
divided by the average book value of assets of the previous and current year. Excess
control is calculated as control rights minus cash flow rights.
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Table 2.8 Results of CEO pay-performance regressions for ultimate owner
subsamples
Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)

Full sample

ROA
Cashflow

ROA*Cashflow

-0.02
(0.33)
-0.01***
(0.00)
0.06***
(0.01)

Ultimate owner: State, non-state
State-controlled
Non State-controlled
subsample
subsample
0.83
-0.42
(0.75)
(0.31)
-0.01***
-0.01***
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.05***
0.03*
(0.02)
(0.02)

Industry fixed effects Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

1564

1166

398

Adjusted R2(%)

0.29

0.32

0.31

Chow F stat

5.50***

3.48**

*

***:P<0.01, **: P<0.05, : P<0.1.
The coefficients for the control variables are not reported in the tables because they are
not of direct interest for this study.
The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
Row 8 reports the F-statistic and associated significance from a Chow test with null
hypotheses of no difference on main variables between state-controlled and non-state
controlled firms, as well as between family-controlled and non-family controlled firms.
Ln (total cash compensation) is the natural logarithm of average annual cash
compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of
three highest-paid executives by three. ROA is return on assets, calculated as net income
divided by the average book value of assets of the previous and current year.
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Table 2.9 CEO compensation and firm performance in China’s listed firms: statecontrolled and non state-controlled from 2005 to 2007
Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)

ROA

Performance*owner-state dummy
Owner-state dummy
Size (lnassets)
Adjusted R2(%)
No. of observations
***:P<0.01, **: P<0.05, *: P<0.1.

Fixed effects results
0.27***
(0.04)
1.34***
(0.48)
0.00
(0.07)
0.31***
(0.03)
0.06
2635

The coefficients for the control variables are not reported in the tables because they are
not of direct interest for this study.
The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
Ln (total cash compensation) is the natural logarithm of average annual cash
compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of
three highest-paid executives by three. ROA is return on assets, calculated as net income
divided by the average book value of assets of the previous and current year. Ownerstate dummy equals to 1 for firms with state controlling owner and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2.10 Results of CEO pay-performance regressions for state-controlling
subsamples from 2005 to 2007

ROA

Full
sample

State-controlled
subsample

Non
state-controlled
subsample

Full
sample

State-controlled
subsample

Non
controlled
subsample

-0.11
(0.36)

2.22*
(1.25)

-0.39
(0.39)

0.69***
(0.22)

1.74***
(0.59)

0 .46**
(0.20)

0.00
(0.00)

0.01*
(0.00)

-0.01***
(0.00)

-0.03*
(0.02)

-0.03
(0.04)

-0.02
(0.02)

Excess control
-0.00***
(0.00)

Cashflow

-0.01***
(0.00)

0.01
(0.00)

ROA*(Excess
control)

ROA*Cashflow

0.03
(0.02)

0.02
(0.03)

0.04
(0.02)

Industry
effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

2546

1755

791

2546

1755

Adjusted R2(%)

0.06

0.08

0.04

0.06

0.08

fixed

state-

791

0.04

***:P<0.01, **: P<0.05, *: P<0.1.
The coefficients for the control variables are not reported in the tables because they are
not of direct interest for this study.
The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
Ln (total cash compensation) is the natural logarithm of average annual cash
compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of
three highest-paid executives by three. ROA is return on assets, calculated as net income
divided by the average book value of assets of the previous and current year. Excess
control is calculated as control rights minus cash flow rights.
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Table 2.11 2SLS regressions, CEO compensation and firm performance.
CEO compensation and ROA are both considered endogenous variables. I use the basic model
specification from Table 2 column 4, for the CEO compensation. Industrial dummies and year
dummies are omitted for brevity.
Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)

Variable
ROA

0.65
(2.72)

Excess control

0.03***
(0.01)

ROA*excess control

-0.29***
(0.10)

LN(ASSETS)
STDRET
LEV
BOARDIND
LAGNEGPROFIT

0.52*
(0.31)
-1.02
(2.60)
0.01
(0.03)
2.00**
(0.95)
0.06
(0.19)

***:P<0.01, **: P<0.05, *: P<0.1
The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
#: the sample is reduced to 1076 because Excess control has less available observations.
Ln (total cash compensation) is the natural logarithm of average annual cash
compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of
three highest-paid executives by three. ROA is return on assets, calculated as net income
divided by the average book value of assets of the previous and current year. Excess
control is calculated as control rights minus cash flow rights. LN(ASSETS) is natural log
of book value of assets. STDRET is standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the
year. LEV is leverage rate, calculated as total debt/total assets. BOARDIND is the
proportion of independent directors on board. LAGNEGPROFIT equals to 1 for lossmaking firms in previous year and 0 otherwise.
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Table 3.1 Definitions of variables
Variable

Definition
CEO compensation

LCEOCOM
(natural
logarithm)

The natural logarithm of average annual cash compensation of CEOs,
calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three
highest-paid executives by three
Firm performance

ROA

RET

ROA, which is calculated as net income divided by the book value of
assets
The industry-adjusted annual stock returns, which is calculated as
stock returns minus industry mean stock returns
Compensation committee

CC
CCIND(%)
CCPAID

Equal to 1 if compensation committee exists, 0 otherwise
The proportion of independent directors on the compensation
committee
Equal to one if at least one member on the compensation committee
gets paid from the firm they serve and zero otherwise
Board characteristics

BOARDIND

The proportion of independent directors on board

LBOARDSIZE

The natural logarithm of the number of directors serving on board

BMEETING

The number of board meetings for the current year
Firm-level control variables

LEV

Leverage rate (total debt/total assets)

LASSETS

Natural log of book value of assets

LAGNPROFIT

Dummy variable, equal to 1 for loss-making firms in previous year
and 0 otherwise

STDRET

Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the year

GROWTHO

Growth opportunity, calculated as year-end market to book ratio of
assets in the previous year

industry

Dummy variables, 22 industries in according to Standard Industrial
Classification of CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission)

Year

Dummy variables, 6 years in the sample
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics for CEO compensation and its hypothesized
determinants
The sample consists of 5869 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2006.
Compensation amounts and sales are expressed in 2001 Yuan.
Panel A: CEO compensation

CEOCOM

Year No.

Mean

S.D.

Minimum

Maximum

200
1
200

764

105,921

242,359

3,177

6,296,667

926

127,369

113,062

6,600

913,333

2
200
3
200

976

170,529

161,782

11,424

1,706,667

1040

210,237

195,437

10,267

1,716,667

1040

163,854

211,344

1,000

4,443,467

1123

192,370

165,596

8,000

1,393,567

4
200
5
200

6
Panel B: BOARDIND
Year
BOARDIND

Mean

S.D.

BOARDIND<0.33
(Numbers)

BOARDIND=0.33#
(Numbers)

BOARDIND>0.33
(Numbers)

2001
2002

0.06
0.24

0.10
0.08

0.04 (731)
0.21 (754)

0.33 (21)
0.33 (119)

0.40 (12)
0.40 (53)

2003

0.32

0.07

0.24 (248)

0.33 (490)

0.39 (238)

2004

0.34

0.06

0.25 (172)

0.33 (567)

0.39 (301)

2005

0.34

0.06

0.25 (130)

0.33 (578)

0.39 (332)

2006

0.35

0.07

0.24 (150)

0.33 (555)

0.40 (418)

CEOCOM= average annual cash compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the
sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid executives by three;
BOARDIND= the proportion of independent directors on board
All sample firms are divided to three subsets (proportion of independent directors on
board is greater than, less than, or the same as 0.33), Column 5, 6, and 7 show the mean
value of the proportion of independent directors on board, numbers of firms in each
subsets are presented in parentheses.
#: when one third of directors on board are independent directors
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation, firm performance,

board characteristics and firm-specific characteristics
Panel C: Summary of CEO compensation, firm performance, board characteristics and firm-specific
characteristics
All firms
N

Non-CC firms
Mean

S.D.

N

Mean

CC firms
S.D.

N

Mean

S.D.

Test:
difference
means

CEO
compensation
CEOCOM

5869

165,341

187,365

3041

146,753

199,823

2828

185,330

170,762

***

LCEOCOM

5869

11.64

0.88

3041

11.49

0.90

2828

11.80

0.83

***

ROA

5869

0.03

0.08

3041

0.02

0.07

2828

0.03

0.09

*

RET

5869

-0.08

0.43

3041

-0.07

0.36

2828

-0.08

0.50

***

Board
characteristic
BOARDIND

5869

0.29

0.12

3041

0.25

0.14

2828

0.32

0.08

***

BOARDSIZE

5869

9.74

2.27

3041

9.58

2.29

2828

9.90

2.23

***

LBOARDSIZE

5869

2.25

0.23

3041

2.23

0.24

2828

2.27

0.22

***

BMEETING

5869

7.66

3.24

3041

7.39

3.14

2828

7.95

3.31

***

CC
Firm-level
control

5869

0.48

0.50

3041

0

0

2828

1

0

***

LEV

5869

1.38

6.60

3041

1.45

4.57

2828

1.31

8.24

***

LASSETS

5869

21.30

0.93

3041

21.26

0.90

2828

21.34

0.96

**

STDRET

5869

0.10

0.04

3041

0.10

0.04

2828

0.11

0.04

***

LAGNPROFIT

5869

0.09

0.28

3041

0.09

0.28

2828

0.09

0.28

0

GROWTHO

5869

4.00

5.55

3041

4.07

3.12

2828

3.09

7.28

***

Firm
performance
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Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of compensation committee characteristics,

2001-2006
Panel D: Summary of
characteristics, 2001-2006

CC
CCPAID

compensation

committee

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Yes (numbers)

57

310

474

579

662

746

No (numbers)

707

616

502

461

378

377

Mean

0.70

0.67

0.63

0.62

0.61

0.62

S.D.
Lower quartile

0.46
0

0.47
0

0.48
0

0.49
0

0.49
0

0.49
0

Upper quartile

1

1

1

1

1

1

Sample consists of 5869 firm-years of data during the years 2001-2006.
The average CEO compensation, firm-specific characteristics and firm performance are
compared between CC firms and non-CC firms using Wilcoxon test. Zero denotes no
significant difference.
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1
CEOCOM= the average annual cash compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of
annual cash compensations of three highest-paid executives by three; LCEOCOM= the natural
logarithm of average annual cash compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of
annual cash compensations of three highest-paid executives by three; ROA= net income divided
by the book value of assets; RET= The industry-adjusted annual stock returns, which is
calculated as stock returns minus industry mean stock returns; BOARDIND= The proportion of
independent directors on board; LBOARDSIZE= The natural logarithm of the number of
directors serving on board; BMEETING= The number of board meetings for the current year;
CC= Equal to 1 if compensation committee exists, 0 otherwise; LEV= leverage rate (total
debt/total assets); LASSETS= Natural log of book value of assets; LAGNPROFIT= Dummy
variable, equal to 1 for loss-making firms in previous year and 0 otherwise; STDRET= Standard
deviation of monthly stock returns over the year; GROWTHO= Growth opportunity, calculated
as year-end market to book ratio of assets in the previous year
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Table 3.3 Regression of CEO compensation on its economic determinants and
board variables, firm performance is measured by ROA
Panel A: firm performance is measured by ROA

Dependent variable: ln(total cash
compensation)
Variable

Predicted sign

Model 1

Model 2

ROA

+

0.48 (0.32)

0.61*(0.69)

BOARDIND

?

1.56***(0.07)

0.16(0.11)

LBOARDSIZE

+

0.00(0.05)

BMEETING

+

0.01**(0.00)

ROA*BOARDIND

+

LASSETS
STDRET
LEV
LAGNPROFIT

+
+
?
+

GROWTHO

4.04***(1.00)

2.21**(1.00)
0.25***(0.02)
-0.08(0.23)
-0.00(0.00)
-0.12***(0.03)
0.00***(0.00)

Industry fixed
effects

No

Yes

Year fixed effects

No

Yes

N

5869

5869

R (%)

15

26

Chi squares

792.4

2022.6

2
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Table 3.3 Regression of CEO compensation on its economic determinants and
board variables, firm performance is measured by RET
Panel B: firm performance is measured by RET
Variable

Predicted sign

Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)
Model 1
Model 2

RET

+

-0.17 (0.12)

-0.08(0.08)

BOARDIND

?

1.63***(0.07)

0.27**(0.11)

LBOARDSIZE

+

0.01(0.05)

BMEETING

+

0.01*(0.00)

RET*BOARDIND

+

LASSETS

+

0.29***(0.02)

STDRET

+

-0.34(0.25)

LEV

?

-0.00(0.00)

LAGNPROFIT

-

-0.18***(0.03)

GROWTHO

+

0.00(0.00)

0.66*(0.35)

0.37*(0.22)

Industry fixed effects

No

Yes

Year fixed effects

No

Yes

N

5869

5869

R2(%)

13

24

Chi squares

630.9

1940.8

The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
The coefficients for the year and industry indicator variables are not reported in the tables because they
are not of direct interest for this study. ***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1
Ln(total cash compensation)= the natural logarithm of average annual cash compensation of CEOs,
calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid executives by three;
ROA= net income divided by the book value of assets; RET= The industry-adjusted annual stock returns,
which is calculated as stock returns minus industry mean stock returns; BOARDIND= The proportion of
independent directors on board; LBOARDSIZE= The natural logarithm of the number of directors
serving on board; BMEETING= The number of board meetings for the current year; LEV= leverage rate
(total debt/total assets); LASSETS= Natural log of book value of assets; LAGNPROFIT= Dummy
variable, equal to 1 for loss-making firms in previous year and 0 otherwise; STDRET= Standard deviation
of monthly stock returns over the year; GROWTHO= Growth opportunity, calculated as year-end market
to book ratio of assets in the previous year
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Table 3.4 Regression results of CEO pay-performance for firms with or without
CC
Panel A: firm performance is measured by ROA
Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)
Independent variables

All firms

CC firms

Non-CC firms

ROA

0.61*(0.32)

0.06(0.55)

0.69(0.45)

BOARDIND

0.16(0.11)

0.06 (0.19)

0.28* (0.15)

ROA*BOARDIND

2.21**(1.00)

4.24**(1.66)

0.89(1.44)

Time effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5869

2828

3041

R2(%)

26

21

21

Chi squares

2022.6

728.5

1140.5

Panel B: firm performance is measured by RET
Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)
Independent variables

All firms

CC firms

Non-CC firms

RET

-0.08(0.08)

-0.12(0.10)

0.00(0.13)

BOARDIND

0.27**(0.11)

0.23(0.19)

0.31**(0.15)

RET*BOARDIND

0.37*(0.22)

0.52*(0.27)

0.09(0.36)

Time effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5869

2828

3041

R2(%)

24

19

21

Chi squares

1940.8

708.5

1075.4

The coefficients for the control variables are not reported in the tables because they are
not of direct interest for this study. The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are
presented in parentheses. ***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1
Ln(total cash compensation)= the natural logarithm of average annual cash compensation of CEOs,
calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid executives by three;
ROA= net income divided by the book value of assets; RET= The industry-adjusted annual stock returns,
which is calculated as stock returns minus industry mean stock returns; BOARDIND= The proportion of
independent directors on board
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Table 3.5 Results of compensation committees and CEO pay-performance
regressions for only CC firms subsample
BOARDIND
Variable

Full sample

<33%

=33%

ROA

2.70***

2.28***

2.73***

(0.33)

(0.81)

(0.38)

-0.06*

0.07

-0.09**

(0.03)

(0.07)

(0.04)

-1.12***

-0.89

-1.01**

(0.38)

(0.83)

(0.45)

Time effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

2316

503

1813

R2(%)

27

31

25

CCPAID

ROA*CCPAID

The coefficients for the control variables are not reported in the tables because they are
not of direct interest for this study.
The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1
Ln(total cash compensation)= the natural logarithm of average annual cash compensation of
CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid
executives by three; ROA= net income divided by the book value of assets; BOARDIND= The
proportion of independent directors on board; CCPAID=Equal to one if at least one member on
the compensation committee gets paid from the firm they serve and zero otherwise.
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Table 3.6 Results of compensation committees, board independence and CEO payperformance regressions
Variable

Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)

ROA

0.78***

0.85***

(0.22)

(0.23)

BOARDIND

0.13
(0.13)

CC

0.08***

0.08***

(0.03)

(0.03)

ROA*CC

0.56*
(0.29)

ROA*BOARDIND*CC

2.02**
(0.86)

Time effects

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Observations

5869

5869

R2(%)

27

27

Chi squares

1038.0

1070.0

The coefficients for the control variables are not reported in the tables because they are
not of direct interest for this study.
The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1
Ln(total cash compensation)= the natural logarithm of average annual cash compensation of
CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid
executives by three; ROA= net income divided by the book value of assets; BOARDIND= The
proportion of independent directors on board; CC= Equal to 1 if compensation committee exists,
0 otherwise.
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Table 3.7 Relationship between board independence and executive payperformance before and after compensation committee formation
Panel A: Regression of the natural log of executive compensation on ROA-1 and BOARDIND
Test period
Model:

LCEOCOM    1 ROA1   2 BOARDIND
  3 BOARDIND * ROA1  u

Number
observations

of

1

3

Adjusted R F-test
square

All periods

1398

.95**(0.44)

5.16***(1.20)

0.31

32.83

Period before

266

-.38(0.89)

1.52(1.49)

0.30

6.77

Periods after

503

.40(0.71)

5.33***(1.74)

0.23

8.45

Panel B: Regression of the natural log of executive compensation on ROA-1 and BOARDIND and
an indicator variable denoting periods after compensation committee formation

LCEOCOM    1 ROA1   2 BOARDIND
Model:   3 BOARDIND * ROA1   4 ROA1 * Post

  5 BOARDIND * ROA1 * Post  u

Before versus after

Number of
observations

1

3

4

769

.99(0.72)

3.95**(1.58)

-2.34*(1.20)

5

Adjust
ed R
square

6.49*(3.51)

0.31

Ftest

16.10

Standard errors are in parentheses because the  value of White (1980) test is greater
than 0.05, suggesting the models I used have little Heteroskedasticity issues.
The coefficients for the control variables are not reported in the tables because they are
not of direct interest for this study.
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1
LCEOCOM= the natural logarithm of average annual cash compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing
the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid executives by three; ROA-1= net income
divided by the book value of assets for the previous year; BOARDIND= The proportion of independent
directors on board; Post=

equals to 1 if it is in the time periods after the committee

formation, and equals zero otherwise.
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Table 3.8 Results of compensation committees, board independence and CEO payperformance regressions for state-controlled and non state-controlled sub-samples
Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)
Variable

Full sample

State-controlled

Non state-controlled

ROA

0.78***

0.88***

0.34

(0.22)

(0.26)

(0.41)

0.13

0.09

0.15

(0.13)

(0.15)

(0.24)

0.08***

0.05

0.09

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.07)

2.02**

3.34***

0.51

(0.86)

(1.00)

(1.56)

Time effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

5869

4398

1471

R2(%)

27

33

24

Chi squares

1038.0

163.1

7849.7

BOARDIND

CC

ROA*BOARDIND*CC

The coefficients for the control variables are not reported in the tables because they are
not of direct interest for this study.
The Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1
Ln(total cash compensation)= the natural logarithm of average annual cash compensation of
CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid
executives by three; ROA= net income divided by the book value of assets; BOARDIND= The
proportion of independent directors on board; CC= Equal to 1 if compensation committee

exists, 0 otherwise.
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Table 3.9 3SLS regressions, CEO compensation and firm performance.
CEO compensation, ROA, BOARDIND and ROA*BOARDIND are all considered endogenous variables.
All other variables are exogenous. I use the basic model specification from Table 3.3 column 4, for the
CEO compensation. Industrial dummies and year dummies are omitted for brevity. ***:P<0.01,
**:P<0.05, *: P<0.1
Dependent variable: ln(total cash compensation)
Variable
6.56
ROA
(24.86)
19.53**
BOARDIND
(9.14)
1.84**
LBOARDSIZE
(0.75)
0.05***
BMEETING
(0.02)
1.82
ROA*BOARDIND
(74.38)
0.04
LASSETS
(0.11)
-1.06
STDRET
(1.33)
0.00
LEV
(0.00)
0.41
LAGNPROFIT
(0.38)
GROWTHO

0.02

(0.01)
Ln(total cash compensation)= the natural logarithm of average annual cash compensation of CEOs, calculated by
dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid executives by three; ROA= net income divided
by the book value of assets; BOARDIND= The proportion of independent directors on board; LBOARDSIZE= The
natural logarithm of the number of directors serving on board; BMEETING= The number of board meetings for the
current year; LEV= leverage rate (total debt/total assets); LASSETS= Natural log of book value of assets;
LAGNPROFIT= Dummy variable, equal to 1 for loss-making firms in previous year and 0 otherwise; STDRET=
Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the year; GROWTHO= Growth opportunity, calculated as year-end
market to book ratio of assets in the previous year
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Table 4.1 Definitions of variables
This table provides variable definitions used in the empirical analysis
Variable

Definition
Firm performance

ROA

The average roa, which is calculated as EBIT divided by the
book value of assets of the current year

LCEOCOM

The natural logarithm of average annual cash compensation
of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash
compensations of three highest-paid executives by three

BOARDIND

Proportion of independent directors on board

LBOARDSIZE

Natural log of the total number of directors serving on the
board

CEO compensation

Board characteristics

Ownership structure
INDIV

Proportion of shares owned by individual stockholders

TOP

The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder

STATESHARE

The percentage of shares held by the state
Firm-level control variables

LASSETS

Natural log of the book value of assets

LEV

Leverage rate (total debt/total assets)

STDRET

Standard deviation of stock returns over the year

BIG10

Equal to 1 if financial statements are audited by Big 10
accounting firms, 0 otherwise

INDUSTRY

Dummy variables, 6 industries following Chen et al.
(2006)
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics
Panel A: INDIV
Year

No.

Mean

S.D.

Minimum

Maximum

2000

204

0.378

0.112

0.150

0.730

2001

598

0.401

0.127

0.136

1

2002

729

0.398

0.125

0.136

1

2003

758

0.399

0.122

0.087

1

2004

834

0.400

0.122

0.087

1

2005

802

0.421

0.l29

0.150

1

2006

894

0.500

0.129

0.109

1

2007

882

0.571

0.150

0.068

1

Panel B: STATESHARE
Year

No.

Mean

S.D.

Minimum

Maximum

STATESHARE

2000

204

0.357

0.263

0

0.850

2001

598

0.337

0.261

0

0.850

2002

729

0.339

0.265

0

0.850

2003

758

0.346

0.266

0

0.850

2004

834

0.348

0.266

0

0.850

2005

802

0.342

0.262

0

0.850

2006

894

0.286

0.234

0

0.821

2007

882

0.267

0.222

0

0.821

Year

No.

Mean

S.D.

Minimum

Maximum

2001

598

0.464

0.175

0.11

0.85

2002

729

0.446

0.176

0.03

0.85

2003

758

0.443

0.173

0.07

0.85

2004

834

0.440

0.170

0.06

0.85

2005

802

0.424

0.162

0.06

0.85

2006

894

0.368

0.147

0.05

0.82

2007

882

0.363

0.149

0.05

0.84

INDIV

Panel C: TOP
TOP

INDIV=Proportion of shares owned by individual stockholders; STATESHARE= The
percentage of shares held by the state; TOP= The percentage of shares held by the
largest shareholder
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Table 4.2 Spearman correlations among variables
Panel D: Spearman correlations among variables
Variable

LCEOCOM

BOARDIND

LBOARDSIZE

INDIV

TOP

LCEOCOM

1.0000

BOARDIND

0.3600

1.0000

LBOARDSIZE

0.0548

-0.0933

1.0000

INDIV

0.1799

0.1990

-0.0575

1.0000

TOP

-0.1268

-0.1039

-0.0036

1.0000

STATESHARE

-0.0725

-0.0573

0.0673

LASSETS

0.3605

0.1530

0.1766

0.5355
0.3563
0.0837

STDRET

0.1650

0.2137

-0.0522

BIG10

0.1866

0.0488

LEV

0.1341

0.1433

STATESHARE

LASSETS

STDRET

BIG10

0.5150

1.0000

0.1625

0.1399

1.0000

0.1870

-0.1280

-0.0641

0.0122

1.0000

0.0706

0.0277

0.0493

0.0458

0.1759

0.0279

1.0000

0.0504

0.0931

-0.1427

-0.0462

0.2882

0.1182

0.0217

LEV

1.0000

Summary of statistics for the sample firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchange during the years 2000-2007.
LCEOCOM= the natural logarithm of average annual cash compensation of CEOs, calculated
by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid executives by three;
BOARDIND= Proportion of independent directors on board; LBOARDSIZE= Natural log of
the total number of directors serving on the board; INDIV= Proportion of shares owned by
individual stockholders; TOP= The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder;
STATESHARE= The percentage of shares held by the state; LASSETS= Natural log of the
book value of assets; STDRET= Standard deviation of stock returns over the year; BIG10=
equal to 1 if financial statements are audited by Big 10 accounting firms, 0 otherwise; LEV=
leverage rate (total debt/total assets)
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics on accruals and average performance

Panel E: Descriptive statistics on accruals and average performance
Variable
Mean
Median Standard
deviation

25th
percentile

75th
Percentile

ary _ accruals
%DA  DiscretionAssets

0.0073

0.0026

0.0837

-0.0310

0.0412

Abs(%DA)

0.0541

0.0356

0.0643

0.0158

0.0696

Reported:
ROA=operating income/assets

0.0508

0.0392

0.0457

0.0194

0.0669

True:
operating income/assets-%DA

0.0435

0.0394

0.0911

-0.0008

0.0882

Reported:
ROA=operating income/assets

0

0.04202

0.0450

-0.0302

-0.0163

True:
operating income/assets-%DA

0

0.05498

0.0906

-0.0453

0.0445

Performance measures

Industry-adjusted performance

Financial statement data are obtained from CSMAR database for each year, 2000-2007.
Following Chen et al. (2006), for each firm, I identify 6 industries. Industry-adjusted
performance is the firm’s operating income in any year minus the average industry
value for that year. I measure firm performance alternatively as reported ROA,
operating income/Assets, or performance adjusted for discretionary accruals as true firm
performance, operating income/Assets-%DA. Normal discretionary accruals are
computed as Eq. (2). %DA (percentage discretionary accruals) are residuals between
accrual accruals and normal accruals as a fraction of assets defined by the modified
Jones model.
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics on board characteristics and ownership variables
Panel F: Descriptive statistics on board characteristics and ownership variables
Variable
Mean
Median Standard
25th percentile
deviation
CEO compensation
LCEOCOM(Natural log
of CEO compensation)

75th Percentile

11.88

11.92

0.90

11.29

12.52

BOARDIND(Proportion
of independent directors
on board)

0.29

0.33

0.12

0.27

0.33

BOARDSIZE

9.68

9

2.21

9

11

LBOARDSIZE(Natural
log of board size)

2.24

2.20

0.23

2.20

2.40

INV

0.44

0.41

0.14

0.34

0.53

TOP

0.42

0.4

0.17

0.28

0.55

STATESHARE

0.32

0.35

0.26

0

0.54

LASSETS(Natural log
of assets )

21.40

21.32

0.93

20.75

21.95

LEV

1.24

0.99

1.07

0.57

1.61

STDRET

0.11

0.10

0.06

0.08

0.12

BIG10

0.26

0

0.44

0

1

Board characteristics

Ownership structure

Firm-level control
variables

Variables are as defined in table 4.1. Data on CEO compensation, board characteristics
and ownership structure for the period 2000-2007 are obtained from the CSMAR
database. I use CCER database for each year 2000-2007 to obtain data on firm level
control variables. I winsorize the extreme observations of each variable at 1%.
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Table 4.3 Regression analysis of CEO compensation, ownership structure and
board characteristics
Discretionary accruals computed by performance-matched modified Jones model over 2000-2007. The dependent
variable is discretionary accruals divided by assets, computed by Eq. 2.

Variable

Fixed effects results
Full sample
0.0005
(0.0027)

State-controlled
0.002(0.003)

Non
State-controlled
-0.006(0.007)

BOARDIND(Proportion of
independent directors on board)

-0.0320**
(0.0131)

-0.029**(0.015)

-0.080**(0.037)

LBOARDSIZE

-0.0111
(0.0088)

-0.017*(0.010)

-0.009(0.022)

INDIV

-0.0300*
(0.0174)

-0.041*(0.022)

-0.014(0.034)

TOP

0.1535**
(0.0670)

0.129(0.080)

0.130(0.175)

TOP2

-0.1391*
(0.0712)

-0.140*(0.081)

0.063(0.206)

STATESHARE

0.0261***
(0.0091)

0.027***(0.010)

0.043*(0.024)

LASSETS

0.0378***
(0.0047)

0.042***(0.006)

0.041***(0.011)

LEV

-0.0126***
(0.0023)

-0.018***(0.003)

-0.003(0.005)

STDRET

0.0406*
(0.0228)

0.012(0.027)

0.067(0.046)

BIG10

0.0086
(0.0056)

0.009(0.006)

0.011(0.016)

Adjusted R-squared

0.025

0.03

0.04

LCEOCOM(CEO compensation)

***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed below coefficient estimates. LCEOCOM= the natural logarithm of
average annual cash compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid
executives by three; BOARDIND= Proportion of independent directors on board; LBOARDSIZE= Natural log of the total number
of directors serving on the board; INDIV= Proportion of shares owned by individual stockholders; TOP= The percentage of shares
held by the largest shareholder; STATESHARE= The percentage of shares held by the state; LASSETS= Natural log of the book
value of assets; STDRET= Standard deviation of stock returns over the year; BIG10= equal to 1 if financial statements are audited
by Big 10 accounting firms, 0 otherwise; LEV= leverage rate (total debt/total assets)
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Table 4.4 Determinants of reported performance (ROA) and true firm
performance
In the second column, the dependent variable is ROA (operating income/assets) for firm j in year t. In the
third column, the dependent variable is true performance (operating income/assets-%DA) for firm j in
year t. The sample period is 2000-2007

Variable

Dependent
variable=operating
income/assets
0.0112***
(0.0010)

Dependent
variable=(operating
income/assets)-%DA
0.0107***
(0.0028)

BOARDIND(Proportion of
independent directors on board)

-0.0173***
(0.0048)

0.0147
(0.0135)

LBOARDSIZE

0.0009
(0.0033)

0.0120
(0.0091)

INDIV

0.0112*
(0.0064)

0.0412**
(0.0179)

TOP

0.0321
(0.0248)

-0.1214*
(0.0692)

TOP2

-0.0037
(0.0263)

0.1355*
(0.0735)

STATESHARE

0.0002
(0.0034)

-0.0260***
(0.0094)

LASSETS

-0.0046***
(0.0017)

-0.0424***
(0.0049)

LEV

-0.0089***
(0.0009)

0.0037
(0.0024)

STDRET

0.0735***
(0.0084)

0.0329
(0.0235)

BIG10

0.0012
(0.0021)

-0.0074
(0.0058)

Adjusted R-squared

0.081

0.023

LCEOCOM(CEO compensation)

***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed below coefficient estimates. LCEOCOM= the natural logarithm of
average annual cash compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid
executives by three; BOARDIND= Proportion of independent directors on board; LBOARDSIZE= Natural log of the total number
of directors serving on the board; INDIV= Proportion of shares owned by individual stockholders; TOP= The percentage of shares
held by the largest shareholder; STATESHARE= The percentage of shares held by the state; LASSETS= Natural log of the book
value of assets; STDRET= Standard deviation of stock returns over the year; BIG10= equal to 1 if financial statements are audited
by Big 10 accounting firms, 0 otherwise; LEV= leverage rate (total debt/total assets)
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Table 4.5 Determinants of reported performance (ROA) and true performance,
high and low performance (ROA) subsets (2000-2007)
Low performance subset
(Lower half)
Variable

High performance subset
(Upper half)

Dependent
variable=operating
income/assets
0.0031***
(0.0005)

Dependent
variable=(operating
income/assets)-%DA
0.0094**
(0.0042)

Dependent
variable=operating
income/assets
0.0117***
(0.0017)

Dependent
variable=(operating
income/assets)-%DA
0.0123***
(0.0045)

BOARDIND(Proportion of
independent directors on
board)

-0.0094***
(0.0023)

0.0041
(0.0190)

0.0090
(0.0083)

0.0519**
(0.0226)

LBOARDSIZE

0.0011
(0.0015)

0.0238*
(0.0127)

0.0048
(0.0057)

0.0240
(0.0154)

INDIV

0.0030
(0.0032)

0.0444*
(0.0270)

0.0197*
(0.0108)

0.0775***
(0.0294)

TOP

0.0168
(0.0122)

-0.0782
(0.1013)

0.0012
(0.0423)

-0.2479**
(0.1151)

TOP2

-0.0129
(0.0133)

0.0569
(0.1103)

0.0026
(0.0434)

0.2630**
(0.1181)

STATESHARE

-0.0010
(0.0017)

0.0015
(0.0145)

-0.0007
(0.0053)

-0.0362**
(0.0145)

LASSETS

-0.0038***
(0.0011)

-0.0407***
(0.0087)

-0.0142***
(0.0029)

-0.0680***
(0.0078)

LEV

-0.0006
(0.0004)

0.0054*
(0.0033)

-0.100***
(0.0017)

0.0157***
(0.0047)

STDRET

-0.0038
(0.0040)

-0.0165
(0.0332)

0.1141***
(0.0152)

0.1187**
(0.0414)

BIG10

0.0022**
(0.0009)

-0.0116
(0.0082)

0.0003
(0.0034)

-0.0119
(0.0093)

No.

2851

2851

2850

2850

Adjusted R-squared

0.04

0.02

0.10

0.05

LCEOCOM(CEO
compensation)

***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed below coefficient estimates. LCEOCOM= the natural logarithm of
average annual cash compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid
executives by three; BOARDIND= Proportion of independent directors on board; LBOARDSIZE= Natural log of the total number
of directors serving on the board; INDIV= Proportion of shares owned by individual stockholders; TOP= The percentage of shares
held by the largest shareholder; STATESHARE= The percentage of shares held by the state; LASSETS= Natural log of the book
value of assets; STDRET= Standard deviation of stock returns over the year; BIG10= equal to 1 if financial statements are audited
by Big 10 accounting firms, 0 otherwise; LEV= leverage rate (total debt/total assets).
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Table 4.6 Determinants of reported performance (ROA) and true performance,
time periods after the commence of non-tradable shares reform (2005-2007)
Variable

Dependent
variable=operating
income/assets
0.0124***
(0.0022)

Dependent
variable=(operating
income/assets)-%DA
0.0215**
(0.0065)

BOARDIND(Proportion of
independent directors on board)

0.0019
(0.0284)

0.0810
(0.0844)

LBOARDSIZE

-0.0143*
(0.0085)

-0.0169
(0.0252)

INDIV

0.0472***
(0.0089)

0.0465*
(0.0265)

TOP

0.0600
(0.0441)

-0.3338**
(0.1313)

TOP2

-0.0333
(0.0472)

0.3521**
(0.1403)

STATESHARE

-0.0075
(0.0053)

-0.0344**
(0.0158)

LASSETS

-0.0073**
(0.0030)

-0.0605***
(0.0089)

LEV

-0.0086***
(0.0014)

0.0051
(0.0042)

STDRET

0.0732***
(0.0113)

0.0199
(0.0337)

BIG10

0.0008
(0.0037)

0.0010
(0.0110)

No.

2578

2578

Adjusted R-squared

0.13

0.04

LCEOCOM(CEO compensation)

***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed below coefficient estimates. LCEOCOM= the natural logarithm of
average annual cash compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid
executives by three; BOARDIND= Proportion of independent directors on board; LBOARDSIZE= Natural log of the total number
of directors serving on the board; INDIV= Proportion of shares owned by individual stockholders; TOP= The percentage of shares
held by the largest shareholder; STATESHARE= The percentage of shares held by the state; LASSETS= Natural log of the book
value of assets; STDRET= Standard deviation of stock returns over the year; BIG10= equal to 1 if financial statements are audited
by Big 10 accounting firms, 0 otherwise; LEV= leverage rate (total debt/total assets)
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Table 4.7 Determinants of reported performance (ROA) and true performance for
state-controlled sub-samples (2000-2007)

Variable

Dependent variable=operating
income/assets

Dependent variable=(operating
income/assets)-%DA

State-controlled

State-controlled

Non
State-controlled

Non
State-controlled

LCEOCOM(CEO
compensation)

0.011***(0.001)

0.009***(0.002)

0.009***(0.003)

0.015**(0.007)

BOARDIND(Proportion
of independent directors
on board)

-0.014**(0.006)

-0.031***(0.012)

0.015(0.015)

0.049(0.037)

LBOARDSIZE

0.000(0.004)

-0.007(0.007)

0.018(0.010)*

0.002(0.022)

INDIV

0.003(0.008)

0.017(0.011)

0.043*(0.023)

0.031(0.034)

TOP

-0.011(0.030)

0.118**(0.056)

-.140*(0.083)

-0.012(0.177)

TOP2

0.022(0.031)

-0.049(0.066)

0.162*(0.084)

-0.111(0.289)

STATESHARE

0.009**(0.004)

-0.017**(0.008)

-0.018(0.011)

-0.060**(0.024)

LASSETS

-0.004**(0.002)

-0.009**(0.004)

0.046***(0.006)

-0.050***(0.011)

LEV

-0.009***(0.001)

-0.009(0.002)

0.009***(0.003)

-0.007(0.005)

STDRET

0.060***(0.010)

0.109***(0.015)

0.048*(0.029)

0.042(0.047)

BIG10

0.002(0.002)

-0.005(0.005)

-0.007(0.006)

-0.016(0.016)

No.

4242

1409

4242

1409

Adjusted R-squared

0.07

0.15

0.02

0.04

***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed below coefficient estimates. LCEOCOM= the natural logarithm of
average annual cash compensation of CEOs, calculated by dividing the sum of annual cash compensations of three highest-paid
executives by three; BOARDIND= Proportion of independent directors on board; LBOARDSIZE= Natural log of the total number
of directors serving on the board; INDIV= Proportion of shares owned by individual stockholders; TOP= The percentage of shares
held by the largest shareholder; STATESHARE= The percentage of shares held by the state; LASSETS= Natural log of the book
value of assets; STDRET= Standard deviation of stock returns over the year; BIG10= equal to 1 if financial statements are audited
by Big 10 accounting firms, 0 otherwise; LEV= leverage rate (total debt/total assets)
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Figure 2.1 Xiamen Haoshiguang Co. example.
Source: Data obtained from company prospectuses. The arrow indicates the direction of control.
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